Frewe v. Dupons Const. Co.
Decision Date | 30 January 1968 |
Citation | 155 N.W.2d 595,37 Wis.2d 676 |
Parties | Estelle A. FREWE and Transcontinental Insurance Company, a Foreign Corporation, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. DUPONS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Inc. and Wisconsin Natural Gas Company, Defendants-Respondents, City of Kenosha, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
K. Thomas Savage, Kenosha, for appellant.
Kenneth M. Kenney, Wolfe, O'Leary, Kenney & Wolfe, Milwaukee, for plaintiffs-respondents.
Prosser, Zimmermann, Wiedabach, Koppa & Lane, Milwaukee, for Wis. Nat. Gas Co.; Heide, Sheldon, Hartley & Thom, Kenosha, of counsel.
This case comes before the court on denial of a motion for summary judgment. The standard rules governing inquiry on summary judgment are set forth in Hyland Hall & Co. v. Madison Gas & Electric Co. (1960), 11 Wis.2d 238, 244, 245, 105 N.W.2d 305, 309, 310:
'As has been said many times by this court, the inquiry on summary judgment is not to decide the questions of fact raised by the affidavits and other proof, but to decide whether such questions exist and should be submitted to the trier of the facts * * *. The law applicable to granting or denying summary judgment has been stated many times by this court. In Voysey v. Labisky (1960), 10 Wis.2d 274, 277, 103 N.W.2d 9, we stated:
The issue presented, therefore, is whether there are any triable issues of fact presented. The issue turns on two questions: (1) Whether the employment relation of Bailey with the city was such that it can be said as a matter of law that Bailey was acting outside the scope of employment at the time of his alleged negligence concerning the explosion; and (2) Does sec. 62.15 (11), Stats., insulate the city from liability for the negligence of its employee, Bailey.
It is settled law that a master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant when such acts are within the scope of the servant's employment. Kruse v. Weigand (1931), 204 Wis. 195, 235 N.W. 426; Eckel v. Richter (1926), 191 Wis. 409, 211 N.W. 158.
'A master is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the negligent conduct of servants within the scope of employment.' Restatement, 1 Agency (2d), p. 536, sec. 243.
The first question presented is whether Bailey was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of his alleged negligence concerning the explosion incident.
The city urges that Bailey was merely an 'inspector' on the job and consequently was acting outside the scope of his employment in the matter. The city bases this contention on the following provision of the contract specifications entered into between the city and Dupons.
Concededly, these provisions define the inspector's duty. However, this definition does not constitute an express limitation upon the scope of the inspector's authority. Consequently, there is room for argument and evidential presentation that Bailey was given further duties in connection with his job. If such was the case, or if Bailey so acted with the knowledge and acquiescence of the city, his scope of employment may have been greater than that described in the contract provisions above.
From the affidavits before the trial court, questions are raised as to exactly what the scope of Bailey's employment was. There is testimony which indicates it is quite unclear whether Bailey's authority extended further than 'inspection.' The deposition of James M. Foote, Dupons' foreman on the job, revealed the following:
'Q How did it happen that the sewer lateral was constructed to the Isetts Building if it was not part of the original project?
'A It was a directive from the City to put it in.
'Q Who from the City directed to put it in?
'A It came to me from the City Inspector.
'Q Who was that?
'A Mr. Bailey--Robert Bailey.
'* * *
'Q As I understand your testimony, initially it was Bailey who told you about the requirement to have the lateral go into the Isetts Building?
'A Yes, my orders came from him.
'Q How did you get that?
'A Verbally.
'Q No work order?
'A I never saw any work order.
'* * *
'Q What was your understanding what Bailey's position was with reference to this 55th Street Job?
'A He was the City Inspector.
'Q What was your then impression of what an inspector was to do concerning that job?
'A He was to see that everything was installed according to specifications.
'Q By your understanding, did he have any supervisory over above you as to the job?
'A Yes, being that the City is the owner and he--the City Inspector's word, you might say, is law when you are doing a job or any inspector.
'Q Did he take--did he perform any physical activities insofar as that sewer job was concerned?
'A No, sir; outside of errands he ran a few errands.
'Q For you?
'Q His job, by your understanding, was to see that you and the Dupons Company performed in keeping with the contract and specifications; is that right?
'A That's correct.
'Q And not beyond that?
'A No, he didn't have no absolute duties beyond that.
'* * *
'Q And in the course of the period that you had worked with him, he had from time to time given you specific instructions to do certain things incident to Dupons' performance of a particular job?
'A In a capacity of City Inspector, yes.
'Q And you observed his instructions when he gave you them?
'A Yes, I did.'
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that the duties of 'inspection' exclude a certain amount of supervision or direction. Part of that duty, it seems, might be not only to inspect, but to see that the job is done right and direct how it is to be done or redone and corrected.
Seidl v. Knop (1921), 174 Wis. 397, 400, 182 N.W. 980, 981.
A certain amount of instruction and direction is not necessarily unnatural, disconnected or extraordinary so as to say it was outside the scope of Bailey's employment.
Unrman v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc. (1957), 2 Wis.2d 71, 76, 77, 85 N.W.2d 772, 774 (Emphasis supplied.)
There is, therefore, a triable question of fact, viz, the scope of Bailey's employment with the city.
Whether the trial court felt, or this court feels, the evidence preponderated on one side or the other of the question...
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