Freidenbloom v. Pecos Valley Lumber Co.
| Decision Date | 06 August 1930 |
| Docket Number | 3446. |
| Parties | FREIDENBLOOM v. PECOS VALLEY LUMBER CO. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Sept. 5, 1930.
Syllabus by the Court.
Conditional vendee in possession, purchasing material for improvement of property, held "owner" within mechanic's lien statute; materialman who sells material to conditional vendee in possession held "original contractor" within mechanic's lien statute (Comp. St. 1929, § 82--206).
Under Comp. St. 1929, § 82--206, a materialman who sells material to a conditional vendee in possession, is dealing with the "owner" and is an "original contractor" within the meaning of the statute.
Trial court's findings supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed on appeal.
Findings supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed.
Appeal from District Court, Lincoln County; Frenger, Judge.
Suit by one Bailey against one Riddle, wherein John A. Freidenbloom and the Pecos Valley Lumber Company separately intervened. From the judgment rendered, intervener John A. Freidenbloom appeals.
Affirmed and cause remanded.
W. C Whatley, of Las Cruces, for appellant.
A. H Hudspeth, of Carrizozo, and Tomlinson Fort, of Roswell, for appellee.
Bailey sued Riddle on an account and attached a lot upon which Riddle had previously erected a filling station while he was in possession under an executory contract of purchase. John A. Freidenbloom intervened, claiming to be the owner of the land and improvements, and resisted the attachment. Pecos Valley Lumber Company also intervened, claiming a materialman's lien on the filling station and lot for lumber and other building material which it alleged Riddle bought from it and used in erecting the improvements. Freidenbloom resisted the lien; Riddle defaulted and trial was had as between Freidenbloom, the owner of the property and the lumber company as lien claimant. From a judgment in favor of the latter, foreclosing the lien, Freidenbloom appeals.
1. Appellant challenges the correctness of the trial court's ruling that the Pecos Valley Lumber Company was "an original contractor" within the meaning of Comp. St 1929, § 82--206, and as such had 120 days after the completion of its contract within which to file its claim of lien. He argues that, since we have held in Gray v. Pumice Stone Company, 15 N.M. 478, 110 P. 603, that one who deals directly with the owner of the property is an original contractor, and since Riddle was not the owner of the legal title to the lot when he contracted for the material to build the filling station, but was simply a conditional vendee in possession, the Pecos Valley Lumber Company, when it furnished material, did not deal with the "owner," and was therefore not an original contractor. The argument is not sound. In the Gray Case we...
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