French v. Blackburn

• Citation: 428 F. Supp. 1351
• Decision Date: 31 March 1977
• Docket Number: No. C-76-52-WS.,C-76-52-WS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: Roy Kirk FRENCH, III, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. The Honorable A. Eugene BLACKBURN, Clerk of Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District of the State of North Carolina, as representative of a class of defendants similarly situated, Defendant.

428 F. Supp. 1351

Roy Kirk FRENCH, III, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. The Honorable A. Eugene BLACKBURN, Clerk of Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District of the State of North Carolina, as representative of a class of defendants similarly situated, Defendant.

No. C-76-52-WS.

United States District Court, M. D. North Carolina, Winston-Salem Division.

March 31, 1977.

Legal Aid Society of Forsyth County, Winston-Salem, N. C., by Bertram Ervin Brown, II, Winston-Salem, N. C. (Gerald C. Kell, Winston-Salem, N. C., on brief, for plaintiff.

Isaac T. Avery, III, Associate Atty. Gen., N. C. Dept. of Justice, Raleigh, N. C., for defendant.

North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Foundation, Inc. by Norman B. Smith, Greensboro, N. C., and Barry Nakell, Chapel Hill, N. C., as amicus curiae.

Before CRAVEN, Circuit Judge, GORDON, Chief District Judge, and WARD, District Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HIRAM H. WARD, District Judge.

This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief to declare unconstitutional and to permanently enjoin the enforcement of the North Carolina involuntary commitment procedure set forth in Article 5A of Chapter 122 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Since the complaint draws into question the constitutionality of a state statute, a three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. The facts, having been established by the pleadings and stipulations, are without material dispute, and the parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment under Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, Roy Kirk French, III, has been subjected to the proceedings under the statute on two separate occasions. The defendant, A. Eugene Blackburn, is sued in his official capacity as the Clerk of Superior Court for the Twenty-First Judicial District of North Carolina.¹

Proceeding under N.C.G.S. § 122-58.3, the plaintiff's mother, on January 19, 1976, filed a sworn petition which provided the basis for a finding by the assistant clerk of superior court that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the facts alleged in the petition were true and that the plaintiff was probably mentally ill or an inebriate and imminently dangerous to himself or others. The assistant clerk then issued a custody order under N.C.G.S. § 122-58.3(b) and a notice of the hearing for involuntary commitment under N.C.G.S. § 122-58.5.

Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 122-58.4, the plaintiff was, on the same date, taken into custody and transported to Reynolds Health Center, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and there examined by a qualified physician who found him to be mentally ill or an inebriate and imminently dangerous to himself or others and who therefore recommended that he be hospitalized. The plaintiff was confined to the Community Health Center of Reynolds Memorial Hospital from January 19, 1976, to the time of the hearing on January 28, 1976. The hearing resulted in the release of the plaintiff, it being found by the presiding judge that although the plaintiff may have been mentally ill or inebriate, that it had not been shown that he was imminently dangerous to himself or others.²

The foregoing procedures resulted in this sweeping attack on the North Carolina involuntary commitment procedures.³ The plaintiff contends that the procedures violate the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments due to: (1) the failure to provide a probable cause hearing within 48 hours of the initial custody of a respondent in the involuntary commitment proceedings; (2) the type of notice of the hearing which is given to a respondent; (3) the ability of counsel to waive, with the court's consent, the presence of the respondent at the hearing; (4) the failure to require that the respondent be advised of his right against self-incrimination; and (5) the failure to provide for proof beyond a reasonable doubt based upon a recent overt act, threat, or attempt. The plaintiff further argues that his right to equal protection of the laws has been denied since he is not entitled to a jury trial whereas such is available to those persons subjected to lunacy proceedings under N.C.G.S. § 35-2.⁴

We find that this broadside attack on the North Carolina statutory procedures for involuntary commitment is without merit and will, therefore, grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment.⁵

