Frendak v. United States

• Decision Date: 24 October 1979
• Docket Number: No. 11043.,No. 11046.,11043.,11046.
• Citation: 408 A.2d 364
• Parties: Paula J. FRENDAK, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. UNITED STATES v. Paula J. FRENDAK.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

408 A.2d 364

Paula J. FRENDAK, Appellant, v.UNITED STATES, Appellee.

UNITED STATES v.Paula J. FRENDAK.

No. 11043.

No. 11046.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued November 16, 1978.

Decided October 24, 1979.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Fred B. Ugast, Trial Judge.

Thomas W. Farquhar, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

John W. Polk, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., at the time brief was filed and John A. Terry and John T. Kotelly, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

John D. Aldock, Washington, D. C., appointed by the court as amicus curiae, with whom William R. Galeota, Washington, D. C., was on brief.^*

Before KERN, GALLAGHER and FERREN, Associate Judges.

FERREN, Associate Judge:

A jury found appellantPaula Frendak guilty of first-degree murder, D.C.Code 1973, § 22-2401, and carrying a pistol without a license, D.C.Code 1973, § 22-3204.Troubled by evidence introduced at Frendak's competency hearings and at trial, the court conducted hearings on her sanity at the time of the crime.As a result, the court decided — over Frendak's objection — to interpose the insanity defense at a second, "insanity" phase of the trial.The jury then found Frendak not guilty by reason of insanity on both counts.

On appeal, Frendak challenges the verdict on alternate grounds.She asserts, first, that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support the jury's initial determination that she committed first-degree murder.Second, Frendak — joined by the government and amicus curiae — attacks the present validity of Whalem v. United States,120 U.S. App.D.C 331, 346 F.2d 812(en banc), cert. denied,382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 124, 15 L.Ed.2d 100(1965), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the trial judge has discretion to raise an insanity defense over the objection of a defendant found competent to stand trial.The government urges this court, in addition, to hold that a finding of competency to stand trial is, in itself, sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant is capable of rejecting the defense.

We conclude that the government produced sufficient evidence to support a conviction for first-degree murder.As to the second issue, however, we reinterpret Whalem, supra.We hold that the trial judge may not force an insanity defense on a defendant found competent to stand trial if the individual intelligently and voluntarily decides to forego that defense.In reaching this result, however, we further hold that the court's finding of competency to stand trial is not, in itself, sufficient to show that the defendant is capable of rejecting an insanity defense; the trial judge must make further inquiry into whether the defendant has made an intelligent and voluntary decision.Because it is unclear whether Frendak made such a decision, we remand for further proceedings.

I.Facts; Proceedings to Date

At approximately 2:15 on the afternoon of January 15, 1974, Willard Titlow left his office on the seventh floor of 1735 K Street, N.W. AppellantPaula Frendak, a co-worker, departed immediately afterwards, explaining to a secretary that she had an appointment with her attorney.Within minutes, Titlow was discovered fatally shot in the first floor hallway of the building.

Following the shooting, Frendak left Washington, traveling through Atlanta, Miami, Mexico City, Spain, and Turkey before she was arrested on February 11, 1974 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, after refusing to surrender her passport at the airport.A later search of her baggage revealed that she was carrying a .38 caliber pistol, 45 rounds of ammunition, two empty cartridges, and a pocket knife.On March 13, 1974, authorities in Abu Dhabi surrendered Frendak to the United States Marshal, who brought her back to the District of Columbia to face charges relating to the murder of Willard Titlow.On May 29, 1974, Frendak was indicted for first-degree murder and carrying a pistol without a license.

In the months preceding her trial, Frendak underwent a series of psychiatric examinations to determine her competency.There were four competency hearings at which psychiatrists gave varying testimony about Frendak's mental condition and her ability to consult with counsel concerning the proceedings against her.Ultimately, after the fourth hearing, the court determined that appellant was suffering from a personality disorder, was able to cooperate with her counsel, possessed a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against her, and was fully cognizant of the charges.¹Accordingly, the court concluded that she was competent to stand trial, although it reserved the right to raise the competency issue sua sponte at any point in the proceedings.

