Fridriksson v. Alachua Cnty. Sheriff's Office
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-64-AW-GRJ |
| Decision Date | 06 June 2022 |
| Parties | CHANCE FRIDRIKSSON, Plaintiff, v. ALACHUA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,[1] DEPUTY VILLEGAS, SERGEANT SUDBURY and LT. JAMIE SCOTT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court are two motions filed by two different sets of Defendants in this Eighth Amendment “failure-to-protect” case brought under 42 U.S.C § 1983. ECF No. 9.
The first motion is a motion for summary judgment by Alachua County Sheriff's officer Defendants Scott Sudbury (“Sudbury”) and Jamie Scott (“Scott”). ECF No. 27. Sudbury and Scott argue they are entitled to summary judgment because Fridriksson failed to rebut their evidence that they did not have the culpable state of mind necessary to support a deliberate indifference claim and because they are entitled to qualified immunity.
The second motion is a motion to dismiss by Defendant Deputy Villegas (“Villegas”). ECF No. 35. In this motion, Villegas argues that Fridriksson failed to allege that Villegas had the subjective knowledge needed to state a claim for deliberate indifference and that he, too, is entitled to qualified immunity.
Fridriksson has not responded to either motion, even though the Court gave him several opportunities to do so, warning him that failure to respond would result in a recommendation that this case be dismissed. It appears, therefore, that Fridriksson has abandoned this case.
For the reasons discussed below, this case is due to be dismissed for failure to prosecute and for failure to comply with a court order. Separate from dismissal for failure to prosecute summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of Defendants Sudbury and Scott as there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding Fridriksson's deliberate indifference claim against these Defendants. Lastly, Villegas' Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted on qualified immunity grounds.
On October 25, 2021, the Court issued a Summary Judgment Notice, ECF No. 28, directing Fridriksson to respond to Defendant Sudbury and Scott's Motion for Summary Judgment on or before November 24, 2021, with a sworn counter-affidavit, other witnesses' sworn counter-affidavits, depositions, exhibits. ECF No. 28 at 1. The Court cautioned Fridriksson that “(1) failure to respond to the summary judgment motion will indicate that the motion is unopposed; (2) all material facts asserted in the motion will be considered admitted unless controverted by proper evidentiary materials... and (3) Plaintiff may not rely solely on the allegations in the issue pleadings. in opposing the summary judgment motion.” Id. at 2.
When Fridriksson failed to respond by the November 24, 2021, deadline, the Court directed him to show cause on or before January 15, 2022, why Defendants' motion should not be granted. ECF No. 30. The Court further warned Fridriksson that “failure to comply with the order within the allotted time would result in a recommendation that the motion be granted as unopposed.” Id. at 1. The show cause deadline passed nearly four months ago, and Fridriksson has still not responded.
With respect to Villegas' Motion to Dismiss, after Fridriksson initially failed to respond, the Court issued another show cause order directing him to respond to the motion to dismiss by April 15, 2022. ECF No. 36 at 2. That deadline has come and gone as well without any response from Fridriksson.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) expressly authorizes the involuntary dismissal of a claim due to a plaintiff's failure to prosecute or abide by court orders or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. State Exch. Bank v. Hartline, 693 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The Federal Rules authorize a district court to dismiss a claim, including a counterclaim, or entire action for failure to prosecute or obey a court order or federal rule.”) (citations omitted). “[A] court also has the inherent ability to dismiss a claim in light of its authority to enforce its orders and provide for the efficient disposition of litigation.” Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962)); see also Foudy v. Indian River Cty. Sheriff's Office, 845 F.3d 1117, 1126 (11th Cir. 2017) () (citations omitted); Smith v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat'l Ass'n, 679 Fed.Appx. 876, 879 (11th Cir. 2017) () (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation omitted).
In this case, Fridriksson was warned on at least three occasions that his case would be dismissed if he failed to respond to Defendants' motions.
Yet, he did not do so. Dismissal of this case is appropriate. Garrett v. Birmingham Police Dep't, 769 Fed.Appx. 899, 900-01 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); Watts v. Ford Motor Co., 648 Fed.Appx. 970, 972-73 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).[2]
Before dismissing a pro se case, courts must consider whether a dismissal without prejudice would effectively be with prejudice because of the statute of limitations. Stephenson v. Warden, 554 Fed.Appx. 835, 838 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Pertinent here, the statute of limitations for claims under Section 1983 for the type of injuries allegedly sustained by Fridriksson is four years. Ellison v. Lester, 275 Fed.Appx. 900, 901-02 n.7 (11th Cir. 2008). (“We have held that the four-year statute of limitations... applies to § 1983 claims arising in Florida.”). In this lawsuit, Fridriksson complains about events that occurred in March through May of 2021. ECF No. 6. Thus, dismissal without prejudice would not bar Fridriksson from refiling this action prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.
Because Defendants' motions center around the same or similar set of facts, yet apply different legal standards, the Court will highlight the background facts relevant to each motion and then address the summary judgment evidence filed by Sudbury and Scott. The Court will then address Villegas' Motion to Dismiss and his defense of qualified immunity.
Plaintiff, Chance Fridriksson (“Fridriksson”), proceeding pro se, brought this lawsuit for damages he suffered after his cellmate allegedly physically and sexually assaulted him while he was incarcerated at the Alachua County jail. The basis of Fridriksson's constitutional claim is that Defendant jail officers failed to protect him from an aggressive, sexually inappropriate and “emotionally unstable” cellmate who attacked him and that Defendants thereafter failed to provide him with mental health counseling.[3] ECF No. 9 at 6-7. Fridriksson also alleges that Defendants failed to investigate his assault and later authored a false disciplinary report about the assault that resulted in Fridriksson's losing his jail privileges for thirty (30) days. Id. at 6.
For relief, Fridriksson seeks $200,000 in actual and punitive damages. ECF No. 9 at 8. Fridriksson also requests a review and investigation conducted by the Attorney General toward the imposition of fines and the loss of the jail's accreditation. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment. Pursuant to Rule 56, a reviewing court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Those materials may include “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). “Only when that burden has been met does the burden shift to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment.” Clark, 929 F.2d at 608.
In the Eleventh Circuit, “[e]ven after Celotex, it is never enough simply to state that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden at trial.” Id. “Instead, the moving party must point to specific portions of the record in order to demonstrate that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden of proof at trial.” United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property in Green and Tuscaloosa Counties in the State of Alabama, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 n.19 (11th Cir. 1991).
If the moving party meets its burden, the non-moving party is then required “to go beyond the pleadings” and present competent evidence “showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 106 S.Ct. at 2253. Generally, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” supporting the non-movant's case is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If, in...
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