French v. Casto, Civ. A. No. 793.
| Decision Date | 06 April 1956 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 793. |
| Citation | 139 F. Supp. 527 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | Robert S. FRENCH et al., Plaintiffs, v. Alice V. CASTO, Margaret Casto Phillips and John Masters Phillips, Defendants. |
McDaniel Purcell, Huntington, W. Va., for plaintiff.
Taylor Vinson, and Scherr, Meek & Vinson, Huntington, W. Va., for defendants.
This is an action for a declaratory judgment wherein the plaintiffs, heirs at law of Blanche Shaul, deceased, seek to be adjudicated the owners of an undivided one-half interest in the Buckeye Apartments in Huntington, W. Va. Plaintiffs base their claim on two deeds, each dated May 5, 1924. The defendants base their title on the wills of Blanche Shaul and Howard M. Shaul, husband and wife. The other one-half interest in the property is not in dispute, both sides admitting that it belongs to the heirs at law of Howard M. Shaul.
Findings of Fact.
Some time prior to 1924 Howard M. Shaul acquired title to the property in question. Under the West Virginia law in 1924, a man could not convey good title to real estate directly to his wife. In order to provide a home for his wife as long as she should live, Shaul followed the practice in West Virginia under the then existing law and by deed dated May 5, 1924 conveyed the property to a third party, "as Trustee, with full and complete power in said Trustee to convey by proper deed as Trustee, a life estate in and to" the property. The deed was very short and no mention was made of the remainder.
By a second deed, dated the same day, the trustee conveyed to Blanche Shaul, the wife, a life estate in the property as he was authorized to do by the first deed.
The granting clause states that the trustee "does hereby grant and convey * * * a life estate" to Blanche Shaul "being the life estate in the same property conveyed to the said Lace Marcum as Trustee, by H. M. Shaul, and Blanche Shaul, his wife, by deed of even date herewith". Had the deed stopped there, we would have no suit. But for some unknown reason the trustee also undertook to dispose of the remainder. After granting a life estate only the next paragraph provides:
"It is the purpose of this deed to vest the life estate in all that certain property above described, in the said Blanche Shaul, and at her death the remainder to revert back to H. M. Shaul, her husband, if he survive her, and if he does not survive her, then the remainder in said property shall be divided equally between the heirs of the said H. M. Shaul, on the one side, and the heirs at law of the said Blanche Shaul on the other, that is one-half of said remainder to go to the heirs at law of the said H. M. Shaul, and the other one-half of the remainder to the heirs at law of the said Blanche Shaul."
It is around this paragraph in the deed from the trustee to Blanche Shaul that the controversy centers. The plaintiffs are heirs at law of Blanche Shaul and contend that the paragraph quoted above gave them a contingent remainder in one-half of the property. The defendants say that this paragraph attempting to convey the remainder was null and void and of no effect because the trustee had no right to convey the same and no right or interest in the remainder which was then vested in Howard M. Shaul.
On April 2, 1949, Howard M. Shaul died testate, having executed his will on July 22, 1935, which was duly probated in Cabell County, West Virginia. By the terms of his will he left "all the estate of every kind and character, real, personal and mixed, wheresoever situate of which I may die seized and possessed, to belong to her (Blanche Shaul) absolutely".
Blanche Shaul died testate on December 5, 1953, having executed her will on February 4, 1953, which was duly probated in Cabell County, West Virginia. By the terms of her will, after a certain bequest, her estate, real, personal and mixed, was to be divided into two equal parts. One part went to the heirs at law of Howard M. Shaul, her husband, and the other part went to the defendants, Alice V. Casto and Margaret Casto Phillips. Defendants base their title upon these wills. They say that the second deed from the trustee to the wife, Blanche Shaul, granted only a life estate because the trustee had no greater estate to grant, and that his attempt to convey the remainder was null and void and of no effect as to such remainder; that the remainder continued in Howard M. Shaul until his death, when it passed by his will to his wife, which then gave her the remainder plus her life estate, or the fee; and that the will of Blanche Shaul gave them a one-half interest in the property, and the other half to the heirs of her husband, Howard M. Shaul.
Plaintiffs contend that Blanche Shaul and Howard M. Shaul intended to convey the entire fee by the 1924 deeds; that the omission of the remainder clause in the first deed to the trustee was an oversight, and the two deeds should be read together as one instrument to show the real intent of the parties; that the second deed expresses their actual intent, that is, to convey the life estate to Blanche Shaul and the remainder to go equally to the heirs at law of each; that it was the intent of Howard M. Shaul when making the first deed to the trustee to then and there divest himself of not only a life estate but the entire fee; that when Howard M. Shaul died leaving his wife surviving him the contingent remainder granted by the trustee in the second deed became a vested remainder, whereby the wife then owned a life estate only with one-half of the remainder in her heirs and the other one-half of the remainder vesting in the heirs of her husband; that upon the death of Blanche Shaul the fee to one-half of this property vested in the plaintiffs as heirs at law of Blanche Shaul and the other half of the fee vested in the heirs of Howard M. Shaul. The plaintiffs say that the wills of the Shauls did not affect the title to the property; that when Howard Shaul died he had no right, title or interest in the property to convey, and that Blanche Shaul never had more than a life estate; that when she died title to one-half of the property was already in her heirs by reason of the trustee deed and title to the other one-half of the property was already in his heirs by reason of the trustee deed.
Blanche Shaul owned other personal property, stocks and bonds, and the right of defendants to take such property under the will of Blanche Shaul was never questioned, and the estate has been settled accordingly. It is only by reason of the provision in the second deed which relates to this particular property, that title to this property is in dispute.
It was not until some time in 1955 that claim was made by the plaintiffs to one-half of this property. At that time the defendants and the heirs of Howard M. Shaul decided to sell the property. Attorneys for the purchaser discovered the provision in the second deed relating to the remainder, which, in their opinion, cast a cloud upon the title to the one-half interest. They requested that a quit-claim deed be secured from the plaintiffs herein. When approached, the plaintiffs refused to sign a quit-claim deed and thereafter instituted this action.
The property consisted of an apartment building containing four apartments, in one of which the Shauls lived. Kemper Royal, a servant of the Shauls, stated that Shaul had told him at one time that...
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