French v. Querbes

• Decision Date: 25 May 1942
• Docket Number: 35048.
• Citation: 8 So.2d 631,200 La. 654
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: FRENCH et al. v. QUERBES et al.

8 So.2d 631

200 La. 654

FRENCH et al. v. QUERBES et al.

No. 35048.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

May 25, 1942

Cook, Cook & Egan and Albert T. Hughes, Jr., all of Shreveport, for appellants.

Blanchard Goldstein, Walker & O'Quin, Tucker, Bronson &amp Martin, Wilkinson, Lewis & Wilkinson, and F. Leonard Hargrove, all of Shreveport, for appellees.

HIGGINS Justice.

The husband and wife, the owners of the fee simple title to two separate contiguous tracts of land, instituted this action against R B. Williams, their transferee of an undivided one-half mineral interest in the 40-acre tract of land, and his respective assignees of certain mineral interests therein, to be recognized as the owners of 72/92nds of the royalties and the rentals accruing under a mineral lease, which the plaintiffs granted on their two respective tracts of land covering the S.E. 1/4 of the N.W. 1/4 and south 12 acres evenly off the south side of the N.E. 1/4 of N.W. 1/4 containing 52 acres of land (the separate and paraphernal property of the wife), and the S.W. 1/4 of N.W 1/4, containing 40 acres (belonging to the community of acquets and gains existing between the plaintiffs), or a total of 92 acres, both tracts being in Section 23, Township 23 North, Range 16 West, Caddo Parish, Louisiana; and they also prayed for an accounting of 26/92nds of the royalties paid under the lease over a period of seven years to the defendants, it being alleged that the defendants were overpaid to that extent out of the production from the above described 40 acres of land.

The eight defendants filed exceptions of no right and no cause of action on the ground that neither from the provisions of the oil and gas lease nor from the alleged conduct of the parties at the time it was executed or subsequently thereto, did it appear that the plaintiffs intended to pool their interests or confect a community or joint lease.

The trial judge, in sustaining the exceptions, concluded that even if the lease be considered a pooling one, nevertheless, from the allegations of the petition and the documents annexed to the pleadings, it appeared that the plaintiffs sold to R. B. Williams one-half of their mineral rights in the 40-acre tract of land only, without any express or implied reference to the 52-acre trace of land, and, therefore, the defendants, the transferee of one-half of the mineral interest of the plaintiff, and his assignees, were entitled to one-half of the royalties from the production on the 40 acres of land, the amount that they had been receiving for a period of seven years, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to have the 52-acre tract considered as in any way affecting their mineral rights or royalty interests in the 40-acre tract.

The plaintiffs appealed devolutively.

As the case comes to us solely on the issue of whether or not the trial judge correctly maintained the exceptions of no right and no cause of action, the allegations of fact of the plaintiffs' original and supplemental petitions, and the facts established by the documents annexed to the pleadings, are to be accepted as true for the purpose of considering the exceptions.

The record shows that Mrs. Fannie B. French and her husband, J. B. French, owned in community the 40-acre tract of land above described and that the 52-acre tract of land in question was the seprate and paraphernal property of the wife. On December 14, 1928, they executed an oil and gas lease in favor of D. L. Perkins covering both tracts of land separately described, reserving a 1/8 royalty in all oil, gas and casinghead gasoline produced. On October 16, 1929, the wife conveyed to R. B. Williams one-half of the minerals in and under the above described 40-acre tract, subject to the Perkins' lease. On November 2, 1929, the husband ratified the sale of the above minerals by his wife. On September 21, 1935, the husband executed a dation en paiement to his wife of the above 40 acres of land and thus at the time of the filing of the suit on April 1, 1938, she was the sole owner of both tracts of land or the 92 acres, except for the previously alienated mineral interest therein.

The jurisprudence of this State is well-settled, when two or more tracts of land separately owned are included in one lease, that that fact alone does not create the presumption that the lessors intended to pool their royalties or make a joint or community lease. Martel v. A. Veeder Co., 199 La. 423, 6 So.2d 335.

In the case of Louisiana Canal Co. v. Heyd, 189 La. 903, 181 So. 439, 116 A.L.R. 1260, in holding that it was the intention of the parties to make the lease a joint one and that their actions brought them within the scope of the case of Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., 185 La. 751, 170 So. 785, and, therefore, the case of the United Gas Public Service Co. v. Eaton, La.App., 153 So. 702, was inapplicable, the Court said [189 La. 903, 181 So. 442, 116 A.L.R. 1260]:

'In all cases where parties owning separate tracts of land execute together one oil and gas lease covering their separate tracts and where the lease contract contains no community or pooling clause, whether they are entitled to share proportionately in the royalties, regardless of which tract is developed, depends on the intention of the parties. From the fact that the parties join in the same lease contract and from that fact alone, there does not necessarily arise a presumption that they intended to pool. In the case of Lusk v. Green, 114 Okl. 113, 245 P. 636, it was held:

"Where a husband and wife, each owning a tract of land not contiguous but several miles apart, execute an oil and gas mining lease, and each tract is separately described in and covered by the same lease contract, it will not be presumed that either intended to convey to the other a royalty interest in his or her land, unless there is some affirmative evidence evincing such intention.'

'No hard and fast rule of interpretation can be laid down for determining the intention of the parties in a given case, and no presumption of law arises one way or the other as to their intention from the mere fact that they sign a lease contract together. Where such lease contracts are silent as to the intention of the parties and where the parties have not by their conduct and dealings since the confection of the lease indicated their own...