Friends for Ferrell Parkway, LLC v. Stasko

• Decision Date: 28 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-1899.,01-1899.
• Citation: 282 F.3d 315
• Parties: The FRIENDS FOR FERRELL PARKWAY, LLC; C. Randolph Zehmer; Andrea M. Kilmer; Mario A. Rosales, Jr.; Jack R. Davey, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John P. STASKO, Refuge Manager, Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, in his official capacity; Anthony D. Leger, Refuge Chief, National Wildlife System, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

282 F.3d 315

The FRIENDS FOR FERRELL PARKWAY, LLC; C. Randolph Zehmer; Andrea M. Kilmer; Mario A. Rosales, Jr.; Jack R. Davey, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John P. STASKO, Refuge Manager, Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, in his official capacity; Anthony D. Leger, Refuge Chief, National Wildlife System, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-1899.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued January 22, 2002.

Decided February 28, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

ARGUED:

Carl Strass, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellants. Kent Pendleton Porter, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office, Norfolk Virginia, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF:

Kenneth E. Melson, United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellees.

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ and Judge GREGORY joined.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs filed suit against John Stasko and Anthony Leger, in their capacities as officials of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS"). They sought judicial review of FWS' actions in connection with a proposed land transaction between FWS, the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, and Lotus Creek Associates, L.P., a private developer. FWS wanted to acquire the lands in order to protect sensitive wetlands and wildlife habitat.

The district court dismissed the case for lack of Article III standing. Because none of the plaintiffs have constitutional standing to bring this suit against FWS, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

The Friends for Ferrell Parkway, LLC, C. Randolph Zehmer, a resident of Sandbridge, Virginia, Andrea Kilmer, a resident of Lago Mar, Virginia, Mario Rosales, Jr., a resident of Red Mill Farm, Virginia, and Jack Davey, a resident of Lotus Creek, Virginia (collectively "plaintiffs"), filed suit against John Stasko and Anthony Leger of FWS. Stasko is Refuge Manager of the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge, and Leger is Refuge Chief of the National Wildlife System. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin a proposed land transaction between FWS, the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia ("the City"), and Lotus Creek Associates, L.P., a private developer ("Lotus"). Plaintiffs' complaint focused on FWS' anticipated acquisition of two pieces of property. The first was a right of way owned by the City known as Ferrell VII. The right of way was previously designated for construction of Ferrell Parkway, a road that would bypass certain subdivisions and present straighter access to Sandbridge, a resort area on the ocean. The second was a piece of property owned by Lotus known as Phases II and III of Lotus Creek, located adjacent to the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge ("Refuge") and south of Ferrell VII.

Under the terms of the land transaction, FWS agreed to buy Phases II and III of Lotus Creek from Lotus for inclusion in the Refuge in exchange for the City's agreeing to sell FWS the Ferrell VII right of way. The City Council deemed preserving both parcels to be a necessary environmental protection measure, and abandoned proposed plans both to construct Ferrell Parkway and to allow development of Lotus Creek. In particular, the City Council concluded that the protection of both parcels in a natural state was necessary to "help mitigate natural and human threats to the Black Gut Natural Heritage Area and its respective habitats, thereby reducing natural habitat destruction and loss," and to "help reduce nonpoint source pollution loadings to the Back Bay watershed." In addition, the City and FWS agreed that the City would acquire FWS' lands bordering Sandbridge Road for the purpose of future road improvements by the City.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that FWS' proposed acquisition of Ferrell VII harmed them by not providing the benefits that the construction of Ferrell Parkway would purportedly generate. These benefits included providing Sandbridge residents with an emergency exit, and providing residents of Lago Mar, Red Mill Farm, and Lotus Creek with a route for through traffic to and from Sandbridge. Such a route would allegedly prevent traffic from flowing through their residential streets.

Plaintiffs sought judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 et seq. They asserted that FWS was acting in violation of a variety of federal statutes and regulations, including the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., in seeking to acquire the Ferrell VII right of way. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin on a preliminary and permanent basis the proposed land acquisition.

Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged that the sale of Phases II and III of Lotus Creek to FWS would injure plaintiff Davey because the loss of that portion of Lotus Creek would make it impossible for the Lotus Creek condominium community to function as intended. Plaintiffs further amended their complaint to allege that Phases II and III lied outside the acquisition boundaries of the wildlife Refuge, and that FWS' actions in acquiring Lotus Creek constituted impermissible local land use planning.

On May 14, 2001, the district court dismissed plaintiffs' case for want of standing. Applying the standing requirements of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), the court found that plaintiffs' purported injuries were "merely conjectural and hypothetical" for many reasons. First, access to Sandbridge Beach via Sandbridge Road continued to exist. Further, plaintiffs were not prohibited from obtaining better access to Sandbridge Beach, for the City planned to improve Sandbridge Road with land gained from the transaction with FWS. In addition, roads through a nearby military installation were opened in an emergency to provide access. Moreover, plaintiffs had no right under Virginia law to have a roadway constructed. See Va.Code Ann. § 15.2-2001 (Michie 1997 & Supp.2000). And finally, plaintiffs' traffic flow concerns were highly speculative because there was no guarantee the City would build Ferrell Parkway even if it decided not to sell Ferrell VII.

The court next turned to plaintiff Davey's claim that he was injured because his opportunity to see Lotus Creek developed would be destroyed if the transaction were completed. The court thought it significant that there would then be no future residents of Phases II and III with whom he could share the costs of providing services to his community. But it held that he could not establish causation or redressability because Lotus — not FWS — caused his injury by deciding to sell the land. Thus, no relief granted against FWS would guarantee that the property would be developed. Plaintiffs appeal.

II.

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution restricts the federal courts to deciding actual cases and controversies. Among "[t]he several doctrines that have grown up to elaborate that requirement," the one "that requires a litigant to have `standing' to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). The basic purpose of standing doctrine is to ensure that the plaintiff has a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of a dispute to render judicial resolution of it appropriate in a society that takes seriously both "the idea of separation of powers" and, more fundamentally, the system of democratic self-government that such separation serves. Id. at 750-52, 104 S.Ct. 3315. The doctrine encompasses both prudential, "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction," and "a core component derived directly from the Constitution." Id. at 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315; see also Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130.

In order to satisfy Article III's standing requirements, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he has suffered an injury in fact; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000); see also Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing injury, traceability, and redressability because it is the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130; FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990).

In addition, an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue as individuals; (2) the interests at stake are germane to the group's purpose; and (3) neither the claim made nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the suit. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181, 120 S.Ct. 693; Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). Only the first prong of associational standing is in contention here insofar as plaintiff the Friends for Ferrell Parkway is concerned.

As we have previously recognized, the injury-in-fact element requires that the plaintiff "suffer an invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized, as well as actual or imminent." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir.2000) (en banc) (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130). The alleged injury must not be "conjectural or hypothetical." Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180, 120 S.Ct. 693; ...