Friedman v. United States

• Decision Date: 16 March 1967
• Docket Number: No. 18245.,18245.
• Citation: 374 F.2d 363
• Parties: Harold FRIEDMAN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

374 F.2d 363 (1967)

Harold FRIEDMAN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 18245.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

March 16, 1967.

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Burnett Schwartz, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant. Louis Gilden, St. Louis, Mo., with him on the brief.

William C. Martin, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee. Richard D. FitzGibbon, Jr., U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., with him on the brief.

Before VAN OOSTERHOUT and GIBSON, Circuit Judges, and REGISTER, District Judge.

FLOYD R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, Harold Friedman, was convicted on a one-count indictment charging a violation of Title 18, § 1001 of the United States Code, which provides:

"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, * * * shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." (Emphasis supplied.)

The indictment charges that appellant "* * * wilfully and knowingly did make a false, fictitious and fraudulent statement and representation as to material facts in a matter within the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, an agency of the United States, in that a written statement given and submitted to the said Federal Bureau of Investigation stated and represented in substance that on November 7, 1964, while in the custody of the Missouri State Highway Patrol and while handcuffed, he appellant was struck, beaten, saulted, and severely injured by Lieutenant C. V. Maxey, * * * in the Troop C headquarters of the Missouri Highway Patrol, whereas in truth and fact as he well knew, he was not struck, beaten, assaulted or severely injured or wounded * * *."

The facts show that defendant, together with his lawyer, voluntarily went to the office of the F.B.I. in St. Louis for the purpose of complaining about alleged mistreatment by Lt. Maxey, an officer of the arresting agency, while being held incidental to the arrest on a state charge. Defendant's purpose in making such complaint was to initiate a federal prosecution under the Civil Rights Laws and to induce the F.B.I. to investigate his charges against Lt. Maxey. During the course of a lengthy visit with two agents of the F.B.I. at the F.B.I.'s office and in the presence of his lawyer, defendant made an oral statement following which a typewritten statement was prepared by the agents and signed by defendant Friedman. Following investigation by the agents, it was determined by the F.B.I. that the statement made by Friedman with regard to his being "* * * struck, beaten, assaulted, and severely injured and wounded by Lt. Maxey * * *" was false. It is noteworthy, however, that after Friedman had been taken into custody by state officials, Lt. Maxey admitted that he had scuffled with Friedman while he was in custody on two occasions, each lasting about one and one-half minutes, and that Friedman admittedly had some small, observable injuries. Nonetheless, the instant prosecution was instituted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The primary factual issue was the truthfulness of Friedman's statement. Each side presented relevant evidence on this issue. The jury resolved the issue by finding Friedman guilty as charged on the indictment and he timely appeals the conviction resulting from that verdict.

The dispositive question before us is whether a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is alleged in the indictment. This question is resolved by determining if the giving of false information to the F.B.I. relative to a violation of the criminal law is a "matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the government." There is no doubt that the F.B.I. is an agency of the United States Government. However, appellant contends that the "jurisdiction" of the F.B.I. to investigate crimes against the United States is not the "jurisdiction" envisioned by § 1001. We agree with that contention.

The proper examination of this statute must begin by viewing the historical circumstances in which it was cast. During the economic collapse of the 1930's the government, at an accelerated pace, began entering the field of economic reform and regulation. Jurisdiction over various parts of our economy was being delegated to innumerable federal agencies. For a proper functioning of their regulative and reform power these agencies depended upon information supplied by the individuals and corporations with which they were dealing. The giving of false information to these agencies would, of course, seriously pervert their functions, making effective regulations impossible. However, a fatal defect in the existing law made punishment of such fraudulent activity very difficult. The forerunner of the present § 1001 proscribed the making of false pecuniary claims against the Government, but not the supplying of false information. In 1934, largely at the request of the Secretary of the Interior to regulate "hot oil" shipments, the defect was remedied when Congress amended the statute to substantially its present form. Obviously, the immediate and primary purpose in amending the old "fraudulent claims" statute was to curtail the flow of false information to the newly created regulative agencies. Though the statute was drafted in broad inclusive terms, presumably due to the numerous agencies and the wide variety of information needed, there is nothing to indicate that Congress intended this statute to have application substantially beyond the purposes for which it was created.

The Government argues that the purpose of § 1001 is to protect agencies from being the victim of false information that has the tendency and effect of perverting normal and proper agency function. Since this false statement could interfere with the F.B.I. in their investigation, the Government contends the making of the false statement constitutes an offense. Though the giving of false information might have the effect of causing needless investigation, it does not pervert the agency's functions as envisioned by the purposes of the statute. The F.B.I. was only empowered to investigate the claim. This mere investigation of the claim caused no real corruption of its authorized activities.

Regardless of the history of the statute, the Government is asking us to attach a very literal interpretation of the Statute and apply it in a context not envisioned by the drafters. This we hesitate to do. A literal application of this statute can reach patently absurd results. As well phrased by Chief Justice Hughes in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, at 450, 53 S.Ct. 210, at 216, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932): "To construe statutes so as to avoid absurd or glaringly unjust results, foreign to the legislative purpose, is, as we have seen, a traditional and appropriate function of the courts. * * *" As this statute carries a penalty exceeding the penalty for perjury,¹ if we were to give it the literal interpretation urged by the Government we would be saying that Congress considered it more serious for one to informally volunteer an untrue statement to an F.B.I. agent than to relate the same story under oath before a court of law. Certainly, Congress intended no such result. In fact, if we adopt a literal application of this statute, anything more than a casual social conversation with a Government employee would, without warning, subject the speaker to the possibility of severe criminal punishment. This is a formidable, indeed a dangerous, power the Government assumes the statute invests in law enforcement officials. We cannot blithely assume that Congress granted such a sweeping power. It is our position that such a formidable police authority must be clearly authorized. It will not be assumed to exist. If the Congress wanted unsworn statements to investigative officials to serve as the basis for severe criminal punishment, we think it would have said so in clear, direct and positive terms.

Finally, we note that a literal application of the statute would completely remove the necessity for taking oaths. The numerous statutes authorizing investigative agencies to administer oaths would be rendered useless. Since the Judiciary is an agency of the United States Government, a strict application of this statute would remove the time-honored and now necessary formality of requiring witnesses to testify under oath. We simply cannot believe that Congress intended to supplant the existing perjury statutes and destroy the protections they afford. A literal interpretation of a statute will not be resorted to when it brings about absurd consequences or produces results not intended by Congress. Sorrells v. United States, supra, p. 446 of 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210 (1932).

On facts very similar to the ones before us, Circuit Judge Pickett, in United States v. Levin, 133 F.Supp. 88, 90 (D. Colo.1953), reasoned:

"If the statute is to be construed as contended for here by the United States, the results would be far-reaching. The age-old conception of the crime of perjury would be gone. * * * Any person who failed to tell the truth to the myriad of government investigators and representatives about any matter, regardless of how trivial, whether civil or criminal, which was within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States, would be guilty of a crime punishable with greater severity than that of perjury. * * * It is inconceivable that Congress had any such intent when this portion of the statute was enacted."

It is, therefore, our conclusion that this statute should not be given a broad literal interpretation to be applied in all areas of our national life. Such an interpretation was not envisioned by the enactment, reaches patently absurd results, and is fundamentally dangerous. This...