Frink v. Arnold

• Decision Date: 27 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. 4-91-CV-30495.,4-91-CV-30495.
• Citation: 842 F. Supp. 1184
• Parties: Harry Burke FRINK, Jr., Plaintiff, v. C/O Tony ARNOLD; Bernard Eaves; Paul W. Grossheim; Charles Higgins; and K.W. Schmidt, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

842 F. Supp. 1184

Harry Burke FRINK, Jr., Plaintiff, v. C/O Tony ARNOLD; Bernard Eaves; Paul W. Grossheim; Charles Higgins; and K.W. Schmidt, Defendants.

No. 4-91-CV-30495.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, C.D.

January 27, 1994.

Jeffrey M. Lipman, Des Moines, IA, for plaintiff.

Suzie A. Berregaard Thomas, Asst. Atty. Gen. for the State of Iowa, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BENNETT, United States Magistrate Judge.

                                     TABLE OF CONTENTS
                I.   INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND                                  1186
                II.  FINDINGS OF FACT                                                        1186
                III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW                                                      1188
                     A. Introduction                                                         1188
                     B. The "Reasonable Relationship" Test                                   1189
                        1. Rational Connection Between Restriction and Governmental Interest 1190
                        2. Alternative Means of Exercising the Restricted Right              1191
                        3. Accommodation of the Right on Staff and Inmates                   1192
                        4. The Existence of Alternatives                                     1192
                     C. Conclusion                                                           1192
                

Plaintiff Harry Burke Frink, Jr., an inmate in the Iowa correctional system, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, alleging that Defendants, correctional personnel at the Mount Pleasant Correctional Facility ("MPCF"), Mount Pleasant, Iowa, violated his First Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution by seizing his fictional writings and requiring him to send them out of the institution. Frink seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages.

I. Introduction and Procedural Background

Frink filed a pro se complaint on August 9, 1991 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. At that time Frink was an inmate at the Iowa Men's Reformatory ("IMR") in Anamosa, Iowa. However, the acts complained of in the pro se complaint occurred at the MPCF in Mount Pleasant, Iowa which is in the Southern District of Iowa. On August 9, 1991, then United States District Court Judge David R. Hansen entered an order transferring this case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.¹ On September 19, 1991, Frink moved for appointment of counsel which was granted on September 26, 1991. On October 7, 1991 counsel with considerable experience in prisoners' rights litigation entered his appearance on behalf of Frink.

On July 20, 1992, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to trial of this matter before the undersigned United States magistrate judge. In lieu of a trial on the merits, the parties elected to submit this case on a stipulated record. Post-trial briefs have been filed and the matter is now fully submitted.

II. Findings of Fact²

Frink was previously incarcerated at MPCF, a medium security correctional facility located in Mount Pleasant, Iowa. Frink was committed to the Iowa Department of Corrections on August 30, 1979 to serve consecutive 25 year sentences for two counts of sexual abuse in the second degree and two counts of kidnapping in the second degree. Frink was transferred to MPCF from the IMR on February 7, 1990.³

MPCF houses approximately 820 inmates who are housed in two wings, east and west. Approximately 410 inmates are housed in the west wing, and approximately 230 of these inmates are enrolled in the Sex Offender Treatment Program ("SOTP") offered at IMR. Inmates enrolled in the SOTP are housed in either unit 2A or 2B. One correctional officer is assigned per unit at MPCF. Defendant Tony Arnold is a correctional officer at MPCF. At all times relevant to this case, Arnold was the unit officer for unit 2A. Approximately 68 inmates are assigned to unit 2A.

While at IMR, Frink had begun writing fictional prose. His goal is to become a professional writer. Frink has had rather limited success in achieving this goal having had one short story published in an Iowa community college magazine. When Frink was transferred to MPCF he took his written work with him. Frink continued his writing activities once he arrived at MPCF.

Frink enrolled in the SOTP when he arrived at MPCF, as well as an alcohol and drug treatment program, and was assigned to unit 2A. When Frink enrolled in the SOTP he signed a "treatment contract."⁴ All inmates who wish to enroll in the SOTP are required to sign a treatment contract.

