Frink v. State
| Decision Date | 24 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 73A05–1507–CR–761.,73A05–1507–CR–761. |
| Citation | 52 N.E.3d 842 |
| Parties | Jennifer L. FRINK, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
52 N.E.3d 842
Jennifer L. FRINK, Appellant–Defendant
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
No. 73A05–1507–CR–761.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
March 24, 2016.
Brian J. Johnson, Danville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
CRONE, Judge.
Case Summary
[2] Frink filed a motion to dismiss the charge pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35–34–l–4(a)(5). Specifically, Frink alleged that she cannot be guilty of criminal trespass because she had a contractual
[52 N.E.3d 844
interest in School Corporation property by virtue of her status as a parent of children living within the school system. She also claimed that the School Corporation's no-trespass warning violated her substantive and procedural due process rights. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The trial court certified its order at Frink's request, and we accepted jurisdiction of this interlocutory appeal. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. Finding that the State alleged sufficient facts to disprove that Frink had a contractual interest in School Corporation property and that her substantive and procedural due process claims are not proper issues for the motion to dismiss, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[4] The student disclosed to Hensley that he and Frink had sexual intercourse on multiple occasions during school hours, both on and off school property. The student stated that on some occasions, Frink had removed him from school property in her vehicle during school in order to have intercourse. Hensley notified Miltz, the student's parents, and the High School resource officer, Shelbyville Police Sergeant Bart Smith, about what he had learned. Miltz notified the Department of Child Services as well as the superintendent of the School Corporation. After conferring with the superintendent, Miltz decided that the correct course of action would be to immediately terminate Frink's employment and to give her a no-trespass warning.
[5] Miltz and Sergeant Smith met with Frink. Miltz informed Frink about the student's allegations. Frink “didn't try to defend herself” but simply said, “Not very good.” Id. at 22. Miltz terminated Frink's employment. Also, at Miltz's direction, Sergeant Smith advised Frink that she was not to come onto the property of the School Corporation, and he gave her a document entitled “Criminal Trespass Warning.” Appellant's App. at 43. The document cites Indiana Code Section 35–43–2–2 and explains the elements of the offense of criminal trespass. Frink acknowledged her understanding that she was not to be on any School Corporation property.
[6] Approximately one week later, on May 18, 2014, Miltz contacted Officer Edward Hadley of Shelbyville Police Department to report that Frink had been on School Corporation property despite the no-trespass warning. Officer Hadley subsequently went to Frink's residence to speak with her and to again advise her of the no-trespass warning. Frink stated that she understood that she was not to come onto any School Corporation property.
[7] Thereafter, on Friday, November 14, 2014, Frink went to Coulston Elementary School, a school within the School Corporation. She completed forms to transfer her children from their prior school to Coulston. At the time of Frink's visit, staff at Coulston were not aware of the no-trespass warning. Coulston staff later learned of the no-trespass warning when they requested the children's records
[52 N.E.3d 845
from the prior school. Accordingly, Coulston staff notified the Shelbyville Police Department. Officer Hadley was dispatched to the scene and made a report of Frink's prohibited visit. Coulston staff informed police that Frink would likely return the following Monday to meet the teachers. Frink and her husband indeed returned to Coulston the following Monday to meet the children's teachers. Frink talked, drank coffee, and remained at the school for approximately ten minutes. Coulston staff again notified the Shelbyville Police Department. Officer Hadley responded to the scene, but Frink left before he arrived.
Discussion and...
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