Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick
Court | United States Supreme Court |
Citation | 115 S.Ct. 1483,131 L.Ed.2d 385,514 U.S. 280 |
Docket Number | 94286 |
Parties | FREIGHTLINER CORPORATION, et al., Petitioners v. Ben MYRICK, et ux., et al |
Decision Date | 18 April 1995 |
In separate state common-law suits, respondents alleged that the absence of an antilock braking system (ABS) in tractor-trailers manufactured by petitioners constituted a negligent design defect that caused accidents injuring one respondent and killing another's spouse. The District Court granted summary judgments for petitioners, holding that respondents' claims were pre-empted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act) and by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's Standard 121, even though the applicable portion of that standard had previously been suspended by the Ninth Circuit. Among other things, the Act forbids any State to "establish, or continue in effect," a motor vehicle safety standard "[w]henever a Federal . . . standard . . . is in effect" with respect to "the same aspect of performance," 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d), while Standard 121 imposed vehicle stability requirements and truck stopping distances shorter than those that could be achieved with brakes lacking ABS. The Eleventh Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed, holding that respondents' claims were not expressly pre-empted under Circuit precedent and were not impliedly pre-empted due to a conflict between state law and the federal regulatory scheme.
Held:
1. Respondents' lawsuits are not expressly pre-empted. Because of Standard 121's suspension, there is simply no "minimum," § 1391(2), "objective," § 1392(a), federal standard addressing stopping distances or vehicle stability for trucks. States thus remain free to "establish, or continue in effect," their own safety standards concerning those "aspects of performance." § 1392(d). Moreover, the absence of regulation cannot itself constitute regulation in this instance. The lack of a federal standard did not result from an affirmative decision of officials to refrain from regulating brakes, but from the decision of a federal court that the Government had not compiled sufficient evidence to justify its regulations. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 178, 98 S.Ct. 988, 1004, 55 L.Ed.2d 179, distinguished. Pp. __.
2. Because respondents' common-law actions do not conflict with federal law, they cannot be pre-empted by implication. This Court has found implied conflict pre-emption where it is "impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements," English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275, 110 L.Ed.2d 65, or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of [Congress'] full purposes and objectives," Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581. Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2632, 120 L.Ed.2d 407, distinguished. First, it is not impossible for petitioners to comply with both federal and state law because there is simply no federal standard for a private party to comply with. Nothing in the Act or its regulations currently regulates the use of ABS devices. Second, a finding of liability against petitioners would undermine no federal objectives or purposes with respect to such devices, since none exist absent a promulgated federal standard. Pp. __.
13 F.3d 1516 (CA 11 1994), affirmed.
Charles Fried, for petitioners.
Michael H. Gottesman, for respondents.
Paul R.Q. Wolfson, for the U.S., as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court.
By statute, the Secretary of Transportation has the authority to issue appropriate safety standards for motor vehicles and their equipment. Respondents filed lawsuits under state common law alleging negligent design defects in equipment manufactured by petitioners. Petitioners claim that these actions are pre-empted by a federal safety standard, even though the standard was suspended by a federal court. We hold that the absence of a federal standard cannot implicitly extinguish state common law.
This case arises from two separate but essentially identical accidents in Georgia involving tractor-trailers. In both cases, 18-wheel tractor-trailers attempted to brake suddenly and ended up jackknifing into oncoming traffic. Neither vehicle was equipped with an antilock braking system (ABS).1 In the first case, respondent Ben Myrick was the driver of an oncoming vehicle that was hit by a tractor-trailer manufactured by petitioner Freightliner. The accident left him permanently paraplegic and brain damaged. In the second case, the driver of an oncoming car, Grace Lindsey, was killed when her vehicle collided with a tractor-trailer manufactured by petitioner Navistar.
Respondents independently sued the manufacturers of the tractor-trailers under state tort law. They alleged that the absence of ABS was a negligent design that rendered the vehicles defective. Petitioners removed the actions to the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia on the basis of diversity of citizenship. They then sought summary judgment on the ground that respondents' claims were pre-empted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act or Act), Pub.L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., and its implementing regulations. In respondent Myrick's case, the District Court held that the claims were pre-empted by federal law and granted summary judgment for petitioner Freightliner. Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 795 F.Supp. 1139 (ND Ga.1992). Following the opinion in the Myrick case, the District Court granted summary judgment in the Lindsey action in favor of petitioner Navistar.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed. Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 13 F.3d 1516 (1994). It held that under its previous decision in Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (CA11 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065, 110 S.Ct. 1781, 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990), the state-law tort claims were not expressly pre-empted. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' alternative argument that the claims were pre-empted due to a conflict between state law and the federal regulatory scheme. We granted certiorari, 513 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 306, 130 L.Ed.2d 218 (1994). We now affirm.
In 1966, Congress enacted the Safety Act "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents." 15 U.S.C. § 1381. The Act requires the Secretary of Transportation to establish "appropriate Federal motor vehicle safety standards." § 1392(a). The Act defines a safety standard as "a minimum standard for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment performance, which is practicable, which meets the need for motor vehicle safety and which provides objective criteria." § 1391(2).
The Safety Act's express pre-emption clause provides:
The Act also contains a savings clause, which states: "Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law." § 1397(k).
The Secretary has delegated the authority to promulgate safety standards to the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 49 CFR § 1.50(a) (1994). In 1970, the predecessor to NHTSA issued regulations concerning vehicles equipped with air brakes, which are used in trucks and tractor-trailers. Known as Standard 121, this regulation imposed stopping distances and vehicle stability requirements for trucks. See 36 Fed.Reg. 3817 (1971).2 Because these stopping distances were shorter than those that could be achieved with brakes without ABS, several manufacturers notified NHTSA that ABS devices would be required. Some manufacturers asked NHTSA to alter the standard itself because they believed that ABS devices were unreliable and rendered vehicles dangerously unsafe when combined with new, more effective brakes. In 1974, NHTSA responded that Standard 121 was practical and that ABS devices did not cause accidents. See generally Paccar, Inc. v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632, 637-638 (CA9), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862, 99 S.Ct. 184, 58 L.Ed.2d 172 (1978).
Several manufacturers and trade associations then sought review of Standard 121 in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court remanded the case to NHTSA because "a careful review of the extensive record" indicated that "the Standard was neither reasonable nor practicable at the time it was put into effect." 573 F.2d, at 640. The court found that NHTSA had failed to consider the high failure rate of ABS devices placed in actual use, id., at 642, and that "there [was] a strong probability that [ABS] has created a potentially more hazardous highway situation than existed before the Standard became operative," id., at 643. Until NHTSA compiled sufficient evidence to show that ABS would not create the possibility of greater danger, the court concluded, the Standard would remain suspended. Ibid.
After the Ninth Circuit's decision in Paccar, the...
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