Friezo v. Friezo, 17456.

• Decision Date: 06 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 17456.,17456.
• Citation: 914 A.2d 533,281 Conn. 166
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Victoria Wood FRIEZO v. David FRIEZO.

914 A.2d 533

281 Conn. 166

Victoria Wood FRIEZO v. David FRIEZO.

No. 17456.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 17, 2005.

Decided February 6, 2007.

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Wesley W. Horton, with whom were Kenneth J. Bartschi and, on the brief, Brendon P. Levesque, Hartford, Edward Nusbaum, Westport, Ronald W. Crawley, certified legal intern, and Clarisse N. Thomas, certified legal intern, for the appellant (defendant).

Gary I. Cohen, Greenwich, for the appellee (plaintiff).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.¹

ZARELLA, J.

The defendant, David Friezo, appeals from the judgment of the trial court² dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, Victoria Wood Friezo, and issuing certain financial orders following a determination that the parties' prenuptial agreement was unenforceable. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) concluded that the parties' prenuptial agreement was unenforceable; (2) presumed that the parties were entitled to an equal distribution of the marital property; (3) included in the defendant's income $3,846,029 in management fees and $4,922,645 in performance fees associated with the defendant's interest in certain hedge funds when no such income existed; (4) concluded that the defendant's testimony lacked credibility; and (5) awarded the plaintiff $125,000 in attorney's fees even though she received a substantial lump sum property award. We conclude that the prenuptial agreement was enforceable and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

I FACTS

The trial court made the following specific findings and conclusions. The plaintiff, a citizen of the United Kingdom with a high school education, began working in London, England, for Bankers Trust as a trader's assistant and personal aide in 1994. "The plaintiff worked under the direction of the defendant³ . . . [and][t]he parties began dating within one week of the plaintiff's new employment. Six or eight weeks later, the parties became sexually intimate. The plaintiff moved out of her mother's house two weeks later to live with the defendant in his . . . apartment. . . . The parties maintained their finances separately. The defendant paid the shelter costs but did not provide any cash, credit card or bank account access to the plaintiff. . . . The plaintiff paid her own expenses. Prior to their marriage, the parties never had any conversation about the defendant's income or assets. The plaintiff never inquired; the defendant never offered any information.⁴

"The parties traveled together to New York City in December, 1994, and stayed at the defendant's apartment on 65th Street. They traveled to Florida in January, 1995, where the plaintiff met the defendant's parents. For the next two years, the plaintiff flew with the defendant frequently on his business and personal trips to the United States. . . . In the spring of 1996, the plaintiff accompanied the defendant as he looked for a house to buy in Connecticut. The defendant [subsequently] purchased a house . . . [in] Westport. . . .

"The plaintiff continued at Bankers Trust uneventfully for three years. As a trader's assistant, she entered and recorded stock transactions that the traders had done. As a personal aide to the defendant, she booked his travel to Hong Kong and Tokyo, made hotel and dinner reservations, and helped plan his workday. She did not decide upon the defendant's meetings, but she did organize them. She was responsible for keeping a log as to the defendant's whereabouts and appointments. She submitted the defendant's expense account receipts and bills to Bankers Trust. On at least one occasion, the defendant directed the plaintiff to photocopy certain of the defendant's financial documents for him to give to his accountant.⁵ The plaintiff denies that she made any attempt to peruse the documents to determine their content. She did not know the defendant's income or his net worth. . . .

"In the summer of 1997, the defendant asked the plaintiff to go to the United States to oversee renovations and furnishing of the Westport house. The plaintiff . . . readily agreed to his request . . . [and] took an unpaid leave of absence from the Bankers Trust job. In October, 1997, the plaintiff received notice that her employment at Bankers Trust was terminated because of the extraordinary length of her leave of absence. She continued to look after the renovations at the Westport house. Because her tourist visa allowed her to stay in the United States only ninety days at a time, the plaintiff traveled home to London every three months for a stay of a week before returning to Westport. . . . As in London, the plaintiff provided all the domestic services and ran personal errands for the defendant. The defendant paid the mortgage and utility expenses at the Westport house. The plaintiff used her savings to pay all her other living expenses. . . .

