Friends Creek v. Mariposa Pub. Utilities Dist., Case No. 1:15-cv-00583-EPG
| Decision Date | 05 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:15-cv-00583-EPG |
| Parties | FRIENDS OF MARIPOSA CREEK, an unincorporated association, and SARAH WINDSOR, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. MARIPOSA PUBLIC UTILITIES DISTRICT, a public utility district, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Defendant Mariposa Public Utilities District ("Defendant" or the "District") has moved for reconsideration of the Court's Order of April 19, 2016, granting Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 51). In that Order, the Court found that the undisputed facts of the case demonstrated: (1) Defendant's operations were governed by two National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits; and (2) Defendant discharged effluent emissions in excess of the limitations set in those permits. Defendant now requests that the Court vacate the Order, amend the Order, or certify the Order for immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Court finds inadequate grounds for Defendant's requests, the Motion is DENIED.
This is an action under the Clean Water Act alleging the discharge of pollutants by a water treatment facility in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1365. The Facility, which is operated by Defendant, is subject to various discharge limitations listed in permits issued by the California Regional Water Quality Board, Central Valley Region (the "Regional Water Board"). In particular, the permits limit the amount of dichlorobromomethane ("DCBM") and copper the Facility can discharge. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant has discharged DCBM and copper in excess of these limits.
On February 26, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to the issue of liability. (ECF No. 37.) Plaintiffs asked the Court to determine, based on the undisputed facts in the case, that the District violated the Clean Water Act. Plaintiffs did not ask the Court to determine the amount of penalties to be assessed based on these violations. A trial on the amount of penalties is currently set for February 14, 2017.
On April 19, 2016, the Court issued an Order granting the motion for partial summary judgment. In particular, the Court found that the undisputed facts of the case showed: (1) Plaintiffs had adequately demonstrated standing to pursue this litigation; (2) the District's discharges into Mariposa Creek were governed by NPDES Permit Nos. R5-2007-0171 (the "2007 Permit") and R5-2014-0042 (the "2014 Permit"); (3) the 2007 and 2014 Permits set specific effluent limitations governing the District's discharges; (4) the two time scheduling orders (the "TSOs") issued by the Regional Water Board were not permits (and thus further discovery on them was unneeded); (5) Defendant discharged pollutants in excess of the effluent limitations set by the Permits; and (6) no actions taken by the Regional Water Board had stripped the Court of its jurisdiction.
On May 16, 2016, Defendant filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the April 19, 2016 Order. After reviewing the papers submitted in support and opposition of the Motion, the Court determined that this matter is suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule230(g). Based on the pleadings and for the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
"It is a basic principle of federal practice that 'courts generally . . . refuse to reopen what has been decided.'" Magnesystems, Inc. v. Nikken, Inc., 933 F.Supp. 944, 948 (C.D. Cal. 1996), quoting Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). As a result, reconsideration is an "extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources." Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). Reconsideration is not "granted absent highly unusual circumstances." McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999). A motion for reconsideration "is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a 'second bite at the apple.'" Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001). "A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court's decision, and recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party's burden." United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001); see also Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mechanical Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 (D. Ariz. 2003) ().
"Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law." Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A motion for reconsideration serves "a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Hefelbower v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, Case No. CV F 13-1121-LJO-MJS, 2013 WL 4647963, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2013), quoting Publisher's Resource, Inc. v. Walker Davis Publications, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 1985). Under this Court's Local Rule 230(j), a motion for reconsideration must describe "what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did notexist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion" and "why the facts or circumstances were not shown at the time of the prior motion."
Defendant asks the Court to reconsider its finding that Plaintiff Sarah Windsor possessed standing to pursue her claims. No new or different facts or circumstances are posed; rather, Defendant clarifies the argument posed in its original opposition briefing and asserts that Windsor's credibility is at issue. Specifically, Defendant contends that the declaration of Mark Rowney, the general manager of the facility, created a dispute of fact as to the plausibility of Windsor's claims because it demonstrated that the environmental harms Windsor observed could not be traced to the Facility's discharges.
The Court need not consider a simple re-argument of the same facts leveled in Defendant's opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. American Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. American Const. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2001) (); see also Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2014) (). The Court determined in the Order re: Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that Windsor need not show that the environmental harms alleged were scientifically traceable to the Facility's discharges to show standing. (Order re: Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 11:5-14:2, ECF No. 51 ().)
Defendant's argument in the current motion is substantially identical to the argument it made in opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Compare Motion for Reconsideration 12:14-16, ECF No. 55 () with Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 15:6-8, ECF No. 43("There is simply no credible basis on which to claim that discharges of DCBM will cause nay odor of the type which Ms. Windsor complains of").) The Court previously determined that Plaintiff had demonstrated standing because she lived in close proximity to the creek, enjoyed the use of the creek, and had curtailed her activities with the creek because of her understanding of the discharged pollutants. Mere disagreement with this decision is not a basis for reconsideration.
Defendant requests the Court reconsider its finding that the terms of the 2007 and 2014 Permits are clear and unambiguous and that extrinsic evidence of their intent (in the form of the Rowney Declaration) is thus unnecessary. Essentially, Defendant argues that the Court's interpretation of the terms of the Permits constituted clear error because the TSOs must be read as amendments to the Permits. Thus, Defendant argues, the TSOs modified the final effluent limitations that the Facility was required to meet. Because the Court has found that the interim effluent limitations in the TSOs did not modify the final effluent limitations in the Permits for the purposes of Plaintiffs' claims, Defendant contends that the Court committed clear error.1
As with the standing issue, Defendant does not offer new facts or a change in the law to justify reconsideration. And, as with the standing issue, Defendant largely re-argues the same arguments as it did in opposing the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (and in its two prior motions to dismiss). In fact, portions of the Motion for Reconsideration appear to have been copied verbatim from the Opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Compare Motion for Reconsideration 19:6-13...
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