Friedman v. White
| Decision Date | 13 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2–14–0942.,2–14–0942. |
| Citation | 42 N.E.3d 902 |
| Parties | Neil FRIEDMAN, Mark J. Schacht, Alan Chernoff, Peter Vaselopoulos, and Jeffrey Goldberg, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Jesse WHITE, Secretary of State, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
David A. Novoselsky, of Novoselsky Law Offices, P.C., of Waukegan, for appellants.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Laura A. Ward, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee.
delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 Plaintiffs, Neil Friedman, Mark J. Schacht, Alan Chernoff, Peter Vaselopoulos, and Jeffrey Goldberg, brought suit against defendant, Jesse White, as Illinois Secretary of State (the State). Plaintiffs argued that two surcharges added to the cost of annual motor-vehicle registration, specifically a $1 surcharge to fund the Illinois State Police Vehicle Fund and a $2 surcharge to fund the Department of Natural Resources (see 625 ILCS 5/3–806 (West 2014)
), are unconstitutional. The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss. We conclude that plaintiffs have forfeited their challenge to the $1 charge and that they did not meet their burden of showing that the $2 charge is unconstitutional. Therefore, we affirm.
¶ 3 Plaintiffs filed suit on March 18, 2014. They filed an amended complaint on March 20, 2014. They alleged that they were Illinois residents who owned and registered vehicles in this state. They brought the suit as the proposed representatives of a class of such people. Plaintiffs challenged the imposition of surcharges under section 3–806 of the Illinois Vehicle Title and Registration Law (625 ILCS 5/3–806 (West 2014)
). Amendments to that statute created a $1 surcharge on motor-vehicle registration fees that is deposited into the State Police Vehicle Fund, and a $2 surcharge that is “deposited into the Park and Conservation Fund for the Department of Natural Resources to use for conservation efforts.” Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the legislature promulgated these surcharges “for the avowed purpose” of supplementing the general appropriations necessary to fund the Illinois State Police and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Plaintiffs alleged that additional charges imposed as part of the registration process must be used to offset related services, but that the surcharges at issue instead supported unrelated purposes for the general public, thereby constituting an unlawful taking. Plaintiffs alleged that the surcharges therefore violated the Illinois Constitution's due process, equal protection (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2 ), and uniformity (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 2 ) clauses. They sought a declaration that the surcharges were unconstitutional, a refund of the surcharges to themselves and others similarly situated, and a payment of interest, costs, and attorney fees.
¶ 4 On May 27, 2014, the State filed a motion to dismiss under sections 2–615
and 2–619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–615, 2–619 (West 2014)). The State argued that the uniformity clause did not require that the people taxed actually receive a benefit. It argued that, even otherwise, the State Police Vehicle Fund paid for state police vehicles to patrol the public highways, which motor-vehicle owners used, and the Park and Conservation Fund was used for conservation efforts, which, among other things, helped counteract the effects of pollution and highway construction. The State argued that, for the same reasons, the surcharges were constitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses, as there was a rational relationship between the people taxed and the legislation's goal.
¶ 6 A hearing on the motions took place on June 26, 2014. The trial court issued a 21–page memorandum ruling on September 5, 2014, which we summarize. The trial court agreed with plaintiffs that the State's motion to dismiss was an improperly combined motion, so it was construing it as a motion to dismiss under section 2–615
. Plaintiffs' complaint was framed as a facial challenge to the surcharges' validity. The surcharges were properly analyzed as taxes rather than as compensation for services rendered in renewing license plates. To survive scrutiny under the uniformity clause, a nonproperty tax classification must (1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy. If a statute passed muster under the uniformity clause, it would satisfy due process and equal protection standards. The people subject to the surcharges were those who owned motor vehicles of the “first division” (generally, cars and small trucks), autocycles, motorcycles, motor-driven cycles, and pedalcycles (collectively, subject vehicles). 625 ILCS 5/3–806 (West 2014). The people not taxed were those who did not own motor vehicles and those who owned second-division vehicles. The statute required the $1 surcharge to be deposited into the State Police Vehicle Fund, which was used to acquire state police vehicles (see 30 ILCS 605/7c (West 2014)
). Subject-vehicle owners were more likely than other citizens to require the assistance of the state police, who patrolled highways in vehicles acquired by funds in the State Police Vehicle Fund. Thus, the $1 surcharge on subject-vehicle owners was reasonably related to the object of the legislation. It was neither unfair nor unreasonable that people who did not own subject vehicles also benefitted from the state police's services, as the uniformity clause was designed to enforce only minimum standards of fairness and reasonableness between groups of taxpayers.
