Frinzi v. Hanson

• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HALLOWS
• Citation: Frinzi v. Hanson, 30 Wis.2d 271, 140 N.W.2d 259 (Wis. 1966)
• Decision Date: 01 March 1966
• Parties: Dominic H. FRINZI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J. Louis HANSON, Defendant-Respondent.

Page 259

140 N.W.2d 259

30 Wis.2d 271

Dominic H. FRINZI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J. Louis HANSON, Defendant-Respondent.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

March 1, 1966.

Nicholas C. Catania, Milwaukee, for appellant.

Arthur DeBardeleben, Park Falls, for respondent.

HALLOWS, Justice.

By the demurrer the facts alleged in the complaint are admitted as verities and only a question of law is presented. The complaint alleges Dominic H. Frinzi was a Milwaukee lawyer of good name and credit and at the time of the alleged libel was a candidate for the office of governor in the Democratic primary which was to be held on September 7, 1964. Frinzi was a member in good standing of the Democratic Party and supported and espoused the principles, ideals and platform of that party without qualification or equivocation. On the 3rd day of September, a few days before the primary, the respondent J. Louis Hanson, who was the state chairman of the Democratic Party, issued for publication in various state newspapers an allegedly defamatory statement concerning Frinzi. While the complete published statement is not pleaded, the following is set forth in the complaint as libelous:

'(a) That 'an unholy alliance between the Knowles forces and the anti-John Doe forces is supporting the candidacy of DOMINIC FRINZI.'

'(b) 'The price apparently is Knowles' support to weakening the anti-gambling laws of Wisconsin.'

'(c) That 'DOMINIC FRINZI, by stating that he is considering running as an independent has thrown away all pretense at being a Democrat.'

It is sufficiently alleged that the matter was false and made with a malicious purpose to affect his standing as a Democratic Party condidate in the primary election and to discredit and impugn the integrity of Frinzi as an individual and his professional standing and reputation. Damages, both compensatory and punitive, were prayed for.

The one question raised and which is the only one argued or briefed is whether the alleged statements are capable of conveying a defamatory meaning to the minds of the public and particularly whether the meaning attributable to the statements by Frinzi might be fairly ascribed to them under the circumstances. Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp. (1962), 15 Wis.2d 452, 113 N.W.2d 135; Downer v. Tubbs (1913), 152 Wis. 177, 139 N.W. 820; Woods v. Sentinel-News Co. (1935), 216 Wis. 627, 258 N.W. 166. To sustain the demurrer, it must be determined as a matter of law that the language complained of is incapable under the circumstances pleaded of harming the reputation of Mr. Frinzi 'so as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.' Restatement, 3 Torts, Defamation, p. 140, sec. 559.

The older cases define a libel as language which imputed the commission of certain crimes or tended to degrade or disgrace a person generally or to subject one to public distrust, ridicule, or contempt in the community where he had been regarded in high confidence and esteem; ¹ or as language which tends to bring the plaintiff into public hatred, contempt or ridicule or imply or be generally understood to imply reproach, dishonesty, scandal or ridicule. ²

If the alleged communication is capable of a defamatory meaning, the demurrer must be overruled; and if the language is of such a character that it is capable of a nondefamatory meaning as well as a defamatory meaning, then a jury question is presented whether such communication was understood in fact in a defamatory sense by the persons to whom it was published. Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp., supra. If the communication cannot reasonably be considered defamatory or to be so understood, the demurrer must be sustained.

In determining whether language is defamatory, the words must be reasonably interpreted and must be construe in the plain and popular sense in which they would naturally be understood in the context in which they were used and under the circumstances they were uttered. Meier v. Meurer (1959), 8 Wis.2d 24, 98 N.W.2d 411; Leuch v. Berger (1915), 161 Wis. 564, 155 N.W. 148. Here, the language must be considered as originating with the state chairman of the Democratic Party during a party primary concerning a party candidate a few days before the primary election. In this case we do not reach any question of fair comment or whether the statement made is protected under the First Amendment's constitutional guarantee of free speech as discussed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, and Garrison v. State of Louisiana (1964), 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125, or whether the Times doctrine applies to a candidate for public office.

We think the language that Frinzi was supported by 'an unholy alliance between the Knowles' forces and the anti-John Doe forces' is not libelous as a matter of law considered alone or with the second statement that 'The price apparently is Knowles' support to weakening the antigambling laws of Wisconsin.' This language charged Frinzi with being supported by Republican force supporting Knowles and force which were against the John Doe investigation. The support is characterized as an unholy alliance. It is argued this language by innuendo libels Frinzi because he is identified...