At trial, the government introduced evidence demonstrating that Titlow had been killed by two shots fired at close range, and that the last shot probably had been fired by someone standing over Titlow as he lay on the floor.A police expert in firearms identification testified that the ballistics tests showed positively that the bullets recovered from Titlow's body had been fired by the weapon seized from Paula Frendak in Abu Dhabi.

In addition, Robert Hur, who had worked with both Frendak and Titlow, testified that on three occasions prior to January 15, 1974, Frendak had followed him and Titlow.Another co-worker, Thomas Voit, recalled a similar incident which occurred on the day of the murder.Frendak had followed Voit and Titlow as they left the office and took the elevator down.When the elevator reached the lobby, Frendak got off, turned to Titlow and said, "Willard, this is it," meaning this is your floor.Titlow then explained that he and Voit were going to eat in the basement snack bar, although in fact they intended to slip out the basement door to avoid her.Because the basement door was locked, the men returned to the lobby and noticed Frendak standing nearby.She followed them out of the building to a cafeteria, but did not enter.When they returned from lunch, they found Frendak waiting in the lobby again, and she took the elevator up with them.

A secretary in the office recalled the incidents immediately preceding the shooting.She testified that as soon as Titlow had taken his coat from the closet and left the office for his regular sales call, Paula Frendak, who had been sitting at her desk, followed him out.As she left, she told the secretary that she had made arrangements with her supervisor to take time off to see her lawyer.A few minutes later, Titlow was found fatally wounded.

Ms. Frendak, the only defense witness, admitted owning the murder weapon and taking it with her to the scene of the murder.She explained, however, that she had brought it with her to sell to Titlow and had left the office with him shortly before his murder in order to complete the transaction.She stated that, after giving the pistol to Titlow in the first floor hallway of the building where they worked, an unknown woman had appeared, grabbed the gun, shot Titlow twice, and then fled.Frendak also testified that she had panicked and left the city, fearing that she had been framed.The jury found Frendak guilty of first-degree murder and carrying a pistol without a license.

Although evidence of insanity had been introduced in the competency proceedings, Frendak refused to raise the insanity defense at trial.The court, therefore, appointed John Aldock, Esquire, as amicus curiae to aid it in deciding whether to raise the defense on its own motion, under authority of Whalem v. United States, supra.The court also ordered a mental examination of Frendak on the question of her criminal responsibility.

In a subsequent hearing, the court received reports by Dr. Edward C. Kirby of the staff of the Forensic Pyschiatry Office and Dr. Leon Yochelson of the Psychiatric Institute stating that, at the time of Titlow's murder, Frendak had been suffering from a mental illness which impaired her behavioral controls to such an extent that she could not appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct and could not conform her conduct to the requirements of the law.²Dr. Franklin J. Pepper, a psychiatrist from St. Elizabeths Hospital, testified at the hearing, explaining that appellant had a "paranoid personality" with "some tendency to lap over into some psychotic thinking."When asked whether Titlow's murder had been a product of this condition, Dr. Pepper responded that "at some level in the workings of Miss Frendak's mind, at some level of psychodynamics . . . there is a causal connection between her mental illness and the event."He testified, however, that he was "unable to discover the cause and effect relationship."Although neither Dr. Kirby nor Dr. Yochelson discussed appellant's present capability of considering the consequences of rejecting an insanity defense, Dr. Pepper specifically stated that appellant understood the consequences of her decision not to raise the insanity defense.³

In oral argument at the hearing, amicus expressed reservations about the current status of Whalem, supra, in light of the later Supreme Court decisions in North Carolina v. Alford,400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162(1970), andFaretta v. California,422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562(1975).He argued, however, that the trial court should apply the Whalem rule, as traditionally interpreted, raise the insanity defense, and leave the question of its current validity for appeal.Both Frendak and the prosecution opposed the trial court's imposition of the insanity defense.After hearing the evidence and argument on both sides, the trial judge reaffirmed his prior ruling that appellant was competent to stand trial.He stated, however:

Assuming, as the Court does, that no...