Frink v. Pratt

• Decision Date: 31 October 1889
• Citation: 130 Ill. 327,22 N.E. 819
• Parties: FRINK v. PRATT et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

130 Ill. 327

22 N.E. 819

FRINK

v.PRATT et al.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 31, 1889.

Appeal from appellate court, third district.

Trover by John B. Frink against Pratt & Co., for grain sold to the defendants by plaintiff's tenant, Daniel Wampler. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals.

Blades & Neville, for appellant.

Outten & Vail, for appellees.

SHOPE, C. J.

By written lease, March 11, 1884, Daniel Wampler became the tenant of appellant for three years, at a yearly rental of $500, and taxes assessed upon the premises rented. The rent, by the terms of the contract, fell due on the 1st day of January each year. Wampler occupied the farm rented, and raised crops thereon in the years 1884 and 1885. He paid about 351 of the first year's rental, and the taxes for that year, but he paid nothing on the rent of 1885, falling due January 1, 1886, nor the taxes of 1885. On the 11th day of December, 1885, Wampler sold all the corn raised on the demised premises that year to one Twaddell, agent of appellees at Lake City, in Moultrie county. The sale was of 2,498 bushels of corn, at 23 cents per bushel. The purchase was made December 11, 1885, but the corn was not paid for until January 1, 1886, and was accepted by the agent of appellees in cribs situated on the farm where raised. About two weeks afterwards Twaddell shelled the corn at the cribs, had it hauled and loaded in the cars at Lake City, and shipped to appellees at Decatur, who, previous to its arrival at Decatur, had sold the same to parties in the east, and it was forwarded to them. Appellant brought trover against appellees to recover damages for the conversion of the grain, to the extent of the rent due and unpaid by the tentant. It was contended by appellant that appellees, through their agent, Twaddell, had notice that Wampler was appellant's tenant, or had notice of such facts and circumstances as were sufficient to put them on inquiry, and therefore were not purchasers without notice of appellant's rights. This was denied by appellees, and in respect thereof the testimony is conflicting. It was also contended that, whether appellees had notice or not, they were liable for having converted the crops grown on the premises upon which appellant, as landlord, had a lien for the rent due and unpaid. A jury was waived; cause tried by the court by consent. The issues were found for the defendant, and judgment rendered accordingly. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, (26 Ill. App. 222,) and appellant, plaintiff below, brings the record to this court by his further appeal.

Appellees were dealers in grain at Decatur, Ill. Their agent at Lake City purchased of one Wampler, December 11, 1885, 2,498 bushels of corn in cribs on the farm then occupied by Daniel Wampler, to be accepted by Twaddell in the crib, and full payment was made of the price of the corn, January 1, 1886. Shortly afterwards the corn was shelled, hauled to Lake City, and shipped to appellees at Decatur by their agent, and in the regular course of business was forwarded by appellees to their customers in the eastern cities. This is an action of trover by appellant against appellees to recover damages for the wrongful conversion of said corn, he claiming a lien thereon as landlord of Wampler for rents due for the farm on which the same was raised, for the years 1884 and 1885. There is no doubt but Wampler was the tenant of appellant under a written lease, by which the farm upon which the corn in controversy was raised was demised to Wampler for three years. The rent, payable the 1st of January of the next year, was $500 in cash, and the taxes accruing on the land. At the time of the sale of the corn there was due and unpaid on the rent of 1884 about $149, while upon the rent for 1885, which fell due January 1, 1886, nothing had been paid. It would seem that the corn sold by the tenant to the appellees was the crop raised in 1885, and, if that be so, appellant had no lien thereon for the rent of the year 1884, remaining unpaid. Prettyman v. Unland, 77 Ill. 206. However, the first question presented by the record is whether the action will lie; that is, was appellant invested with such right of property in or right to the possession of the corn alleged to be converted as would enable him to maintain an action of trover?

In trover the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title to the property, without regard to the weakness of that of his adversary. It is a possessory action, and, in order to maintain it, the plaintiff must show in himself either a generalor special property in the thing converted. Davidson v. Waldron, 31 Ill. 120-129. It is essential that the plaintiff at the time of the conversion should have not only the right of property in the chattel, but also the right to its immediate possession. 1 Chit. Pl. 149; Bailey v. Godfrey, 54 Ill. 509;Forth v. Pursley, 82 Ill. 152; Owens v. Weedman, Id. 409; Bertholf v. Quinlan, 68 Ill. 297. The plaintiff must show a legal title. His right to posession must be immediate, absolute, and unconditional, and not dependent upon some act to be done by him. Owens v. Weedman, supra. Cooley, in his work on Torts, (page 445,) says: ‘When, therefore, it is said that the plaintiff in trover must have had, at the time of the conversion, the right to the property, and also a right of possession, nothing more can be intended than this: that the right of which he complains he has been deprived must have been either a right actually in possession, or a right immediately to take possession. It is not enough that it be merely a right in action, or a right to take possession at some future day.’ The statute gives the landlord a lien on ‘the crops grown or growing upon the...