Freemore v. Smith, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-1465
Decision Date | 13 February 2020 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-1465 |
Parties | SHAWN FREEMORE, Petitioner v. BARRY SMITH, Superintendent Respondent |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(JUDGE MANNION)
Petitioner, Shawn Freemore, an inmate confined in the State Correctional Institution, Houtzdale, Pennsylvania, filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. He attacks a 2011 conviction imposed by the Court of Common Pleas for Monroe County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). By Memorandum and Order dated December 2, 2019, Freemore's petition was dismissed as untimely. (Doc. 25, 26). Presently before the Court is Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of this Court's December 2, 2019 Memorandum and Order. (Doc. 27). For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner's motion for reconsideration will be denied.
II. DISCUSSION
A motion for reconsideration is a device of limited utility. It may be used only to seek remediation for manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence which, if discovered previously, might have affected the court's decision. Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986). Accordingly, a party seeking reconsideration must demonstrate at least one of the following grounds prior to the court altering, or amending, a standing judgment: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. Max's Seafood Café v. Quineros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)(citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). A motion for reconsideration is appropriate in instances where the court has "...misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning, but of apprehension." See Rohrbach v. AT & T Nassau Metals Corp., 902 F. Supp. 523, 527 (M.D. Pa. 1995), vacated in part on other grounds on reconsideration, 915 F. Supp. 712 (M.D. Pa. 1996), quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983). It may not be used as a means to reargue unsuccessful theories, or argue new facts or issues that were not presented to the court in the context of the matter previously decided. Drysdale v. Woerth, 153 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (E.D. Pa. 2001). "Because federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments, motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly." Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus. Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
A review of the Court's December 2, 2019, Memorandum and Order reveals the following with respect to this Court's decision to dismiss the instant Petition for writ of habeas corpus as untimely:
Relying on the state court's dismissal of Freemore's PCRA petition as untimely, we are bound by the Pennsylvania Superior and Supreme Court's ruling that the PCRA petition as not properly filed as a matter of state law. Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 243 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, Horn v. Fahy, 534 U.S. 944 (2001). As such, Petitioner's second PCRA petition does not toll the statute of limitations. SeeLong v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 2004) ( ). Case law is clear that an untimely PCRA petition is not "properly filed" and, therefore, does not toll the statute of limitations. SeePace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (). SeealsoMerritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d at 167-68. Consequently, the AEDPA statute of limitations is not subject to statutory tolling.
Petitioner claims that "because the PGRA court did not deny the PCRA as untimely, but denied on the merit, then the Second PCRA must be viewed as "properly filed" for purposes of AEDPA and calculations." (Doc. 27 at 2). In support of this proposition, Freemore relies on the holding in Smith v. Battaglia, 415 F.3d 649, 652-653 (7th Cir. 2004), where the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found the following:
"[the] court applies Harris presumption to determine that there was not clear and express statement that State motion was untimely; as a result, the State motion was properly filed and the Federal petition was timely" (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255).
(Doc. 27 at 2).
The Court finds Petitioner's motion for reconsideration to be without merit.
Petitioner's initial argument in his second PCRA petition is that "Petitioner meets the requirements for exception to the time requirement as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §9545." (Doc. 11 at 7). In support of his argument, Petitioner relied on Commonwealth v. Batts, Pa., 163 A.3d 410 (2017), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016) to invoke the "new constitutional right" exception. Id.
By Notice of Disposition Without Hearing, the PCRA Court informed Freemore of its intent to dismiss his PCRA petition for the following reasons:
(See Doc. 11-8 at 22). The PCRA Court afforded Freemore an opportunity to respond the notice of dismissal. Id. By Order dated October 12, 2017, the PCRA Court found that "after consideration of the Defendant's second PCRA Petition and his "Response to the Court's 'notice of disposition without hearing" filed September 13, 2016, the Defendant's PCRA Petition is DISMISSED." (Doc. 11-8 at 18). Thus, without explicitly stating that Petitioner's PCRA petition was dismissed as untimely, the PCRA Court found that the cases Petitioner was relying on to overcome the timeliness of his petition did not apply to Petitioner, and Petitioner was not to be afforded the benefit of an exception to the timeliness requirement.
By Memorandum Opinion dated August 3, 2018, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of Petitioner's second PCRA petition as follows:
Id. On October 30, 2018,...
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