"In 1998, the plaintiff discovered that she was entering the [United States] on a tourist visa for the last time. The . . . trip to Westport [in the summer of 1998] would be her last unless her immigration status changed. The parties went together to see an immigration lawyer in August, 1998. The plaintiff's marriage to an American citizen would change her immigration status and allow her to stay in the United States. The defendant proposed marriage to the plaintiff on August 20, 1998. The parties needed to marry by the latter part of November, 1998, in order for the plaintiff to remain legally in the United States. Shortly after proposing marriage, the defendant informed the plaintiff that a premarital agreement would be necessary. The plaintiff was not familiar with the concept of a premarital agreement but expressed a willingness to sign one if that is what the defendant wished. The parties set Friday, November 6, 1998, as the wedding date. The plaintiff arranged for a justice of the peace to preside.

"The plaintiff heard nothing more about the possible premarital agreement until Monday, November 2.⁶ At that time, the defendant informed the plaintiff that the wedding could not take place on November 6 because the premarital agreement was not ready. There was no discussion between the parties about possible terms of a premarital agreement. The plaintiff contacted the justice of the peace to set a new wedding date of November 13.⁷

"Both parties were in New York City at the defendant's apartment on Thursday evening, November 5, when the defendant handed . . . the plaintiff a facsimile copy of a draft premarital agreement. . . . He told her to look it over and get it signed."

The record also reveals the following undisputed facts. The draft agreement consisted of nineteen articles. Article one, entitled "Acknowledgment of Present Situation: Changes in Circumstances," included the following language: "Each party acknowledges for himself or herself that both parties have substantial assets and that each would be able to adequately support himself or herself." Articles ten and eleven, entitled "Husband's Representations"⁸ and "Wife's Representations,"⁹ respectively, contained nearly identical language describing each party's assets and liabilities by reference to schedules A and B, and each party's gross income in 1997, although the spaces provided for the statements of income were not filled in. Articles ten and eleven further provided that each party acknowledged that he or she had examined the assets and liabilities set forth in the schedule of the other party and clearly understood and consented to all of the agreement's terms. See footnotes 8 and 9 of this opinion. Schedules A and B were attached to the draft agreement but, as in the case of the parties' incomes, had not yet been filled in.

The plaintiff read the draft agreement over the weekend of November 7 and 8, and made handwritten notes on seven of its twenty-one pages. The notes suggested that she had read the agreement carefully.¹⁰ Among the words that she underlined in article six, which concerned waiver and release of her future rights and claims against the defendant,¹¹ were "waives," "releases," "rights," "claims," "alimony" and "maintenance. . . ." The plaintiff also completed schedule B, noting that she had no liabilities and that her assets consisted of a "checking account" valued at $4000, a "savings account" valued at $11,000, "shares" valued at $4000, and an "endowment" valued at $3000, for a total asset value of $22,000. The plaintiff made no notations or marks on the draft agreement indicating that she had any questions or concerns regarding article ten, article eleven or schedule A.

When the defendant handed the draft agreement to the plaintiff on November 5, he also told her that his sister-in-law, Attorney Kristen A. Friezo, could recommend an attorney with whom the plaintiff might wish to consult. The plaintiff, who was on good terms with Kristen Friezo, made an appointment to go to her New York City law firm on Tuesday, November 10.¹² Upon the plaintiff's arrival for her appointment, Kristen Friezo introduced her to another associate in the law firm, Attorney Eamonn F. Foley.

Foley first asked the plaintiff to sign a conflict of interest waiver, which she did. The two then met for approximately one-half hour. Because Foley already had a copy of the draft, the plaintiff did not show him her copy.¹³ When Foley asked the plaintiff if she had any questions, she posed the questions that had come to mind during her weekend review of the draft. Foley stated that her points were well taken and that he would look into them. During the consultation, Foley also made notes on his own copy of the draft and asked the plaintiff to provide him with a list of her assets.

According to the plaintiff, Foley did not show or discuss with her a facsimile copy of the defendant's assets and liabilities that the defendant's attorney had sent...