Frenza v. SHEET METAL WORKERS'INTERN. ASS'N

• Decision Date: 22 February 1983
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 82-70798.
• Citation: 567 F. Supp. 580
• Parties: Anthony FRENZA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SHEET METAL WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

567 F. Supp. 580

Anthony FRENZA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SHEET METAL WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 82-70798.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.

February 22, 1983.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert J. Dinges, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs.

David Y. Klein, Livonia, Mich., for defendant Union Local 80.

Anthony A. Asher and Dennis L. Gabrian, Southfield, Mich., for defendant SMACNA.

OPINION

RALPH B. GUY, Jr., District Judge.

Plaintiffs, thirteen members of Local 80, instituted this action against the trustee of Local 80, various members and former members of the Local 80 bargaining committee, Local 80, the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association (International),¹ and the Sheet Metal Associated Contractors of North America (SMACNA). The underlying facts, as alleged in plaintiffs' complaint, may be summarized as follows.

Over the years, Local 80 and SMACNA have executed various collective bargaining agreements covering the terms and conditions of employment for sheet metal workers in the metropolitan Detroit area. Upon the expiration of the last such agreement, Local 80, on June 1, 1981, commenced an economic strike. Because of the Local's inability to enter into a new agreement, the International, on August 21, 1981, placed Local 80 in trusteeship. The following day, the trustee removed two members from the bargaining committee and replaced those individuals with himself and another. Approximately six weeks later, a tentative collective bargaining agreement was reached between the reconstituted bargaining committee and SMACNA. As a result, the members of Local 80 were ordered back to work on the following day. Two weeks later, the tentative agreement was ratified by the Local 80 membership and a new collective bargaining agreement came into effect.

On or about January 29, 1982, printed copies of the new agreement were made available to members of Local 80. A review of those copies revealed certain discrepancies between the printed version of the agreement and the ratified version of the agreement. In particular, discrepancies were noted in the method of selecting individuals to serve as trustees of several employee benefit trust funds, the method of distributing funds among these same employee benefit trust funds, the bumping rights of job stewards, the obligation of members to perform shift work, and the rate of pay for shift work performed. Further investigation revealed that the discrepancies were the result of modifications that were agreed upon by SMACNA and the bargaining committee after the ratification vote. Because these changes were made without membership approval, plaintiffs brought the present suit.

In Count I of their First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege that the union defendants breached their duty of fair representation by bargaining after the ratification vote, agreeing to changes after the ratification vote, failing to submit the changes for ratification, failing to inform the members of the changes, conspiring with SMACNA to change the agreement, and conspiring with SMACNA to bypass a ratification vote. In addition, plaintiffs allege that SMACNA violated the 1981 Collective Bargaining Agreement by attempting to modify that agreement through negotiations with the bargaining committee with knowledge that the bargaining committee did not have authority to alter the agreement without a ratification vote. All the defendants have moved to dismiss Count I because § 301 does not provide a right of action for union members who have been denied the right to ratify a collective bargaining agreement as guaranteed by an International's constitution. Moreover, the union defendants note that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust intra-union remedies. Finally, the individual defendants contend that § 301 does not provide a right of action against individual union members.

In Count II of their First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants deprived them of the equal right to vote, in violation of § 101(a)(1) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1). The union defendants have moved to dismiss Count II because plaintiffs were treated in the same manner as all other Local 80 members. SMACNA has moved to dismiss Count II because § 101(a)(1) does not create a right of action against an employer.

In Count III of their First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege that the union defendants breached their duty of fair representation as derived from § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). In addition, plaintiffs allege that SMACNA aided and abetted the union defendants' breach of their duty of fair representation, as well as the union defendants' deprivation of the members' equal right to vote on all referendums. The union defendants have moved to dismiss Count III because plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to support a claim that defendants violated a duty of fair representation. SMACNA has moved to dismiss Count III because its only alleged wrongdoing, i.e., entering into an agreement with the bargaining committee, is not actionable.

In Count IV of their First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege that the union defendants violated 29 U.S.C. § 463(a)(2) by transferring Local 80 assets to the International without the permission of the Local 80 membership. In response, the International contends that no Local 80 assets were transferred to the International. Instead, the International contends that certain trust fund contributions, which formerly were paid to a local trust fund, are presently being paid directly to a national trust fund as required by the new collective bargaining agreement. SMACNA has moved to dismiss Count IV because § 463(a)(2) does not create a right of action against an employer.

With this background, the court will now consider the arguments of each of the parties. To facilitate its discussion of those arguments, the court will discuss them in terms of the various federal rights of action relied on by plaintiffs.

29 U.S.C. § 185

Exhaustion

In Clayton v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 451 U.S. 679, 101 S.Ct. 2088, 68 L.Ed.2d 538 (1981), the Supreme Court held that exhaustion of intra-union remedies should not be required where the relevant internal appeals procedure cannot result in an award of the complete relief sought in plaintiff's § 301 suit. Although the union defendants have convincingly argued that the relevant internal union appeals procedures would provide plaintiffs with a fair hearing on their claims, they have not established that the procedures would be adequate to award plaintiffs the full relief they seek in this action. Specifically, the court finds that a successful internal union appeal would not result in an enforceable declaration that the modifications of the 1981 collective bargaining agreement are null and void, as SMACNA is not bound by the results of the appeal. See, Parker v. Local 413, 501 F.Supp. 440 (S.D.Ohio 1980). Because such a declaration lies at the heart of plaintiffs' request for relief, the court holds that plaintiffs' § 301 claims should not be dismissed due to plaintiffs' failure to exhaust intra-union remedies.

Individual Union Members

As recently reiterated by the Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981), § 301 does not sanction damage actions against individual employees for violating a labor agreement whether or not the union authorizes the breach. See, Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962). Thus, plaintiffs' § 301 claims against the trustee and members of the bargaining committee must be dismissed to the extent that they seek damages from those individuals. Nevertheless, Atkinson and its progeny do not bar suit against individual employees where only equitable relief is sought. Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. v. Newspaper Guild of Wilkesbarre, Local 120, 647 F.2d 372 (3rd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143, 102 S.Ct. 1003, 71 L.Ed.2d 295 (1982). Given that plaintiffs seek both damages and equitable relief in this action, the court holds that the plaintiffs' § 301 claims against the individual defendants should not be dismissed, except to the extent that the claims seek damages from those individuals.

Failure to State a Claim

In Smith v. Evening News Association, 371 U.S. 195, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962), the Supreme Court held that § 301 provides a right of action to an individual union member who wishes to sue his employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. In reaching that conclusion, the court rejected the employer's argument that § 301 provides jurisdiction only over disputes between an employer and union. In short, the court held that jurisdiction under § 301 is to be determined by reference to the type of contract that is in dispute rather than by reference to the participants in the action.

Nineteen years later, the Supreme Court held that § 301 provides a right of action to a local which desires to sue its international for breach of the union constitution. In reaching that conclusion, the Court stated that a union constitution was a labor agreement for purposes of § 301. See, Plumbers & Pipefitters v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 101 S.Ct. 2546, 69 L.Ed.2d 280 (1981). Despite that conclusion, the Court declined to rule on the ability of an individual union member to sue his local or international for breach of the union constitution. Id. at 627 n. 16, 101 S.Ct. at 2553 n. 16. Although the Court cited Smith for the proposition that § 301 jurisdiction is to be determined by reference to the nature of the underlying agreement, the Court refused to rule on the question of whether an individual union member could pursue a § 301 claim for breach of a union constitution. Compare Abrams v. Carrier Corporation, 434 F.2d 1234 (2nd Cir.197...