Fressadi v. Glover
| Decision Date | 19 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-16-03260-PHX-DJH,CV-16-03260-PHX-DJH |
| Parties | Arek Fressadi, Plaintiff, v. Kathryn Ann Glover, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Pending before the Court are several motions challenging the Court's subject matter jurisdiction filed by pro se1 Plaintiff Arek Fressadi ("Plaintiff") (Docs. 285, 286 & 315). These filings contend Defendants' removal of this case to federal court was improper and seek to have the consolidated actions remanded.2 Defendants Kathryn Glover ("Glover") and Rod Robertson Enterprises Inc. ("RRE") (collectively "Defendants") have responded to Plaintiff's motions (Docs. 295, 297, 298, 319 & 323) and Plaintiff has filed supporting reply briefs (Docs. 299, 301 & 325). The Court recently granted Plaintiff's multiple requests to stay these proceedings (see Docs. 287, 288, 291 & 3153) pending a ruling onhis requests to remand. (Doc. 337). This Order being that ruling, the stay is now lifted. Also pending before the Court is RRE's Sealed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 239) and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint (Doc. 308), the latter to which Glover has responded (Doc. 316) and Plaintiff has replied (Doc. 320).4 Before reaching the merits of RRE's Motion for Summary Judgment or Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend, however, the Court will assess the threshold jurisdictional issues raised by Plaintiff.
The events giving rise to Plaintiff's complaints occurred on or about August 26, 2014, in Pima County. While riding a 1993 Suzuki motorcycle, Plaintiff was allegedly hit from behind by Glover and airlifted from the crash site to the hospital. (Doc. 4-7 at 6). Plaintiff claims that, before being evacuated, he told Glover and the responding Pima County Sheriff's deputies to use his free towing coverage from Liberty Mutual Insurance ("Liberty") to have the motorcycle towed to his garage. (Id. at 6-8). This did not occur, and the motorcycle was instead towed to RRE's storage yard. (Id. at 8).
Throughout the next three months, Plaintiff underwent various surgeries to treat injuries from the accident. (Id.) He was often sedated due to the pain of his injuries and subsequent surgeries. (Id.) During this time, Pima County Sheriff's Department ("PCSD") sent him a letter dated August 27, 2014, stating that, if his motorcycle was not released from RRE's storage yard within 10 days, a claim could be filed to transfer ownership ofthe motorcycle. (Id. at 7). In order to release the vehicle, Plaintiff had to present PCSD with proof of ownership and pay for all related towing and storage fees. (Id.)
Plaintiff claims he first learned his motorcycle had been taken to RRE's storage yard in late September 2014. (Id. at 9). He called RRE, who told him that he needed to get clearance from PCSD to release his motorcycle. (Id.) He then contacted PCSD, who informed him that he would need to present his driver's license in person, proof of insurance, and a fee in person to get clearance to release the motorcycle. (Id.) Plaintiff claims he was unable to physically present these documents due to his injuries. (Id.)
After receiving RRE's notification that no one had claimed the motorcycle, Arizona's Motor Vehicle Department ("MVD") sent multiple letters to Plaintiff's home advising him that the motorcycle would be processed as an abandoned vehicle if he did not recover it. (Id.) To avoid the fees associated with an abandoned vehicle fine, Plaintiff sent the notarized title to RRE in early October. (Id. at 10). Plaintiff claims that RRE then filed a "false writing with the State's Motor Vehicle Department ("MVD") on October 20, 2014, indicating that no one had contacted RRE claiming ownership or right of possession of the motorcycle during RRE's period of possession." (Id.) The MVD accepted RRE's "false writing." (Id.)
Plaintiff sent letters in January 2015 disputing MVD's authority to transfer title of the motorcycle. (Id.) He also contacted PCSD, who informed him that he would have to pay $3,021.50 in storage fees to retrieve his motorcycle. (Id.) Plaintiff did not pay the storage fees or retrieve the vehicle. On May 19, 2015, RRE sold the motorcycle. (Id.)
