Frew v. Hawkins
| Decision Date | 22 August 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CIVA3:93CA065WWJ.,CIVA3:93CA065WWJ. |
| Citation | 401 F.Supp.2d 619 |
| Parties | Linda FREW, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Albert HAWKINS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Joaquin Amaya, Jr, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Plainview, for All Plaintiffs, Plaintiff.
Edward Bradbury Cloutman, III, Law Offices of Ed Cloutman, Dallas, for All Plaintiffs, Class Members, Charlotte Garvin, Linda Frew, Maria Ayala, Mary. Fisher, Mary Jane Garza, Shannon Garcia, Plaintiffs.
Gregory Scott Coleman, Weil Gotshal & Manges, Austin, for Bridgett Cook, Linda Wertz, MD Susan Penfield, Dr William Archer, Richard Ladd, MD Beverly Koops, Defendants.
Linda Ann Halpern, Attorney General's Office, Austin, for All Defendants, Defendant.
Mark J Hanna, Mark J Hanna PC, Austin, for Texas Dental Association, Movant.
John Robert Heard, Heard & Smith, San Antonio, for All Plaintiffs, Class Members, Carla Frew, Charlotte Garvin, Linda Frew, Maria Ayala, Mary. Fisher, Mary Jane Garza, Shannon Garcia, Plaintiffs.
Edwin N Horne, Attorney General's Office, Austin, for All Defendants, Dr Eduardo Sanchez, Michael. McKinney, Marina Henderson, Defendants.
Jeffrey S Levin, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Plainview, for Carla Frew, Linda Frew, Maria Ayala, Mary. Fisher, Mary Jane Garza, Crystal Noelevol Brown, James Curtis Brown, Jeremiah DeMark Phillips, Russell Kline Walton, All Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs.
Israel Morales Reyna, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Laredo, for All Plaintiffs, Plaintiff.
Sharon E Reynerson, Lone Star Legal Aid, Paris, for Dominique Shantel Frazar, Jeneva Frazar, Carla Frew, Linda Frew, Crystal Noelevol Brown, James Curtis Brown, Jeremiah DeMark Phillips, Russell Kline Walton, Gloria Padilla, Martha Doe, Maria Ayala, Mary. Fisher, Mary Jane Garza, Plaintiffs.
Richard E Salisbury, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, for All Defendants, Defendant.
Rodolfo David Sanchez, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc, Weslaco, for All Plaintiffs, Plaintiff.
Melanie Plowman Sarwal, Weil Gotshal & Manges — Austin, Austin, for Bridgett Cook, Don Gilbert, Linda Wertz, MD Susan Penfield, Dr William Archer, Richard Ladd, MD Beverly Koops, Defendants.
Matthew F Stowe, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, for All Defendants, Defendant.
Peter J Strelitz, Segal McCambridge Singer & Mahoney, Austin, for Bridgett Cook, Linda Wertz, MD Susan Penfield, Dr William Archer, Richard Ladd, Charles E Bell, Defendants.
Jane Kathryn Swanson, Attorney at Law, The Woodlands, for All Plaintiffs, Carla Frew, Linda Frew, Maria Ayala, Mary. Fisher, Mary Jane Garza, Crystal
Noelevol Brown, James Curtis Brown, Jeremiah DeMark Phillips, Russell Kline Walton, Class Members, Charlotte Garvin, Shannon Garcia, Plaintiffs.
Susan Finkelstein Zinn, Attorney at Law, San Antonio, for Carla Frew, Linda Frew, Dominique Shantel Frazar, Crystal Noelevol Brown, James Curtis Brown, Jeremiah DeMark Phillips, Russell Kline Walton, Jeneva Frazar, Maria Ayala, Mary. Fisher, Mary Jane Garza, Gloria Padilla, Martha Doe, Dr William Archer, All Plaintiffs, Class Members, Charlotte Garvin, Shannon Garcia, Plaintiffs.
JUSTICE, Senior District Judge.
Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From Judgment (Docket No. 406) has been presented for adjudication.
Filed on September 1, 1993, this civil action concerns the alleged failure of the State of Texas to implement a Medicaid program that assures that indigent children and youth receive timely, comprehensive health care. The action was brought by a class of more than one and one-half million indigent children in Texas who are entitled to health benefits through the Early Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment ("EPSDT") program.1 See Docket No. 1, 93; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43),2 1396d(r).3 In Texas, the program is referred to as "Texas Health Steps," which is administered jointly by the federal government and the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. EPSDT is intended to be "the nation's largest preventive health program for children." H.R. 3299, 101st Cong. § 4213 (1989). It is "among the most important programs that the Texas Department of Health runs." Docket No. 133 at 8 (internal quotes omitted).
