Freemore v. Smith
Decision Date | 02 December 2019 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-1465 |
Parties | SHAWN FREEMORE, Petitioner v. BARRY SMITH, Superintendent Respondent |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(JUDGE MANNION)
Petitioner, Shawn Freemore, an inmate confined in the State Correctional Institution, Houtzdale, Pennsylvania, filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. He attacks a 2011 conviction imposed by the Court of Common Pleas for Monroe County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). Following careful consideration of the parties' submissions, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss the petition as untimely. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d).
The procedural background of this case has been extracted from the Pennsylvania Superior Court's August 3, 2018 Memorandum Opinion, affirming the PCRA Court's dismissal of Petitioner's second PCRA as untimely. (See Doc. 15 at 1-4).
Id. By Memorandum Opinion dated August 3, 2018, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of Petitioner's second PCRA petition as follows:
On July 24, 2018, Petitioner filed the above captioned petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he raises seven claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of a fair trial, and that he is subject to an illegal sentence in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 1, petition).
On October 30, 2018, Freemore filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied on April 30, 2019. (Doc. 18 at 11).
Upon consideration of Petitioner's failure to return this Court's Notice of Election, the Court issued a show cause order, requiring Respondent to file a response to the petition, as filed. (Doc. 9, Order).
On March 11, 2019, Respondent filed a response to the petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the petition is untimely. (Doc. 11). A traverse having been filed on May 31, 2019, (Doc. 18), the petition is ripe for disposition.
A state prisoner requesting habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 must adhere to a statute of limitations that provides, in relevant part, as follows:
28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)-(2)(emphasis added); see generally, Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d. 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, under the plain terms of §2244(d)(1)(A), the period of time for filing a habeas corpus petition begins to run when direct review processes are concluded. See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2000). ("[T]he AEDPA provides that upon conclusion of direct review of a judgment of conviction, the one year period within which to file a federal habeas corpus petition commences, but the running of the period is suspended for the period when state post-convictionproceedings are pending in any state court."); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998)(per curiam); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1998). It is not the conclusion of state post-conviction collateral review processes that starts the running of the limitations period. See Bunnell v. Yukins, No. 00-CV-73313, 2001 WL 278259, *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb 14, 2001)("Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the limitations period did not begin to run anew after the completion of his post-conviction proceedings.").
As indicated above, section 2244(d)(2) operates to exclude only the time within which a "properly filed application" for post conviction relief is pending in state court. Thus, when a petition or appeal has concluded and is no longer pending, the one (1) year statute of limitations starts to run and the time is counted. A "properly filed application" for post conviction relief under §2244(d)(2) is one submitted according to the state's procedural requirements, such as rules governing time and place of filing. Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148 (3d Cir. 1998). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has defined "pending" as the time during which a petitioner may seek discretionary state court review, whether or not such review is sought. Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2000). "Pending," however, does not include the period during which a state prisoner may file a petition for writ of certiorariin the United States Supreme Court from the denial of his state post-conviction petition. Stokes v. District Attorney of the County of Philadelphia, No. 99-1493, 2001 WL 387516, at *2 (3d Cir., April 17, 2001). Likewise, the statute of limitations is not tolled under §2244(d)(2) for the time during which a habeas petition is pending in federal court. Jones, 195 F.3d at 158.
The AEDPA statute of limitations also may be subject to equitable tolling. The Third Circuit has held that the federal habeas statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling only in extraordinary circumstances. See Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 2003). In Merritt, the Court of Appeals set forth two general requirements for equitable tolling: "(1) that the petitioner has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her rights; and (2) that the petitioner has shown that he or she exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing the claim." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur on Petitioner's direct appeal on September 2, 2014. Thus, his conviction became final on December 1,...
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