French v. State, 03S00-9911-CR-661.

CourtSupreme Court of Indiana
Citation778 N.E.2d 816
Docket NumberNo. 03S00-9911-CR-661.,03S00-9911-CR-661.
PartiesRoman Lamont FRENCH, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
Decision Date22 November 2002

Kay A. Beehler, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Arthur Thaddeus Perry, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee. BOEHM, Justice.

In this consolidated appeal, Roman Lamont French challenges both his conviction for cocaine dealing and the denial of post-conviction relief. We hold: (1) French was not denied due process when he appeared, without objection, wearing jail garb in front of a new jury during the habitual offender proceeding; (2) although it is error to require a defendant to appear in jail garb at a habitual offender proceeding, it does not require reversal where no objection was raised; (3) the evidence at the habitual offender proceeding was sufficient to identify French as the person convicted of prior crimes; (4) the trial court did not commit fundamental error when it failed to instruct the jury that it was not required to accept a judicially noticed fact; (5) the evidence enhancing French's conviction to a Class A felony was sufficient; (6) he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel; and (7) the cumulative errors of his attorneys did not substantially damage his defense.

Factual and Procedural Background

On February 23, 1998, a confidential informant purchased .24 grams of cocaine from French for $100. French was charged with dealing in cocaine, a Class A felony, and two months later was charged with being a habitual offender. A jury found French guilty of dealing in cocaine. That jury was dismissed and a new jury was impaneled to hear the habitual offender charge a month later.1 The second jury found French to be a habitual offender. The trial court then sentenced French to thirty years for the underlying offense and enhanced his sentence by an additional thirty years as a habitual offender. French appealed and also initiated a post-conviction relief proceeding. This Court suspended consideration of the direct appeal and remanded the matter to the trial court for consideration of the issues raised in his post-conviction petition. This consolidated appeal seeks review of both the underlying conviction and the denial of post-conviction relief.

I. Appearing in Jail Garb at the Habitual Offender Trial

French appeared in full jail garb with handcuffs, shackles, and orange jail clothing at the habitual offender phase of the trial conducted before a new jury a month after the trial of the underlying charge. French contends that this violated his constitutional right to due process.

A. The Restraints and Shackles

In Evans v. State, 571 N.E.2d 1231, 1238 (Ind.1991), this Court concluded that a defendant has the right to appear in front of a jury without physical restraints, unless restraints are necessary to prevent the defendant's escape, to protect those present in the courtroom, or to maintain order during the trial. We have held that "the facts and reasoning supporting the trial judge's determination that restraints are necessary must be placed on the record." Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1193 (Ind.2001) (quoting Coates v. State, 487 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ind.Ct.App.1985)). "An order to restrain the defendant is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Forte v. State, 759 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ind. 2001).

In a sidebar with attorneys for both the State and defense present, the trial court explained its action as follows:

At the conclusion of the previous trial in this case, it is my understanding that there was a significant physical altercation between Mr. French and one or more law enforcement officers.2 I have instructed the law enforcement officers to secure French's ... I think it's his right hand. I think he's left handed ... so that he is able to write. But he also has ankle irons or leg irons, whatever they call them. [Defense counsel], you have an objection to that?

His counsel objected only to the arm constraint because "it could be seen by the jury." The trial court overruled the objection "based upon the altercation that happened as the jury was leaving the courtroom during the last proceeding."

The trial court complied with the requirements of law by stating, on the record, facts and reasoning supporting its determination that restraints were necessary. Based on the reasons given by the trial court, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in having the defendant handcuffed and shackled.

B. Jail Clothing

At his habitual offender proceeding, French appeared in bright orange clothing with the word "jail" on the back. The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant cannot be compelled to appear before a jury in identifiable prison clothing because this may impair the presumption of innocence. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 502-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). French argues that requiring him to wear prison clothes during the habitual offender phase of his trial in front of a separate jury violated his right to due process.

French made no objection to the jail garb. The failure to object to being tried in prison clothes negates the compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation. Id. at 512-13, 96 S.Ct. 1691. Although it is not a denial of due process if a defendant appears in jail garb without objection, we agree that the same reasons requiring an appearance in street clothes at trial also apply in a supplemental proceeding before a jury such as the habitual offender phase. Accordingly, if a defendant objects, it is error to require the defendant to appear in jail garb at the habitual offender phase. Here, however, there was no objection and the issue is not preserved.