The Court is of the general opinion that the North Carolina General Assembly has enacted an excellent legislative scheme which adequately protects the interests of all who may be involved in an involuntary commitment proceeding. We perceive no reason to hold the statutory provisions unconstitutional. There is no doubt that the liberty interest of a person subjected to such proceedings is great and is an interest which has long been protected and to which the state and this Court are obligated to give great deference. However, we are presented with the concept of "fundamental fairness." It is the opinion of this Court that that concept is fully realized by the statutory procedure involved. There are two humanitarian purposes of the involuntary commitment proceedings. Fundamentally, the state is attempting to temporarily withdraw from society those persons whose mental state is such that their presence may pose a danger to society or to themselves. Secondly, the state is providing treatment to those individuals who may not otherwise have the wisdom or the where-withal to seek it themselves. We are, therefore, examining a hybrid proceeding which although involves a deprivation of liberty, the very purpose of that deprivation is not solely to protect society but also has as a purpose the protection, treatment, and aid of an individual who cannot or will not protect himself.⁶ We find that in balancing these interests, the North Carolina statutes for involuntary commitment strike a fair and equitable balance and do not offend the constitutional standards of due process of the law.

I. Probable Cause Hearing

The plaintiff asserts that a probable cause hearing should be held within forty-eight hours after the respondent in an involuntary commitment proceeding is taken into custody to be examined by a qualified physician. The statutory procedure of N.C. G.S. § 122-58.7 currently provides only for a final hearing on commitment within ten days after his custody unless the respondent is given a continuance which may be for up to five days at a time.

Every court which has addressed this issue has held that due process demands that some sort of a hearing be held within a reasonable time after confinement or custody. These same courts vary as to the time in which such a hearing must take place.⁷ The issue before this Court should not be phrased, nor should it be resolved, in terms of required days, hours, or minutes, but should rather turn on the basis of the interests involved and fundamental fairness. The due process clause does not deal in magic numbers, but fundamental fairness.

We are of the opinion that the provision of N.C.G.S. § 122-58.7 which calls for a hearing within ten days of the respondent's custody is not unconstitutional. During this time period the respondent is receiving treatment, Id., § 122-58.6, which may not only aid his mental health, but which also may be necessary to an adequate and informed hearing on the necessity of his commitment. The nature of the confinement itself is limited to the humanitarian purposes of the proceedings as by the very terms of the statute, custody may not be accomplished in a jail or other penal facility but in an institution where treatment and medication are available. Id., § 122-58.4(a). The ten-day period appears even more reasonable in light of the additional procedural safeguards afforded a respondent, which, among other things, gives the respondent at least two opportunities to be released prior to the hearing based upon medical examinations and the findings of the qualified examining physician.⁸ In light of the fact that the inquiry throughout the proceedings is aimed at the respondent's mental health, this Court is very reluctant to substitute another judgment in lieu of the legislature's deference to qualified medical opinion at these initial stages of the involuntary commitment proceedings.

In addition to these considerations, the Court is very much persuaded by the reasoning of Coll v. Hyland, 411 F.Supp. 905 (D.N.J.1976), which held that a hearing within twenty days was constitutionally permissible. The Cole opinion in turn relies heavily on Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F.Supp. 1265 (D.Conn.1972), aff'd sub nom., Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911, 93 S.Ct. 1556, 36 L.Ed.2d 304 (1973), in which a three-judge court ruled that confinement on the basis of a physician's findings for a period of forty-five days pending a hearing was not unreasonably long and did not constitute a denial of due process. This opinion was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court and is, therefore, binding precedent under Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975). Since the Supreme Court has found that a forty-five day confinement pending a hearing is not unreasonable, we find that the North Carolina ten-day custody period prior to a full adversary hearing does not constitute a denial of due process.

II. Notice

N.C.G.S. § 122-58.5 states:

Upon receipt of a qualified physician's finding . . . the clerk of superior court shall . . . calendar the matter for hearing, and notify the respondent and counsel of the time and place of the hearing. Notice must be given at least 48 hours in advance, unless waived by counsel for the respondent.

Plaintiff contends that the notice provision is constitutionally deficient in that it does not indicate a basis of the detention, does not set forth the standard of proof required at the hearing, does not inform him of a right to a jury trial, and does not indicate the names of the witnesses...