French v. State
Decision Date | 31 July 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 03A05-0009-CR-381.,03A05-0009-CR-381. |
Citation | 754 N.E.2d 9 |
Parties | Roman Lamont FRENCH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Dennis M. Stark, Columbus, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Adam M. Dulik, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant, Roman Lamont French, appeals the denial of his motion for change of judge and the denial of jail time credit. We reverse the denial of the motion for change of judge and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
On May 27, 1998, French was arrested in Bartholomew County for misdemeanor battery and invasion of privacy and detained in the Bartholomew County Jail. Thereafter, on August 22, 1998, while still being detained in the Bartholomew County Jail, French was involved in an altercation with a correctional officer. As a result, French was charged with Battery, a Class D felony, and Resisting Law Enforcement, a Class D felony, and later charged as a habitual offender. An arrest warrant, stemming from these charges, was served upon him on October 15, 1998.
On November 10, 1998, while French remained incarcerated, he was served with another warrant for Dealing in Cocaine, a Class A felony, under cause number 03D01-9810-DF-1044. French was tried on that charge and a habitual offender count, found guilty, and sentenced to sixty years incarceration. With regard to that sentence, French received jail time credit for the time spent incarcerated from May 27, 1998, the date he was originally incarcerated in the Bartholomew County Jail, to the date of his sentencing hearing on June 23, 1999.
On June 26, 2000, before the scheduled trial on the felony battery and resisting law enforcement charges, French filed a motion for change of judge. In his motion, French claimed that after being transferred from the Michigan City prison to the Bartholomew County Jail, he learned of disparaging remarks the trial judge allegedly had made against him during the March 29, 2000 sentence modification hearing of another defendant, Larry Montel Booker. However, because French was not aware of the exact nature of the comments, he requested a transcript of the hearing. Once French received and reviewed the transcript, he filed another motion with the court on July 20, 2000, asking the court to set the change of judge motion for hearing. In the motion, French asserted that he had "reviewed the transcript provided by the Court and believe[d] that it accurately and completely sets forth the factual basis for [French's] [m]otion." Record at 80.
During the July 25, 2000 hearing on the change of judge motion, French testified under oath concerning the trial judge's comments and counsel introduced into evidence the transcript of Booker's sentence modification hearing. Particular reference was made to the following comments:
Supplemental Record at 5-6, Defendant's Exhibit A (emphasis supplied).
Though French contended that the statement indicated bias on the part of the trial court, his motion was denied.
Thereafter, on August 4, 2000, French entered into a plea agreement with the State with regard to the charges arising from the jail altercation. In return for French's guilty plea to resisting law enforcement as a Class D felony, the State agreed to dismiss the battery and habitual offender charges and other unrelated charges and promised not to refile still other charges. On August 30, 2000, French was sentenced to the maximum sentence of three years incarceration to be served consecutive to his sixty-year sentence for dealing in cocaine. The trial court denied French any jail time credit because according to the trial court, French had already been awarded all of the credit to which he was entitled on the dealing charge.
French first contends that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for change of judge because the comments the judge made during Booker's sentence modification hearing demonstrated the judge's personal animosity and bias. French's motion was founded upon Criminal Rule 12 which provides as follows:
Though the State concedes that French was permitted to file a motion on subsequently discovered grounds, for the first time upon appeal the State contends that French failed to properly verify his petition and include the "facts showing the cause for a change." According to the State, while French admittedly did not discover the factual basis for the motion until after he had acquired the transcript, he had a duty to amend his original motion to include the factual basis. French's failure, the State argues, prevented the prosecutor from learning the factual basis for the motion until the July 25, 2000 hearing and denied it the opportunity to file counter-affidavits.
When a defendant files a belated motion under Crim.R. 12(D)(2), "it must be verified by the party, specifically alleging when the cause was first discovered, how it was discovered, the facts showing the cause for change, and why the cause could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence." State v. Hahn, 660 N.E.2d 606, 609 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. "The sine qua non of a verified petition is that the person executing it affirm under the penalties for perjury, or state upon oath, before an official authorized to administer oaths, that the representations within the body of the petition are true." Hendricks v. State, 426 N.E.2d 367, 369 (Ind.1981).
Upon reviewing the two motions filed by French, we agree that they were not verified, as they were not executed under penalty of perjury. The motions also did not include the facts showing the cause for change. The failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Crim.R. 12(D) has been held sufficient to justify the denial of a motion for change of judge. See Flowers v. State, 738 N.E.2d 1051, 1059-60 (Ind.2000) (). See also Carroll v. State, 438 N.E.2d 745, 747 (Ind. 1982) ().
Nevertheless, French contends that the State has waived any argument concerning procedural deficiencies by failing to object at the hearing and electing to proceed on the merits. There is support for French's contention. It has been held that the failure to raise lack of verification at the earliest opportunity results in waiver upon appeal. In Brown v. State, 458 N.E.2d 245, 249 (Ind.Ct.App.1983), trans. denied, the defendant appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and, for the first time upon appeal, the State argued that the petition had not been properly verified and, therefore, should have been dismissed. This court noted that "want of verification is waived if an objection is not presented at the earliest possible opportunity" and, based upon this principle, found that the State had waived its claim. Id. at 249.
A similar result was reached in Hendricks, supra, 426 N.E.2d 367. Upon appeal of the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief,...
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