Frenchtown Villa v. Meadors

• Decision Date: 22 September 1982
• Docket Number: Docket No. 57255
• Citation: 324 N.W.2d 133,117 Mich.App. 683
• Parties: FRENCHTOWN VILLA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wayco MEADORS and Shirley Meadors, Defendants-Appellants. 117 Mich.App. 683, 324 N.W.2d 133
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 133

324 N.W.2d 133

FRENCHTOWN VILLA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Wayco MEADORS and Shirley Meadors, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 57255.

117 Mich.App. 683, 324 N.W.2d 133

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 14, 1982.

Decided July 12, 1982.

Released for Publication Sept. 22, 1982.

[117 MICHAPP 684]Ready, Sullivan & Ready, Monroe, for plaintiff-appellee.

Legal Services of Southeastern Michigan by William H. Ridley, Jackson, for defendants-appellants.

[117 MICHAPP 685]Before KAUFMAN, P.J., and V.J. BRENNAN and BEASLEY, JJ.

KAUFMAN, Presiding Judge.

In this summary proceeding, defendants appeal, by leave granted, a circuit court order affirming a district court's judgment of possession in favor of plaintiff.

Defendants are mobile home owners renting a space in plaintiff's mobile home park.In 1979, plaintiff sought to terminate defendants' month-to-month tenancy in a prior summary proceeding.In the course of the earlier suit defendants demanded that they be offered a written lease, as required by the Mobile Home Commission Act, M.C.L. Sec. 125.1128(1)(g);M.S.A. Sec. 19.855(28)(1)(g).The district court judge concluded that plaintiff's failure to comply with the act constituted a complete defense to the suit for possession.The parties then executed a six-month lease, which ran from February 1, 1980, through July 31, 1980.

Upon the expiration of the written lease plaintiff commenced the present summary proceeding for possession of the mobile home space.Defendants raised the affirmative defense that the termination was in retaliation for their prior demand for a written lease, a right provided to them by state law.On the date set for trial, the district court judge ruled that the retaliatory eviction defense was not available as a matter of law since the termination was pursuant to the expiration of the written lease.

On appeal to this court, defendants contend that the district and circuit courts erred by ruling that the retaliatory eviction defense did not apply.The issue before us is whether the defense of retaliatory eviction is available where a landlord seeks to regain possession of premises at the expiration of a fixed-term lease.

[117 MICHAPP 686] The seminal case prohibiting retaliatory evictions is Edwards v. Habib, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 126, 397 F.2d 687(1968), cert. den., 393 U.S. 1016, 89 S.Ct. 618, 21 L.Ed.2d 560(1969).In Edwards, the landlord commenced eviction proceedings against a month-to-month tenant after her complaint to housing authorities led to the discovery of more than 40 sanitary code violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that a tenant could offer evidence of the landlord's retaliation or other improper motive as a defense to the possessory action.The court held that although the landlord could evict for any legal reason or for no reason at all, Congress, in providing jurisdiction over possessory actions, did not intend to permit evictions in retaliation for a tenant's report of housing code violations to authorities.The court reasoned that the use of retaliatory evictions would otherwise frustrate the effectiveness of the housing code as a means of upgrading Washington housing.Id., 130 U.S.App.D.C. 139-140, 397 F.2d 700-701.

The defense of retaliatory eviction has since been recognized in a number of jurisdictions.¹Moreover, in Golphin v. Park Monroe Associates, 353 A.2d 314(D.C. App., 1976), the defense was interpreted to apply even though the tenant's occupancy had been secured under a one-year lease that had since expired.In Golphin, the tenant alleged that the landlord had established a policy of permitting tenants whose leases had [117 MICHAPP 687] expired to remain as month-to-month tenants, but elected to evict him at the time of expiration because of his complaints to housing authorities and his activities in a tenant's association.In holding that the defense of retaliatory eviction could be presented, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals interpreted Edwards v. Habib, supra, as standing "for the proposition that the states' judicial processes may not be used to accomplish an eviction for retaliatory purposes".Id., 318.(Emphasis in original.)The court concluded that a contrary result would permit a landlord to make the retaliatory eviction defense academic by the use of fixed-term leases.Id., 318 n. 10.See also, Engler v. Capital Management Corp., 112 N.J.Super. 445, 271 A.2d 615(1970), but see, Toms Point Apartments v. Goudzward, 72 Misc.2d 629, 339 N.Y.S.2d 281(1972).

In Michigan, the defense of retaliatory eviction is available pursuant to statute in summary proceedings for possession of realty.M.C.L. Sec. 600.5720;M.S.A. Sec. 27A.5720.Consequently, the limits of the defense must be determined by analysis of the statute itself.The primary and fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the purpose and intent as expressed by the Legislature.White v. Ann Arbor, 406 Mich. 554, 562, 281 N.W.2d 283(1979).However, basic to this function is the rule that interpretation of a statute is impermissible where the Legislature makes its intent known in the clear, explicit and unambiguous language of the statute.In such a casethe statute must be applied as written.Perez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 105 Mich.App. 202, 205, 306 N.W.2d 451(1981).

The retaliatory eviction statute, MCL 600.5720;MSA 27A.5720, reads in pertinent part:

[117 MICHAPP 688] "(1) A judgment for possession of the premises for an alleged termination of tenancy shall not be entered against a defendant if 1 or more of the following is established:

"(a) That the alleged termination was intended primarily as a penalty for the defendant's attempt to secure or enforce rights under the lease or agreement or under the laws of the state, of a governmental subdivision of this state, or of the United States."

By its language, the statute precludes a judgment for possession for an alleged termination of a tenancy where the termination was intended primarily as a penalty for the defendant's attempt to secure or enforce legal rights.Thus, the statute is distinguishable from the retaliatory eviction doctrine of Edwards v. Habib, supra, which purports to prohibit the use of judicial process to accomplish an eviction for retaliatory purposes.Golphin v. Park Monroe Associates, supra.Instead, the focus of the statute is upon the termination of the tenancy.In the instant case, plaintiff's motive in refusing to renew defendant's lease may well have been, as alleged, one of retaliation for defendants' prior assertion of rights under the Mobile Home Commission Act.The dispositive question, however, is whether, as a matter of law, the alleged termination in this case could be considered in retaliation for defendants' actions....