French v. Wilson, Civ. A. No. 75-0196.
Decision Date | 09 March 1978 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 75-0196. |
Citation | 446 F. Supp. 216 |
Parties | Joseph FRENCH and Constance French, Plaintiffs, v. Thomas WILSON, City Clerk, City of Warwick and Warwick Credit Union, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Rhode Island Legal Services, Inc., Providence, R.I., for plaintiffs; John M. Sears, Alden C. Harrington, Providence, R.I., of counsel.
Edward J. Mulligan, Warwick, R.I., Leo X. McCusker, Providence, R.I., for defendants.
This is a civil action which at this juncture involves the applicability to this case of Subchapter I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, more commonly known as the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. and the regulations thereunder, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1, et seq. This Court on March 11, 1977 denied defendant's motion to dismiss and deferred ruling on plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment pending the filing by the parties herein of additional statements and memoranda. Reargument on the issue of summary judgment having recently been heard, plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and defendant Warwick Credit Union's motion for summary judgment are presently ready for determination.
The Court hereby finds these facts, as they appear in this case, to be undisputed:
Although this is an unusual case, it is the opinion of this Court that there remains no dispute as to any material fact herein. The complexities arising in this case solely involve questions of law, primarily issues of statutory interpretation. Therefore, the Court, for reasons to be discussed, is constrained to grant plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.
In examining this case, the Court must decide as a matter of law the key issue of whether or not the rescission portion of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z thereunder are applicable to the above-stated undisputed facts.1
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to show why the argument of defendant Warwick Credit Union that the Truth in Lending Act does not apply to this case is without merit. Defendant Warwick Credit Union primarily relies on certain exceptions to the right of rescission afforded by the Act. The right to rescind does not apply to the creation, retention, or assumption of a first lien or equivalent security interest to finance the acquisition of a dwelling in which the customer resides or expects to reside.2 (Emphasis added.) It is an undisputed fact that plaintiffs herein had owned the dwelling in question for quite some time before the October 1, 1973 loan. Therefore, it is misplaced to argue that this exception to the Act applies, since the October loan transaction clearly was not used to finance what was already owned by plaintiffs. Another exception to the right of rescission upon which defendant relies deals with a security interest which is a first lien retained or acquired by a creditor in connection with the financing of the initial construction of the residence of the customer, or in connection with a loan committed prior to the completion of construction of a customer's residence to satisfy that construction loan and provide permanent financing of that residence.3 (Emphasis added.) In this case, however, it is beyond dispute that the dwelling in question had been in existence for many years before the October loan transaction. Since a preexisting dwelling was involved here (and it appears that such dwelling had already been affixed to its new location and was indeed owned by plaintiffs when the October loan transaction was entered into), it becomes evident that any "construction" exception argument propounded by defendants must likewise be rejected.
The Court therefore finds as a matter of law that the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z do apply to the October loan transaction. The implication of such finding is that defendant Warwick Credit Union should have made its October transaction conform to the protections afforded borrowers by the Truth in Lending Act. See Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 36 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973); Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 496 F.2d 927, 935 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1001, 95 S.Ct. 320, 42 L.Ed.2d 277 (1974); Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974); In re Dunne, 407 F.Supp. 308, 310 (D.R.I.1976). In particular, the Court finds that in addition to several violations in the disclosure form prepared by said defendant,4 a crucial omission by defendant upon which this case can be decided was the failure to notify plaintiffs of their right to rescind5 the October loan transaction within 72 hours, the so-called "cooling off" period which the Truth in Lending Act mandates.6
Conceptually, the facts of this case are somewhat analogous to the situation where a borrower finances a home improvement loan. Where the borrower is a homeowner who borrows money to improve the very "roof over his head," it is important that such borrower be given all protections mandated by the Truth in Lending Act, especially the right to rescind during the cooling off period. This protects a borrower from hastily entering into financing arrangements where the possibility exists that he could lose his home upon default if he should reconsider and attempt to disavow the contract entered into. Although plaintiffs herein were "improving" their home in an unconventional manner — by moving it to another location away from a restaurant — they nonetheless should have been given every safeguard provided by the Act, including disclosure of the statutory right to rescind.
The Court now turns its attention to the effect of plaintiffs' May 13, 1975 unilateral rescission of the October 1, 1973 transaction. Under the dictates of 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) and § 226.9(d) of Regulation Z, the effects of such a rescission are as follows:
Applying these requirements to this case, when defendant Warwick Credit Union received plaintiffs' notice of rescission, had it complied with the Act (instead of attempting to foreclose) by then returning any money paid by the plaintiffs within 10 days and terminating any security interest created, plaintiffs would have then had to return whatever amounts they had received from such defendant and defendant would have suffered relatively minor pecuniary loss. Sosa, supra at 118-119. However, since the defendant did not comply with the above-stated statutory requisites, it becomes amenable to the rather harsh legislative remedy which the Truth in Lending Act imposes upon errant creditors.7
The Truth in Lending Act has been interpreted as being "remedial in nature" and "must be construed in liberal fashion if the underlying Congressional purpose is to be effectuated." N. C. Freed Company, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 473 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827, 94 S.Ct. 48, 38 L.Ed.2d 61 (1973). See also Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan and Company, 498 F.2d 1133, 1136 (10th Cir. 1974); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, 329 F.Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.1971). As the Court in Starks v. Orleans Motors, Inc., 372 F.Supp. 928, 932 (E.D.La.1974), aff'd mem., 500 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1974) aptly stated: "Where the nature of an act is remedial, as here, it should be construed liberally in an attempt to provide the remedy, not avoid it." As such, this Court therefore looks to the teachings of Sosa,8 supra at 119, for the remedy to be imposed in this case:
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