Friar v. State
| Decision Date | 09 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. CR-15-825,CR-15-825 |
| Citation | Friar v. State, 2016 Ark. 245, No. CR-15-825 (Ark. Jun 09, 2016) |
| Parties | ROBERT FRIAR APPELLANT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
APPEAL FROM THE JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
AFFIRMED.
Appellant Robert Friar appeals the sentencing order entered by the Jackson County Circuit Court convicting him of capital murder, two counts of attempted capital murder, and seven counts of committing a terroristic act. For these crimes, the circuit court sentenced Friar to life in prison without parole for capital murder1 and, as an habitual offender, to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling 165 years for the remaining offenses. For reversal, Friar contends that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress, in granting the State's motion in limine, and by declining his request to provide the jury with instructions on lesser-included offenses. We affirm on all issues.2
Our review of the record reveals that Delana Aguirre and her children lived in a duplex in the Crossroads area of Newport, Arkansas, with her sister and her mother, Leslie Curl. During the early morning hours of February 27, 2013, Friar fired seven shots from outside the home through the window of Aguirre's bedroom where she had retired for the evening with two of her children. Aguirre survived three gunshot wounds—one to her back, one to her buttocks, and another to her arm. Unfortunately, Aguirre's twenty-month-old daughter, Tacquari, perished after being struck by a single bullet. Aguirre's other child was unharmed.
According to the testimony, Friar and Aguirre had been dating for seven months, and the relationship had become volatile. Aguirre testified that Friar had physically abused her, saying that he had choked her, had struck her with a closed fist, and once had hit her with a belt buckle. She also testified that Friar had threatened her life and the lives of her children and her mother. On the evening of the shooting, Friar sent Aguirre an ominous text message saying, "YEA I WILL HAVE THE LAST SAY SO U N UR MOM TELL D KIDS U LOVE THEM." At 2:32 a.m., mere seconds before the shots rang out, Friar placed a cellular phone call to Aguirre, wherein he said something that she could not understand, and then disconnected the call. Aguirre testified that she was sitting on her bedsmoking a cigarette when Friar called and that the light from her phone was shining in the direction of the window.
The testimony also established that Friar was in close proximity to Aguirre's home at the time of the shooting. Friar lived with his mother near Garfield Street, which was at least a couple of miles from Aguirre's residence. However, that morning he had been riding in a vehicle with Bobbie Woodruff, who parked beside her aunt's house, which was near Aguirre's duplex. Bobbie testified that Friar got out of the vehicle to relieve himself; that he did not return to the vehicle; and that she picked him up a short while later around the corner from where she had parked. The evidence showed that Friar and Woodruff exchanged text messages and phone calls within minutes of the shooting and before they reconnected.
Officers arrested Friar that morning at 4:12 a.m. on Garfield Street and transported him to the Jackson County Sheriff's Office. During the booking process, officers seized Friar's clothing and his cell phone. At that time, Friar was heard to say, That morning, agents of the Arkansas State Police attempted to question Friar, but Friar refused to speak with them. However, later that morning, Friar gave a statement to an officer with the Newport Police Department, and the agents from the state police subsequently interviewed Friar twice that same day. In his three statements, Friar denied that he had been involved in the shooting.
As his first point on appeal, Friar argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress. His argument is multifaceted. Friar contends that there was no probablecause for his warrantless arrest, which requires the suppression of his statements and of the evidence collected from his clothing and his cell phone.3 In addition, Friar argues that the circuit court should have suppressed his statements because the police failed to honor his requests for an attorney and to remain silent. He also asserts that his statements were not voluntarily given but were instead the product of coercion, intimidation, deception, and ignorance.
Edwards further testified that he had known Friar since childhood. He said that sometimes large crowds gathered at the lower end of town and that Friar was often combative with the police on those occasions. Edwards described Friar as an "instigator" and said that Friar was the main focus of attention when dispersing the crowd. Edwards recalled a previous incident in which Friar had been accused of shooting a firearm at another person. For reasons of safety, Edwards had made other officers aware of Friar's aggressive behavior.
In his testimony, McClellan stated that Edwards sent him to provide security at the hospital where the victims had been taken. He said that he spoke with Aguirre, who told him that Friar had shot her and that Friar had purchased a gun from Bobbie Woodruff. McClellan stated that Aguirre implied that Friar was her ex-boyfriend. When McClellan was dispatched to take Friar into custody, he located Friar walking down Garland Street.
Detective Chuck Benish also testified at the hearing. When he arrived at the duplex, Aguirre and Tacquari had been taken to the hospital. Benish said that Edwards advised him that the shooter had been outside the residence because shell casings were located near the window that was riddled with bullet holes. Benish drove to the hospital and spoke with Aguirre. She told him that Friar had shot her and that she had received a phone call from Friar just prior to the shooting. Aguirre also informed Benish that Friar had sent a textmessage to her that night saying that "[Aguirre] and her mother better tell their kids they loved them." Benish recalled that Aguirre told him that Friar had asked her which bedroom she was sleeping in that night and that she had informed Friar that she was sleeping in her children's bedroom, as she did not have one of her own. Benish testified that Aguirre never told him that she saw the shooter and that Aguirre informed him that she had not seen Friar in two days.
For reversal, Friar argues that the officers neither individually nor collectively had probable cause to arrest him. He contends that the evidence amounts only to a strong suspicion based on an ambiguous text message and a phone call immediately prior to the shooting. Friar points out that no one claimed to have seen the shooter and that the police located him after the shooting on the other side of town. Friar asserts that the statement he made during booking, the other statements he gave to the police, his clothing, and the information contained on his cell phone must be suppressed as the fruits of the unlawful arrest.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court conducts a de novo review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical facts for clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause, giving due weight to inferences drawn by the circuit court. MacKintrush v. State, 2016 Ark. 14, 479 S.W.3d 14. A finding is clearly erroneous, even if there is evidence to support it, when the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Johnson v. State, 2015 Ark. 387, 472 S.W.3d 486.
This court has held many times that probable cause to arrest without a warrant exists when the facts and circumstances within the collective knowledge of the officers and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested. Friend v. State, 315 Ark. 143, 865 S.W.2d 275 (1993). Such probable cause does not require that degree of proof sufficient to sustain a conviction; however, a mere suspicion or even "a strong reason to suspect" will not...
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Schnarr v. State
...the circuit court's decision to not give an instruction on a lesser-included offense if there is no rational basis for doing so. Friar v. State, 2016 Ark. 245. This court will not reverse a trial court's ruling on the submission of a lesser-included jury instruction absent an abuse of discr......
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Armstrong v. State
...for giving a lesser-included instruction when the defense to the charge is a total denial of wrongdoing. See, e.g. , Friar v. State , 2016 Ark. 245, 2016 WL 3346565 (affirming refusal to give lesser-included instructions on first- and second-degree murder where defense was that appellant wa......
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Collins v. State
...and we will not reverse a circuit court's ruling on the admission of evidence in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Friar v. State , 2016 Ark. 245, 2016 WL 3346565. An abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit court's decision, but require......
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Porras v. State
...of which he has been accused. See Brown v. State, 321 Ark. 413, 416, 903 S.W.2d 160, 162 (1995). For example, in Friar v. State, 2016 Ark. 245, at 19–20, 2016 WL 3346565, in which the defendant was charged with capital murder and attempted capital murder, our supreme court held that the cir......