¶ 7 The trial court next examined the $2 surcharge, stating as follows, in relevant part. The $2 was deposited into the Park and Conservation Fund for the DNR to use for conservation efforts. The Department of Natural Resources (Conservation) Law (20 ILCS 805/805–420 (West 2014)
) explicitly provided for the disposition of the funds collected from the surcharges. Specifically, 50% was to be used by the DNR for normal operations, and the other 50% was to be used for the construction and maintenance of state owned, leased, and managed sites. The legislative debates surrounding the enactment of the $2 surcharge established that the evil to be remedied was the legislature's repeated failure to appropriate sufficient funds to support the DNR. The surcharge was imposed only on Illinois subject-vehicle owners. While some people might walk or bicycle into state-owned park land, it was not unreasonable to conclude that many or most visitors to state parks would use subject vehicles. The court continued:
“Giving the legislature appropriate deference within the confines of the uniformity requirement, this court is hard-pressed to find the Act's classification of car owners as the taxed class for the benefit of state parks unreasonable. The legislature may have reasonably determined that state parks are most accessible to car travelers. * * * [T]here is a reasonable relationship between those who are to pay the tax (car owners) and the objective of the legislation (to benefit state parks, whose visitors likely arrive by car).
The court therefore ruled that the $2 surcharge on subject-vehicle owners for the benefit of state parks was reasonably related to the object of the legislation.
¶ 8 The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss and denied plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment as moot. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
¶ 10 The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss under section 2–615
of the Code. A defendant may use a section 2–615 motion to contest the legal sufficiency of a complaint alleging that a statute or ordinance is unconstitutional. Consiglio v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2013 IL App (1st) 121142, ¶ 8, 370 Ill.Dec. 664, 988 N.E.2d 1020. At the same time, a section 2–615 motion is often inappropriate for a uniformity challenge, but it may be used when a classification's reasonableness is determined as a matter of law. Jacobsen v. King, 2012 IL App (2d) 110721, ¶ 15, 361 Ill.Dec. 518, 971 N.E.2d 620. As there are no disputed facts in this case, a section 2–615 motion was appropriate. We review de novo an order granting a section 2–615 motion. State of Illinois ex rel. Pusateri v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 2014 IL 116844, ¶ 8, 386 Ill.Dec. 674, 21 N.E.3d 437. Similarly, we review de novo a statute's construction and constitutionality. See Bartlow v. Costigan, 2014 IL 115152, ¶ 17, 383 Ill.Dec. 95, 13 N.E.3d 1216.
¶ 11 Plaintiffs challenge surcharges under section 3–806
, which imposes registration fees on motor vehicles of the first division, autocycles, motorcycles, motor-driven cycles, and pedalcycles. 625 ILCS 5/3–806 (West 2014). First-division motor vehicles are designed to carry 10 or fewer people.1 625 ILCS 5/1–146 (West 2014). The statute imposes a $98 annual fee for first-division motor vehicles. 625 ILCS 5/3–806 (West 2014). It imposes a $68 fee for autocycles2 and a $38 fee for motorcycles, motor-driven cycles, and pedalcycles. Id. The statute goes on to state:
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