Frett v. State Farm Emp. Workers' Comp.
Citation | 844 S.E.2d 749,309 Ga. 44 |
Decision Date | 16 June 2020 |
Docket Number | S19G0447 |
Parties | FRETT v. STATE FARM EMPLOYEE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION et al. |
Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Robert Eugene Bourne, Elliot Jackson Bourne, Bourne Law Firm, 106 Colony Park Dr., Suite 1000, Cumming, Georgia 30040, Nicholas Dale Benzine, Benzine Law Group, 3535 Roswell Road, Ste 9, Marietta, Georgia 30062, Attorneys for the Appellant.
Todd K. Maziar, Morgan & Morgan, PLLC, P.O. BOX 57007, Atlanta, Georgia 30343, Attorneys for the Amicus Appellant.
Charles E. Harris, IV, Karen G. Lowell, Swift Currie McGhee & Hiers LLP, 1355 Peachtree Street, N.E., Ste 300, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-1924, Attorneys for the Appellee.
Rochelle Frett was injured when she slipped and fell at her place of employment during a scheduled lunch break. She filed a claim for benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, OCGA § 34-9-1 et seq., but the State Board of Workers’ Compensation denied her claim. Frett sought judicial review, and the superior court upheld the denial of her claim. Frett then appealed the decision of the superior court, and in Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers’ Compensation, 348 Ga. App. 30, 821 S.E.2d 132 (2018), the Court of Appeals affirmed. Relying on Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Farr, 180 Ga. 266, 178 S.E. 728 (1935), the Court of Appeals held that Frett suffered no injury compensable under the Act because she sustained her injury during a scheduled break, and her injury, therefore, did not arise out of her employment.1 We issued a writ of certiorari to reconsider Farr and review the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case. For the reasons that follow, we overrule Farr, and we reverse the decision below.
1. The facts in this case are undisputed and are summarized accurately in the opinion of the Court of Appeals:
Frett, 348 Ga. App. at 31, 821 S.E.2d 132.
Frett filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. After a hearing, an administrative law judge awarded benefits, but the appellate division of the Board later reversed the award and denied benefits. The Board found that Frett had not sustained a compensable injury under the Act because, although her injury "arose in the course of her employment, it did not arise out of her employment but, instead, arose out of a purely personal matter." Frett sought judicial review in the Superior Court of DeKalb County,2 which ultimately affirmed the denial of benefits. Frett then filed an application for discretionary review,3 and the Court of Appeals granted her application. See Frett, 348 Ga. App. at 30, 821 S.E.2d 132.
Affirming the judgment of the superior court, the Court of Appeals perceived a conflict in the case law with respect to the compensability of an injury that is sustained in circumstances like those presented here. Broadly speaking, one line of cases held that an injury may be compensable if it occurs as an employee is entering the premises of the employer to begin her work or exiting the premises when her work is done. This principle is commonly known as the "ingress and egress rule." See Frett, 348 Ga. App. at 33, 821 S.E.2d 132. Another line of cases, beginning with Farr, held that an injury is not compensable if it occurs during a "scheduled" break. These principles came into conflict, the Court of Appeals noted, in cases in which an employee was injured as she was leaving the premises of her employer at the beginning of a scheduled break or entering the premises at the end of a break. See id. at 34-35, 821 S.E.2d 132. Attempting to resolve this conflict, the Court of Appeals determined that its prior decisions applying the ingress and egress rule to scheduled lunch breaks were "an improper dilution" of Farr, and so, it "disapprove[d]" those decisions, noting that "any decision to apply the ingress and egress rule to the scheduled break exception should be made by our Supreme Court, particularly because the Supreme Court has never expressed its view on the ingress and egress rule generally." Id. at 36, 821 S.E.2d 132.
The Court of Appeals then concluded that Frett's injury was not compensable because it occurred during a scheduled lunch break, when she was "free to do as she pleased." Id.
2. The Workers’ Compensation Act provides for compensation for injuries that occur "in the course of" employment and "aris[e] out of" employment. See OCGA § 34-9-1 (4). These two prerequisites to compensation, which have remained unchanged since the original adoption of the Act in 1920, are "independent and distinct," and any claim for compensation under the Act must satisfy both prerequisites. See Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Stevens, 278 Ga. 166, 166 (1), 598 S.E.2d 456 (2004). See also New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 687, 118 S.E. 786 (1923). The Court of Appeals below did not address the "in the course of" prerequisite. It instead held only that the injury sustained by Frett is not compensable because it did not "arise out of" her employment. See Frett, 348 Ga. App. at 36, 821 S.E.2d 132. For a proper analysis of this case, however, each prerequisite to compensation must be examined.
(a) In the Course of Employment. An injury arises "in the course of" employment when it "occurs within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee may be in performance of her duties and while she is fulfilling or doing something incidental to those duties." Hennly v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 355, 356 (1), 444 S.E.2d 317 (1994). This statutory prerequisite "relates to the time, place and circumstances under which the injury takes place." Potts v. UAP-Ga. Ag. Chem., Inc., 270 Ga. 14, 15, 506 S.E.2d 101 (1998). See also Stevens, 278 Ga. at 166 (1), 598 S.E.2d 456 ().
Injuries occurring "in the course of" employment certainly include injuries sustained when an employee is actually engaged in the performance of her assigned work, but they also include injuries sustained when the employee is engaged in activities "incidental" to her assigned work. See Hennly, 264 Ga. at 356 (1), 444 S.E.2d 317. Such incidental activities include, among other things, ingress and egress to the place of work while on the employer's premises. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Coram, 95 Ga. App. 622, 624, 98 S.E.2d 214 (1957) (). See also Longuepee v. Georgia Institute of Technology, 269 Ga. App. 884, 885, 605 S.E.2d 455 (2004). Incidental activities also include the employee reasonably attending to routine personal needs, such as eating a meal or using the restroom. See, e.g., Thornton v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 198 Ga. 786, 788, 32 S.E.2d 816 (1945) ; Harris v. Peach County Bd. of Commrs., 296 Ga. App. 225, 231, 674 S.E.2d 36 (2009) (same). See also 1 Douglas T. Lay, Kissiah and Lay's Georgia Workers’ Compensation Law § 5.08 (4th ed. 2017) ().4 The latter principle is consistent with Farr, in which we assumed that a worker's injury that occurred while he was preparing to eat lunch at his job site occurred "in the course of" his employment. See Farr, 180 Ga. at 270, 178 S.E. 728. And we have directly applied this principle in a case in which a salesman on a business trip suffered a fatal accident while walking to his hotel from a café where he had eaten dinner. Thornton, 198 Ga. at 787, 32 S.E.2d 816. There, we held that the salesman's injury occurred "in the course of" his employment, and we reasoned that a traveling employee's lodging in a hotel "or preparing to eat, or while going to or returning from a meal" was conduct "incident to his employment, unless he steps aside from his employment for personal reasons." Id. at 790, 32 S.E.2d 816.5
Applying these principles to this case, we conclude that Frett sustained an injury "in the course of" her...
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