The purpose of the EPSDT program is to ensure that poor children receive comprehensive health care at an early age, in order that they will develop fewer health problems as they grow older. EPSDT is designed to provide health education, preventive care, and effective follow-up care for conditions identified during check-ups. Preventive health care identifies health problems that may respond to early treatment but, if left untreated, may instead lead to serious health conditions. For example, a heart murmur detected during an EPSDT screening, if untreated, could lead to heart failure. Severe anemia, if untreated, could result in behavioral problems and reduced mental capacity. Other important components of the EPSDT program include immunizations, parental education, assistance with scheduling appointments, transportation assistance, and coordination of EPSDT and other programs serving Medicaid-eligible children.
After two years of extensive negotiation following the filing of this case, the parties proposed the Consent Decree to the Court in July of 1995. During a fairness hearing held in December of that year, the parties urged the Court to approve the proposed decree. The Court approved the Consent Decree as fair, reasonable, and adequate on February 16, 1996. Docket No. 135. Per the agreement of the parties, the Consent Decree expressly retains the Court's jurisdiction to rectify violations of its terms, and provides a mechanism to invoke this jurisdiction.4 On November 10, 1998, Plaintiffs filed their first Motion to Enforce Consent Decree. Docket No. 208. After nearly a year and a half of discovery and jurisdictional challenges, the Court held a hearing in March of 2000 on Plaintiffs' motion (the "2000 Hearing"). Evidence was presented on multiple issues, including, inter alia: (1) proper implementation of the outreach program and delivery of required outreach reports; (2) operation of the State's managed care system; (3) Defendants' operation of toll-free numbers; and (4) provision of case management to all class members who need it, statewide. In a lengthy memorandum opinion and order, the Court found that the State had failed to comply with numerous provisions of the Consent Decree and that the Consent Decree is enforceable. See Frew v. Gilbert, 109 F.Supp.2d 579 (E.D.Tex.2000) (the "2000 Opinion"). In an attempt to judiciously consider the recommendations of state officials, the Court requested that the parties submit proposed corrective action plans, rather than the Court's unilaterally entering a comprehensive order of enforcement. Before submitting the proposed corrective action plans, however, Defendants brought two interlocutory appeals; and the Fifth Circuit stayed the Court's order requesting proposed corrective action plans during the pendency of the appeals. See Frazar v. Gilbert, 300 F.3d 530 (5th Cir.2002).
One of the appeals involved Defendants' argument that a federal court's jurisdiction over a state official is limited by the Eleventh Amendment to requiring compliance with federal law. Defendants argued that the Consent Decree may not be enforced against them, to the extent that it goes beyond the scope of simple compliance with federal law. The Court rejected this argument, but the Court was overruled by the Fifth Circuit on appeal. Frazar, 300 F.3d at 530. The Fifth Circuit held that the Eleventh Amendment prevented enforcement of the Consent Decree, unless the violation of the Consent Decree was also a statutory violation of the Medicaid Act that imposed a clear and binding obligation on the State. Id. at 543. The Supreme Court, however, unanimously reversed the Fifth Circuit, holding that the Consent Decree is enforceable, in its entirety, under Ex Parte Young.5 Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 124 S.Ct. 899, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004). The Supreme Court noted that, "[t]he decree states that it creates `a mandatory, enforceable obligation,'" in the process of holding that "[o]nce entered, a consent decree may be enforced." Id. at 438, 440, 124 S.Ct. 899 (quoting Consent Decree ¶ 302). On remand, the Fifth Circuit held that, absent the jurisdictional issues related to the Eleventh Amendment, it lacked interlocutory jurisdiction over the appeal.6 Frazar v. Hawkins, 376 F.3d 444 (5th Cir.2004).
The Supreme Court, while clarifying that the Consent Decree is valid and enforceable in its entirety, also explained that "the law's primary response to [the fear that enforcement of consent decrees can undermine the sovereign interests and accountability of state governments] has its source not in the Eleventh Amendment but in the court's equitable powers and the direction given by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Frew, 540 U.S. at 441, 124 S.Ct. 899. It provided Defendants with a potential avenue for relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) (hereinafter "Rule 60(b)(5)"), and directed the Court and the parties to two cases as examples of the application of Rule 60(b)(5) to consent decrees in the context of institutional reform litigation. It also explained that a "federal court must exercise its equitable powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials." Id. at 442, 124 S.Ct. 899. Defendants thus filed the instant Rule 60(b)(5) Motion for Relief from Judgment ("Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion") on November 4, 2004. Docket No. 406.
The Court held a hearing from June 6-15, 2005 (the "June Hearing"), on Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion. Following the hearing, Plaintiffs and Defendants submitted briefs on the legal and factual issues involved in the...
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