Friedman v. Montefiore
| Decision Date | 11 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:21-cv-2083 |
| Citation | 610 F.Supp.3d 1032 |
| Parties | Margaret FRIEDMAN, Executor of the Estate of Mary L. Friedman, Plaintiff, v. MONTEFIORE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
John P. Colan, Sr., Thomas D. Robenalt, Robenalt Law, Westlake, OH, for Plaintiff.
Aric D. Martin, Rolf Goffman Martin Lang, Pepper Pike, OH, Joseph F. Petros, III, Rolf Goffman Martin Lang, Cleveland, OH, for Defendants Montefiore, Montefiore Foundation, Montefiore Home, Montefiore Housing Corporation, Menorah Park Foundation.
Matthew D. Gurbach, Bricker & Eckler, Cleveland, OH, Sommer L. Sheely, Bricker & Eckler, Columbus, OH, for Defendant Ariel Hyman.
ORDER OF REMAND
Plaintiff Margaret Friedman ("Friedman") brought this wrongful death action on October 27, 2021 in state court against defendants Montefiore, Montefiore Foundation, Montefiore Home, Montefiore Housing Corporation, Menorah Park Foundation (collectively "facility defendants"), and Ariel S. Hyman ("Hyman"), in connection with the death of Mary L. Friedman (the "decedent"). (Doc. No. 1-1 (Complaint) ¶ 1.) On November 3, 2021, facility defendants removed this action to federal court. (Doc. No. 1 (Notice of Removal).)
Now before the Court is Friedman's motion to remand this action to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. (Doc. No. 14 (Motion).) Defendants oppose the motion. (Doc. No. 17 (Facility Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition); Doc. No. 18 (Hyman's Memorandum in Opposition).) For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.
From February 24, 2020 until her death on November 30, 2020, the decedent was a resident of Montefiore, a nursing home located in Beachwood, Ohio. (Doc. No. 1-1 ¶¶ 1–2, 15.) Hyman was employed as an administrator for Montefiore. (Id. ¶ 7.) While at Montefiore, the decedent contracted SARS-COV2 and/or COVID-19 or a COVID-19 related illness and died on November 30, 2020. (Id. ¶ 18.)
On October 27, 2021, Friedman, the daughter and executor of the estate of the decedent, filed this action in state court. While the complaint is not arranged by claims, Friedman appears to be raising state law claims for medical malpractice, nursing home neglect, survivorship, and wrongful death. (Id. ¶ 1.) According to the complaint, defendants "negligently, recklessly, and with malicious intent" improperly implemented and administered prevention measures that resulted in the unnecessary exposure of residents (including the decedent) without their knowledge, to the COVID-19 virus. (Id. ¶ 16.) Friedman alleges that defendants showed "a lack of care so great that it [represented] a conscious indifference to the rights of others and gross negligence." (Id. ) She further avers that defendants demonstrated such a "reckless disregard" for the life and health of their residents that their actions constituted "intentional misconduct or willful or wanton misconduct." (Id. ) It is her belief that defendants’ gross negligence resulted in decedent contracting COVID-19 and thereafter receiving improper medical treatment, and caused decedent to suffer injuries including but not limited to her "untimely death." (Id. ¶ 30.)
In particular, Friedman charges that defendants did not properly quarantine new admissions and residents upon their arrival, did not follow well-established guidelines and standards for quarantine of new admissions and residents, and did not follow basic infection prevention procedures, such as wearing masks and washing hands. (Id. ¶ 17.) As is pertinent to the present motion, Friedman also alleges that defendants deliberately falsified the results of the testing of residents for COVID-19, hiding the fact that other residents of Montefiore had tested positive for the virus. (Id. ¶ 16.) "In addition to intentionally falsifying covid tests on residents[,]" she avers that defendants did not properly test their employees who would come into contact with residents and forced employees to work when they exhibited symptoms of COVID-19. (Id. ¶¶ 16–17.)
Facility defendants removed this action, under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), on the basis of original jurisdiction on the belief that the complaint asserted a claim " ‘arising under’ and governed by federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331." (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 4.) Noting that Friedman claimed that defendants engaged in "willful misconduct" in the care rendered to the decedent in relation to her exposure, diagnosis, and treatment of COVID-19, facility defendants insisted that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d6d(d), 247d-6e (the "PREP Act") provides the exclusive federal remedy for such conduct and has preempted any state law challenging similar conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 5–9.) Accordingly, the notice of removal provided that removal was appropriate because the complaint invoked a federal question for which the governing federal law "completely preempts" any state law claims. (Id. ¶ 10.)
In her motion, Friedman contends that the well pleaded complaint sets forth facts and allegations that are limited to state law negligence, recklessness, and/or wanton misconduct. She posits that none of the claims are covered by the PREP Act, but, even if one or more claim did implicate the federal statute, it would constitute no more than a federal defense and, therefore, would be insufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction over the complaint. She also argues that removal cannot be premised on the existence of a substantial federal question or the federal officer removal statute.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), defendants may remove a civil action from a state court only when the federal court has original jurisdiction over the claims alleged in the state court complaint. That is, any civil case filed in state court may be removed to federal court if the case could have been brought originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ; Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987). Absent jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship ( 28 U.S.C. § 1332 ), federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is required. Caterpillar , 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425.
"The party seeking removal bears the burden of demonstrating that the district court has original jurisdiction." Eastman v. Marine Mech. Corp. , 438 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only the power authorized by the United States Constitution or by statutes. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994). " ‘[B]ecause lack of jurisdiction would make any decree in the case void and the continuation of the litigation in federal court futile, the removal statute should be strictly construed and all doubts resolved in favor of remand.’ " Eastman , 438 F.3d at 549–50 ().
Here, defendants do not contend that the Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, so the Court's jurisdiction over this matter must be based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal question jurisdiction exists in "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. An action "arises under" federal law if: (1) "federal law creates the cause of action[,]" or (2) "the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law." Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson , 478 U.S. 804, 808–09, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 92 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1986) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. , 463 U.S. 1, 9, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 77 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1983) ).
The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is generally governed by the "well-pleaded complaint rule," which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. The rule makes the plaintiff the master of her claims, and she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law. Caterpillar , 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (internal citation omitted). "Accordingly, if the plaintiff chooses to bring a state law claim, that claim cannot generally be ‘recharacterized’ as a federal claim for the purposes of removal." Roddy v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Inc. , 395 F.3d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Loftis v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 342 F.3d 509, 515 (6th Cir. 2003) ).
The "mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction." Merrell Dow , 478 U.S. at 813, 106 S.Ct. 3229. Further, "the existence of a federal defense normally does not create statutory ‘arising under’ jurisdiction, and a defendant may not [generally] remove a cause to federal court unless the plaintiff's complaint establishes that the case ‘arises under’ federal law[.]" Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila , 542 U.S. 200, 207, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 159 L. Ed. 2d 312 (2004) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted, alteration and emphasis in original); see also Tisdale v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of U.S. & Canada, Local 704 , 25 F.3d 1308, 1313 (6th Cir. 1994) ().
Facility defendants premised their removal on an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule known as complete preemption. Where a federal statute completely preempts a state-law cause of action, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction on removal notwithstanding the well-pleaded complaint rule. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson , 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S. Ct. 2058, 156 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2003). In such circumstances, Congress so completely preempts a...
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