Frink v. Prod

• Decision Date: 08 April 1982
• Citation: 31 Cal.3d 166,643 P.2d 476,181 Cal.Rptr. 893
• Parties: , 643 P.2d 476 Helene FRINK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Gerald PROD, as Director, etc., Defendant and Respondent. L.A. 31453.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 893

181 Cal.Rptr. 893

31 Cal.3d 166, 643 P.2d 476

Helene FRINK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Gerald PROD, as Director, etc., Defendant and Respondent.

L.A. 31453.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

April 8, 1982.

[31 Cal.3d 169] [643 P.2d 477] John E. McDermott, Mary S. Burdick, Los Angeles, Richard A. Rothschild, San Francisco, Robert F. Tardiff, Jr., Glendale, and Paul Ashby, San Francisco, for plaintiff and appellant.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Thomas E. Warriner, Anne S. Pressman and Louis Verdugo, Jr., Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.

BROUSSARD, Justice.

Helene Frink petitioned for writ of mandate to vacate an administrative decision denying benefits under the Aid to the Totally Disabled program (ATD). The superior court judgment states that while "the weight of the evidence was in petitioner's favor, there was substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the respondent's decision." Relief was denied. On this appeal, petitioner contends that the trial court should have exercised its independent judgment on the evidence rather than apply the substantial evidence rule.

Petitioner's application for benefits was denied in April 1973. She sought a hearing. At the time of the hearing, she was a 53-year-old married woman residing with her husband. She claimed that she was totally and permanently disabled based on back, leg, heart, hand, and psychological impairments. There was evidence that her conditions were not disabling and that they were not permanent. There was also conflicting[31 Cal.3d 170] evidence. A referee for the then Department of Social Welfare concluded that her condition was not permanent, and the director adopted the decision. Rehearing was denied in April 1974. Petitioner filed this mandamus proceeding but did not bring it on for trial until late 1979. ¹

In her points and authorities in support of the petition for writ of mandate, petitioner conceded that the substantial evidence test was applicable. The trial judge recognized that the authorities had established that the substantial evidence test was the proper standard of review but stated that he believed that, should this court reconsider, we would find independent judgment was the proper standard. He concluded that, while the weight of the evidence was contrary to the administrative decision, the decision was supported by substantial evidence.

STANDING

Preliminarily, it is urged that petitioner may not raise the issue of appropriate standard of review because she conceded that the substantial evidence rule was applicable at trial. Ordinarily, a party may not change the theory of his case for the first time on appeal. (Panopulous v. Maderis (1956) 47 Cal.2d 337, 340, 303 P.2d 738.) However, parties have been permitted to change their theory on appeal where the issue is purely a question of law presented on undisputed facts. (Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394, 149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 584 P.2d 512; Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 742, 336 P.2d 534.) In addition, consideration of points not raised below also may be permitted when important issues of public policy are involved. (Hale v. Morgan, supra, 22 Cal.3d 388, 394, 149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 584 P.2d 512.)

In the instant case, appellate rulings, as we shall see, required application of the substantial evidence rule, and the trial court would have exceeded its jurisdiction had it refused to follow the controlling authorities. (Auto Equity Sale, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 454, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937.) The case was submitted on the [31 Cal.3d 171] basis of the administrative record, and it is not claimed that additional evidence was available to the parties. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5, Subd. (e).) The superior court anticipated the issue of appropriate

[643 P.2d 478] standard of review and made determinations on the basis of both substantial evidence and independent judgment standards. In the circumstances, our consideration of the appropriate standard of superior court review of the administrative decision will not result in unfairness to the trial court or the parties (see 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) p. 4265), and is in furtherance of the policy of permitting consideration of important issues of public policy. Petitioner's concession of applicability of the substantial evidence rule--a rule the trial court was required to apply in any event--does not preclude consideration of the appropriate standard of review

CONTENTIONS

In administrative mandamus actions to review decisions terminating welfare assistance, the trial court exercises its independent judgment on the evidence. (Harlow v. Carleson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 731, 734 et seq., 129 Cal.Rptr. 298, 548 P.2d 698.) However, administrative determinations of applications for welfare benefits traditionally have been reviewed under the substantial evidence rule. (Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 676, 131 Cal.Rptr. 789, 552 P.2d 749; Bertch v. Social Welfare Dept. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 524, 529, 289 P.2d 485; Ferreira v. Swoap (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 875, 881, 133 Cal.Rptr. 449; Millen v. Swoap (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 943, 947-948, 130 Cal.Rptr. 387; Repko v. Carleson (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 249, 265-266, 122 Cal.Rptr. 29; Henderling v. Carleson (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 561, 567, 111 Cal.Rptr. 612; County of Madera v. Carleson (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 764, 767, 108 Cal.Rptr. 515; Taylor v. Martin (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 1057, 1059, 105 Cal.Rptr. 211; Stratton-King v. Martin (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 686, 690, 104 Cal.Rptr. 916; County of Contra Costa v. Social Welfare Board (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 468, 473, 18 Cal.Rptr. 573.) The cases have concluded that substantial evidence review is required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 10962 and is appropriate because the applicant, unlike persons who have been receiving benefits, does not have a vested right to the benefits. (Id.)

Petitioner attacks both bases for application of the substantial evidence rule, claiming that section 10962 does not command substantial evidence review and that recent decisions do not require a vested right as a condition to independent judgment review.

LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION OF STANDARD OF REVIEW

Welfare and Institutions Code section 10962 provides: "The applicant or recipient or the affected county, within one year after receiving notice of the director's final decision, may file a petition with the superior court, under the provisions of Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying for a review of the entire proceedings in the matter, upon questions of law involved in the case. Such review, if granted, shall be the exclusive remedy available to the applicant or recipient or county for review of the director's decision." (Italics added.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 provides:

"(a) Where the writ is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board or officer, the case shall be heard by the court sitting without a jury....

"(b) The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.

"(c) Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence; and in all other cases, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record...." (Italics added.)

Prior to Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 335, 156 Cal.Rptr. 1, 595 P.2d 579, it was held that unless authorized by the California Constitution, administrative agencies could not exercise judicial power and that the separation of powers doctrine required courts to independently determine the weight of the evidence when reviewing adjudicative decisions of agencies lacking judicial power. (Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 802, 820-823, 140 Cal.Rptr. 442, 567 P.2d 1162; Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 34 et seq., 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 137-144, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242.) Pointing out that none of the earlier cases had invalidated a statute providing that administrative findings were conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, the court in Tex-Cal held that "the Legislature may accord finality to the findings of a statewide agency that are supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole and are made under safeguards equivalent to those provided by the [Agricultural Labor Relations Act] for unfair labor practice proceedings, whether or not the California Constitution provides for that agency's exercising 'judicial power.' " (24 Cal.3d, at p. 346, 156 Cal.Rptr. 1, 595 P.2d 579.)

While the Legislature could properly provide for substantial evidence review of administrative determinations denying welfare benefits, it has not done so. The statute involved in Tex-Cal, Labor Code section 1160.8, provides: "The findings of the board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall in like manner be conclusive."

By way of ...