Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton

• Decision Date: 22 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. CV. F00-6191 AWI DLB.,CV. F00-6191 AWI DLB.
• Citation: 194 F.Supp.2d 1066
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: FRIENDS OF YOSEMITE VALLEY, a non-profit corporation; and Mariposans for Environmentally Responsible Growth, a non-profit corporation, Plaintiffs, v. Gale NORTON, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Interior; Department of the Interior; National Park Service; John Reynolds, in his official capacity as Western Regional Director of the National Park Service; David A. Milhalic, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Yosemite National Park; and Robert Stanton, in his official capacity as Director of the National Park Service, Defendants.

194 F.Supp.2d 1066

FRIENDS OF YOSEMITE VALLEY, a non-profit corporation; and Mariposans for Environmentally Responsible Growth, a non-profit corporation, Plaintiffs, v. Gale NORTON, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Interior; Department of the Interior; National Park Service; John Reynolds, in his official capacity as Western Regional Director of the National Park Service; David A. Milhalic, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Yosemite National Park; and Robert Stanton, in his official capacity as Director of the National Park Service, Defendants.

No. CV. F00-6191 AWI DLB.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

March 22, 2002.

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Julia A Olson, Wild Earth Advocates, Oakland, CA, for Friends of Yosemite Valley,

Mariposans for Environmentally Responsible Growth ("MERG"), plaintiffs.

E Robert Wright, United States Attorney's Office, Fresno, CA, for Bruce Babbitt, Dept of Interior, National Park Service, John—Reynolds, David a Mihalic, defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER FOLLOWING BENCH TRIAL

ISHII, District Judge.

In this action Friends of Yosemite Valley and Mariposans for Environmentally Responsible Growth (collectively "Plaintiffs") challenge the June 2000 Merced Wild and Scenic River Comprehensive Management Plan ("MRP") and Final Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS"), and the August 9, 2000 Record of Decision ("ROD") implementing the MRP and the FEIS. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have failed to prepare a valid comprehensive management plan that protects and enhances the natural values of the Merced River in Yosemite National Park in compliance with the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1271 et seq., ("WSRA"), and have also violated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., ("NEPA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., ("APA"). This court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and venue is proper in this district.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 12, 1999, the court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order in Sierra Club, et al. v. Babbitt, et al., 69 F.Supp.2d 1202 (E.D.Cal.1999). In that Memorandum Opinion and Order, the court found that the defendants had violated 16 U.S.C. § 1274(d), a portion of WSRA, by failing to develop a comprehensive management plan for the Merced River. The court granted the plaintiffs declaratory judgment on their claim that the defendants had violated the APA by failing to adopt a comprehensive management plan for the Merced River, as required by WSRA. The court ordered the National Park Service ("NPS") to prepare and adopt a valid comprehensive management plan for the Merced River as designated under WSRA no later than twelve months after the entry of the court's decision. Based on a request from the NPS, the court subsequently extended the deadline for the NPS to complete a valid comprehensive management plan to August 14, 2000.

The NPS began public scoping pursuant to NEPA for the comprehensive management plan and environmental impact statement ("EIS") in June of 1999. The Merced River Plan Draft EIS was released in January of 2000. The Draft EIS presented five alternatives, including a no action alternative, for consideration. Availability of the Merced River Plan Final EIS was announced in early July 2000. The record of decision on the MRP was signed on August 9, 2000, with a revised record of decision being signed on November 3, 2000. Following completion of the NEPA process for the MRP, the NPS published the Merced Wild and Scenic River Comprehensive Management Plan ("Merced River Plan" or "MRP") in a reference volume specifically designed for park planners and managers.¹

On August 14, 2000, Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action. A bench trial was held on November 6, 2001, and the entire case was submitted for decision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The review of final agency action is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act under an "arbitrary or capricious" standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Absent a showing of arbitrary action, a court must assume that an agency has exercised its discretion appropriately. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976). Thus, the standard is "highly deferential, presuming the agency action to be valid and affirming the agency action if a reasonable basis exists for its decision." Independent Acceptance Co. v. California, 204 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir.2000)(internal quotations omitted.). An agency's decision should be overturned if it was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, other otherwise not in accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1401 (9th Cir.1995). The Ninth Circuit has explained review of agency decisions as follows:

Review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (Marsh). We must determine whether the agency's decision was made after considering the relevant factors and whether the agency made a clear error of judgment. Id. at 378, 109 S.Ct. at 1861. We may reverse the agency's decision as arbitrary or capricious only if the agency relied on factors Congress did not intend it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation that ran counter to the evidence before the agency, or offered one that is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1521 (9th Cir.1995).

Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 822, 117 S.Ct. 80, 136 L.Ed.2d 38 (1996).

Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief against Defendants. The United States Supreme Court has explained as follows:

It goes without saying that an injunction is an equitable remedy. It "is not a remedy which issues as of course," Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337-338, 53 S.Ct. 602, 603, 77 L.Ed. 1208 (1933), or "to restrain an act the injurious consequences of which are merely trifling." Consolidated Canal Co. v. Mesa Canal Co., 177 U.S. 296, 302, 20 S.Ct. 628, 630, 44 L.Ed. 777 (1900). An injunction should issue only where the intervention of a court of equity "is essential in order effectually to protect property rights against injuries otherwise irremediable." Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456, 39 S.Ct. 142, 143, 63 L.Ed. 354 (1919). The Court has repeatedly held that the basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61, 95 S.Ct. 2069, 2077, 45 L.Ed.2d 12 (1975); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88, 94 S.Ct. 937, 951, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-507, 79 S.Ct. 948, 954-955, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra, at 329, 64 S.Ct., at 591.

Where plaintiff and defendant present competing claims of injury, the traditional function of equity has been to arrive at a "nice adjustment and reconciliation" between the competing claims, Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra, at 329, 64 S.Ct., at 592. In such cases, the court "balances the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them according as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction." Yakus v United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440, 64 S.Ct. 660, 675, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944). "The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra, 321 U.S., at 329, 64 S.Ct., at 592.

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982). The Court later summarized its holding in Weinberger as follows:

We reviewed the well-established principles governing the award of equitable relief in federal courts. Id., at 311-313, 102 S.Ct., at 1802-1804. In brief, the bases for injunctive relief are irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal remedies. In each case, a court must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief. Although particular regard should be given to the public interest, "[t]he grant of jurisdiction to ensure compliance with a statute hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and all circumstances, and a federal judge sitting as chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law." Id., at 313, 102 S.Ct., at 1803.

Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 542, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987).

DISCUSSION

Both Plaintiffs and Defendants have filed objections to declarations submitted by the opposing party. It is undisputed that the focal point for judicial review is the administrative record before the agency at the time of the agency's decision and "not some new record made initially in the reviewing court." Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973). There are, however, exceptions to this general rule. In Animal Defense Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir.1988), the Ninth Circuit explained:

However, certain circumstances may justify expanding review beyond the record or permitting discovery. See, e.g., Public Power Council v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 791, 793 (9th Cir.1982). The district court may inquire outside the administrative record when necessary to explain the agency's action. Id. at 793-94. When such a failure to explain agency action...