Recognizing that no objection was raised in the trial court, French contends that his appearance in jail garb constituted fundamental error reviewable despite the lack of objection. We do not agree. Although, as Justice Sullivan points out, French is entitled to the presumption of innocence as to the habitual offender charge, he was convicted of the underlying charge of dealing cocaine, and the jury was informed of this. The Ninth Circuit addressed a similar issue in Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 746 (9th Cir. 1995), where the defendant appeared in prison clothes, handcuffs, and a security chain before a sentencing jury. Although a sentencing proceeding is not identical to the habitual offender phase, in both instances the presumption of innocence of the underlying charge no longer applies. As the Ninth Circuit put it: "His condition as a prisoner is no surprise to the jury, which just found him guilty. Prison clothing cannot be considered inherently prejudicial when the jury already knows, based upon other facts, that the defendant has been deprived of his liberty." Id. at 747. In French's case a second jury was assembled for the habitual offender phase of the trial. When this is done the jury is to be informed of the underlying felony that provoked the habitual offender charge. Gilliam v. State, 563 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Ind.1990) (The State is not required to prove the primary underlying felony to a second jury which has been subsequently assembled during a habitual offender proceeding.); see also Denton v. State, 496 N.E.2d 576, 581 (Ind.1986)

(There is no harm in a trial court informing a jury subsequently assembled during the habitual offender proceeding that a previous jury returned a guilty verdict on the underlying felony.). In view of these authorities we do not believe this error approaches fundamental error requiring retrial despite French's failure to object.

II. Evidence Identifying French as the Prior Offender

French contends that the evidence used to connect him to the documents presented by the State violated his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination. At the habitual offender phase of the trial, documents from two predicate felony convictions included a date of birth and social security number of the defendant, as well as his name. Columbus Police Officer Matt Myers testified to French's date of birth and social security number listed on the charging information in this case and stated that this information had been provided by French when he was booked into jail on the charge in this case. He further testified that he was not present at the initial hearing in this case but had listened to a tape of the hearing where French again provided this information. Based on his familiarity with French's voice, Myers opined that the person on the tape was French. He then testified that the date of birth and social security number on the records of the two prior felony convictions were the same as those appearing in the booking information and in the charging information, and given at the initial hearing in this case.

Relying on Palmer v. State, 679 N.E.2d 887, 891 (Ind.1997), French argues that Myers' testimony prejudiced his defense because "[p]roof that an individual named in an habitual offender information and an individual so named in various documents is insufficient to [prove] the person committed a prior crime." French suggests that fingerprints on documentary exhibits or prior convictions should have been offered.

He also contends that proof of French's social security number and date of birth in the form of testimony to admissions by French was improper because it admitted into evidence statements French made in custody when being booked without counsel. Assuming French had not been advised of his Miranda rights at the time he gave this information, this claim is raised for the first time on appeal and was not presented to the trial court. It is a classic example of the justification that an issue be raised at trial to be preserved for appeal. Had this claim been presented at the habitual offender proceeding, it would presumably have been a simple...

To continue reading

Request your trial
255 cases
  • Overstreet v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • 27 Noviembre 2007
    ...rule established by Deck. We have previously observed the distinction between the guilt and penalty phases of trial. See French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 821 (Ind.2002) (After recognizing that the presumption of innocence no longer applies to the sentencing proceedings or the habitual offen......
  • Stephenson v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • 26 Abril 2007
    ...the outcome of the trial would have been different. 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind.2002); Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 746; Lowery v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1031, 1041 The issues raised by Stephenson's claim of ineffective assis......
  • Jackson v. Washington
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Virginia
    • 16 Septiembre 2005
    ...decision reached would reasonably likely have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also, French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 826 (Ind.2002) (evidence against the defendant was clear and he was therefore not prejudiced by appearing in jail clothes); State v. King, 8......
  • Conley v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 23 Febrero 2021
    ...ineffective assistance when viewed cumulatively.’ " White v. State , 25 N.E.3d 107, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting French v. State , 778 N.E.2d 816, 826 (Ind. 2002) ), trans. denied , cert. denied , 577 U.S. 1035, 136 S. Ct. 595, 193 L.Ed.2d 477 (2015). Although some of defense counsel's......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT