Friel v. Cnty. of Nassau & Nassau Cnty. Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 25 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–CV–4297 (ADS)(ETB).,12–CV–4297 (ADS)(ETB). |
| Citation | 947 F.Supp.2d 239 |
| Parties | Barbara FRIEL, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU and Nassau County Police Department, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Rossi & Crowley, LLP, by: Thomas J. Rossi, Esq., of Counsel, Douglaston, NY, for the Plaintiff.
Nassau County Attorney's Office, by: Michelle M. Faraci. Deputy County Attorney, of Counsel, Mineola, NY, for the Defendants.
On August 27, 2012, the Plaintiff Barbara Friel (the “Plaintiff”) commenced this action against the Defendants County of Nassau (the “County”) and Nassau County Police Department (the “Police Department,” and collectively, the “Defendants”) pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, the United States Constitution, the New York State Human Rights Law (the “NYSHRL”) and the New York State Constitution. The Plaintiff asserts seven causes of action. In this regard, she alleges that the Defendants (1) violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection by discriminating and retaliating against her based on gender; (2) violated her rights under Title VII by subjecting her to disparate treatment and discriminating against her because of her gender; (3) violated her rights under NYSHRL by subjecting her to disparate treatment and discriminating against her because of her gender; (4) violated her rights under Title VII by retaliating against her for opposing discrimination; (5) violated her rights under NYSHRL by retaliating against her for opposing discrimination; (6) violated her rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by retaliating against her for exercising her free speech rights to oppose discrimination; and (7) depriving her of the protection provided by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that was entered into by the County and the Plaintiff's union.
Presently before the Court is the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ.P.”) 12(b)(6) on the grounds that it fails to state a valid cause of action. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies in part and grants in part the Defendants' motion.
Unless otherwise stated, the following facts are drawn from the Plaintiff's Complaint and construed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff is a female police officer. On July 18, 1986, the Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants. At all times relevant to this action, the Defendant held the position of detective with the Police Department. As part of her job as a detective, the Plaintiff was responsible for “conduct[ing] extraditions and in-state prisoner transfers, which are effectuated when detectives from the receiving jurisdiction travel to the surrendering jurisdiction, take custody of the [detainee] and accompany the [detainee] back to the receiving jurisdiction.” (Compl., ¶ 20.)
Extraditions and in-state prisoner transfers were carried out by two detectives. Before March 1, 2007, one of these two detectives was typically the detective who had worked directly on the case, referred to as the “investigating detective.” Also before March 1, 2007, the Defendants' policy required that only one of these two detectives be the same gender as the detainee.
However, on March 1, 2007, the Defendants changed their policy. At this time, the Defendants began to require that both of the detectives be of the same gender as the detainees being transported outside of Nassau County and adjoining counties. Thereafter, first on May 21, 2008 and then on October 29, 2009, the policy was further modified to extend the distance of the perimeter outside of which both escorts must be of the same gender as the detainee.
According to the Plaintiff, “[a]s a direct result of the [March 1, 2007] policy change, the number of extraditions and transfers that could be assigned to a female detective was drastically reduced,” since “the vast majority of [detainees] are of the male sex.” (Compl., ¶ 23.) The Plaintiff also claims that the Defendants did not follow the new extradition policy in at least 25 instances in 2008, in that they assigned male detectives to extradite female detainees outside the designated perimeter.
On March 25, 2008, the Plaintiff wrote a letter to the Chief of Detectives for a re-evaluation of the extradition policy. Almost nine months later, on December 11, 2008, the Plaintiff was called into Captain Thompson's office and notified that an audit was done of her computer usage. The Complaint does not provide details as to Captain Thompson's full name or his job responsibilities. According to the Plaintiff, she had never previously been audited for computer usage. Captain Thompson advised the Plaintiff that her research into bail jumping cases was inappropriate. However, the Plaintiff asserts that this research was necessary for the fulfillment of her job duties, as bail jumping often results in extraditions of the jumper.
In the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that her “work performance has always been highly acceptable and satisfactory” during her employment at the Police Department. (Compl., ¶ 31.) Thus, the Plaintiff alleges that the audit of her computer usage was a direct consequence of her March 25, 2008 letter. The Plaintiff further alleges that, as a direct consequence of the March 25, 2008 letter, she was denied extradition requests though she was often the investigating detective on the case and/or the detainee was female.
According to the Plaintiff, the above actions by the Defendants caused her harm, which includes (1) deprivation of income in the form of wages, pension value, promotional opportunities and job assignments; (2) physical harm in the form of nervousness, anxiety, humiliation, harm to reputation and good name and depression; (3) loss of pay and loss of benefits; (4) denial of equitable employment compensation, equitable employment terms and conditions and privileges of employment; (5) the incurring of legal fees and expenses; and (6) deprivation of her liberty and rights under the laws of the United States and the state of New York.
On July 22, 2008, the Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“the EEOC”). The EEOC charge indicated that it was filed under Title VII on the basis of gender discrimination. (Faraci Decl., Exh. B.) The Plaintiff did not check the box indicating that the discrimination was also based on retaliation. In the EEOC charge, the Plaintiff described the particulars of the discrimination as follows:
I was hired by the [ ] Police Department on July 18, 1986, and currently hold the position of Detective. On or about March 1, 2007, the extradition policy was changed to prohibit an investigating detective from taking into custody, transporting and processing a subject from another state if the subject [was] a different sex than the investigating detective. Extraditions [within] New York State have been restricted to certain adjoining counties. Prior to March 1, 2007, only one detective neededto be the same sex as the prisoner during extradition.
As most defendants requiring extradition are male, this policy adversely impacts the amount of work female detectives are assigned. On numerous occasions, myself and other female detectives were not considered for extraditions/warrant arrest. The male detectives who responded were awarded overtime pay and used travel days as contractual pay back days.
I have contacted my Union and they have not provided any assistance.
I believe I have been discriminated against because of my sex, female, in violation of Title VII[.]
(Faraci Decl., Exh. B.)
On January 20, 2011 the EEOC issued a finding of probable cause of discrimination. On that same date, the EEOC invited all the parties to the charge in an attempt to conciliate the matter amicably. However, thereafter, on November 9, 2011, the EEOC issued a Notice of Conciliation Failure and forwarded the case to the United States Department of Justice (“the DOJ”) for review and possible litigation. On May 20, 2012, the DOJ issued to the Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue letter relative to her charge. About three months later, on August 27, 2012, the Plaintiff commenced this action.
It is well-established that a complaint should be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) only if it does not contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Indeed, the issue on a motion to dismiss is “not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)). “ ‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’ ” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949–50, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court is required to accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff's favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937;Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118, 110 S.Ct. 975, 979, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990); In re NYSE Specialists Secs. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir.2007). As such, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and ... determine whether they plausibly give rise...
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