On March 16, 1990, Arnold conducted a routine "shakedown" of Frink's cell at MPCF.⁵ During his search, Arnold came across Frink's writings. Upon cursory review of some of the materials, Arnold concluded that the writings might constitute contraband which was unauthorized under the SOTP. Arnold seized the writings and took them to Defendant Bernard Eaves' office. Eaves is a correctional counselor at MPCF, and is assigned to unit 2A. Eaves was Frink's primary counselor while he was in the SOTP.

Eaves read a small portion of the materials, and concluded that at least some of the writings were "very inappropriate" for an inmate in the SOTP.⁶ Eaves then reviewed some of Frink's written materials with his supervisors, Mr. Custer and Dudley Allison, the treatment director at MPCF. Custer directed Eaves to review all of the materials with Frink, and to separate out any materials that Eaves felt were inappropriate. Factors the staff at MPCF consider in determining whether written materials are inappropriate for an inmate in the SOTP are whether the writings contain violence, violence and sex linked together, illegal sexual conduct, or sexual situations involving minors. The existence of such items in inmate written materials is considered by MPCF's treatment staff to be counterproductive to the SOTP inmates because inmates' fantasies about actions reinforce negative behavior and negative thoughts.⁷

On March 30, 1990, Frink filed an inmate grievance concerning the decision to remove his writings. On April 5, 1990, Frink's grievance was denied by Defendant K.W. Schmidt, a grievance officer at MPCF. On April 6, 1990, Frink filed an inmate grievance appeal. On April 13, 1990, Defendant Charles Higgins, MPCF's Deputy Superintendent, denied Frink's appeal. In his response, Higgins stated:

At this time no material has been denied, even though the grievant admits there are some stories he has written which would be found contrary to his programming needs. The grievance is denied in that restrictions placed on the grievant are reasonable under the treatment contract for the Sex Offender program. It is felt that the grievant needs to decide if he is going to accept the restrictions placed on him voluntarily or is more interested in an attempt to further his "writing career." This may be a difficult decision for the grievant to arrive at and he should work with his counselor concerning this matter. Concerning the materials consisting of an apparent 27 files of paper, this is somewhat of a time consuming endeavor for the counselor to review, however, it should be completed as expeditiously as possible.

Eaves subsequently met with Frink and went through the writings with Frink. This session took one full afternoon. Eaves found approximately one-half of the 1600 pages of writings to be inappropriate. Frink was given the choice of having the materials destroyed or mailed out of the institution. Frink chose the latter option, and the materials were mailed to his sister in California.

Frink's writings which were mailed out of MPCF consisted of drafts of short stories, rough play outlines and character outlines. The materials contain descriptions of sexual activity, illegal sexual transactions and acts of male on female violence.⁸

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Introduction

Initially, the court recognizes that the following principles guide the court's consideration of this case. Although inmates may forfeit many valued freedoms and liberties upon being incarcerated, they nonetheless do retain at least some of their constitutional rights during confinement. At a minimum, prisoners are to be accorded those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objects of incarceration. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3198, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2807, 115 L.Ed.2d 979 (1991). Thus, "federal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison inmates." Turner, 482 U.S. at 84, 107 S.Ct. at 2259.

An equally important precept is that prisoners' constitutional rights may be significantly limited or substantially constrained in order to further legitimate objectives of the penal system. Thus, "the limitations on the exercise of constitutional rights arise both from the fact of incarceration and from valid penological objectives — including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security." O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987). In balancing these factors, "the evaluation of penological objectives is committed to the considered judgment of the prison administrators, `who are actually charged with and trained in the running of the particular institution under examination.'" Id. at 349, 107 S.Ct. at 2404 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1886, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)); see also Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810, 812 (8th Cir.1990) ("Issues of prison management are, both by reason of separation of powers and highly practical considerations of judicial competence, particularly ill-suited to judicial resolution....").⁹

This wide-ranging deference to the determinations of prison administrators is not boundless. "It is equally...