On August 27, 2015, Plaintiff sued Glover, RRE, Pima County, and the State of Arizona in Pima County Superior Court in Case Number CV-2015-3965 ("Case 1").6 (Doc. 1-1). In that action, Plaintiff alleged various state law claims arising out of the August 26,2014 accident. (Id.) Plaintiff specifically asserted a cause of action against RRE for conversion resulting from its storage and sale of the motorcycle. (Id. at 10). RRE filed a Notice of Settlement in Case 1 on December 23, 2015. (Doc. 1-7 at 19). On January 7, 2016, RRE and Plaintiff entered into a Settlement Agreement in which Plaintiff, in exchange for $3,000, agreed to "release and forever discharge the Defendant . . . from any and all claims, demands, actions and causes of action, and any liability whatsoever, on account of or in any manner arising or to arise out of the conversion of a 1993 Suzuki motorcycle." (Doc. 239, Ex. B). RRE delivered a check for $3,000 to Plaintiff the following day, and Plaintiff deposited the funds. (See Doc. 2-5 at 50).
On January 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Non-Settlement and Application for Entry of Default. (Doc. 1-7 at 32). In this filing, Plaintiff stated that he wished to revoke the Settlement Agreement due to newly-discovered evidence, and he raised "additional claims of due process, equal protection, and takings issues per 42 U.S.C. § 1983...that [required] Plaintiff to amend his complaint to include the new information and Section 1983 claims." (Id. at 33). Plaintiff argued that new evidence revealed a conspiracy existed between the Arizona Department of Transportation ("ADOT"), PCSO, and RRE in which PCSO forces vehicles to be towed to RRE, the MVD transfers title upon request, and then RRE and PCSO share in the profits upon RRE's auction of the abandoned vehicles. Plaintiff therefore claimed that the Settlement Agreement was void because RRE's attorneys fraudulently concealed his potential RICO and § 1983 claims resulting from this conspiracy. (Id.) RRE thereafter filed a Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement. (Doc. 2-2 at 12).
The state court judge held a hearing on RRE's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement and Plaintiff's objections on March 7, 2016. (Doc. 2-4 at 33; Doc. 2-5 at 41-42).7 After hearing arguments and considering the briefing, the court evaluated andrejected Plaintiff's objections to the Settlement Agreement. (Doc. 2-5 at 48-51). The court found that a valid settlement agreement existed between the parties. (Id. at 51). The court expressly held that a legal opinion could not form the basis of a fraud claim, and Plaintiff's evidence of alleged fraud was precluded by the parole evidence rule. (Id. at 50, 51). The court therefore granted RRE's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement, dismissed all claims against RRE with prejudice, and granted RRE's request for attorney's fees and costs. (Id. at 51 ()). Plaintiff thereafter moved for reconsideration of the ruling on the enforceability of the Settlement Agreement, arguing he was fraudulently induced to enter the Settlement Agreement and had suffered intentional infliction of emotional distress regarding the original conversion claim. (Doc. 3-2 at 2-15). On March 23, 2016, the Superior Court denied Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration because "Plaintiff [had] not set forth any new arguments or facts that would justify reconsideration. . . ." (Doc. 3-2 at 23). On April 13, Plaintiff also moved for reconsideration of the state court's award of attorneys' fees to RRE on the grounds that "RRE...concealed that their criminal conduct was part of a joint Venture agreement with the Pima County Sheriff's Department ("PCSD") where the State acted in concert and or was complicit with RRE's and PCSD's criminal / unlawful conduct." (Doc. 3-9 at 25-26). On April 19, 2019, the state court denied this motion. (Id. at 29). On April 19, 2016, the court issued a final judgment in favor of RRE. (Id. at 30 ()). Plaintiff did not timely appeal the judgment.
Following the Court's dismissal of RRE, on March 25, 2016, Plaintiff moved for a change of venue in Case 1. (Doc. 3-2 at 24). He specifically requested that his case betransferred from Pima County to Graham County due to the corruption he perceived in Pima, Maricopa, Yuma, Cochise, and Santa Cruz counties. (Id. at 25 ( ). While this motion was pending, on March 30, 2016, the Pima County court granted the State of Arizona's pending motion to dismiss it from the action. (Doc. 3-2 at 42-43). Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of that order ("Motion to Reconsider March 30 Order") (Doc. 3-3 at 2). In that Motion, he argued that the court had "no jurisdiction to rule on anything in this case after March 25, 2016," or after Plaintiff filed his Motion for Change of Venue pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-408. (Id.) Accordingly, he argued that the ruling in the State's favor amounted to "a violation of Plaintiff's State constitutional rights, and his U.S. Constitutional rights to due process and equal protection as protected under the Fourteenth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. § 1983" and raises "claims of a Judicial Takings." (Id....
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