Frisby v. Schultz, 87-168
| Citation | 487 U.S. 474,101 L.Ed.2d 420,108 S.Ct. 2495 |
| Decision Date | 27 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-168,87-168 |
| Parties | Russell C. FRISBY, et al., Appellants v. Sandra C. SCHULTZ and Robert C. Braun |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
Brookfield, Wisconsin, enacted an ordinance making it "unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual," and declaring that the primary purpose of the ban is to "protec[t] and preserv[e] the home" through assurance "that members of the community enjoy in their homes . . . a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy." Appellees, who wish to picket a particular home in Brookfield, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against appellants, the town and several of its officials, alleging that the ordinance violated the First Amendment. The Federal District Court granted appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored enough to restrict protected speech in a public forum. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed.
Held: The ordinance is not facially invalid under the First Amendment. Pp. 479-488.
(a) Although the town's streets are narrow and of a residential character, they are nevertheless traditional public fora, Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263, and, therefore, the ordinance must be judged against the stringent standards this Court has established for restrictions on speech in such fora. Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794. Pp. 480-481.
(b) The ordinance is content neutral and cannot be read as containing an implied exception for peaceful labor picketing on the theory that an express state law protection for such picketing takes precedence. This Court will defer to the rejection of that theory by the lower courts, which are better schooled in and more able to interpret Wisconsin law. Pp. 481-482.
(c) The ordinance leaves open ample alternative channels of communication. Although the precise scope of the ordinance's ban is not further described within its text, its use of the singular form of the words "residence" and "dwelling" suggests that it is intended to prohibit only picketing focused on, and taking place in front of, a particular residence, a reading which is supported by appellants' representations at oral argument. The lower courts' contrary interpretation of the ordinance as banning "all picketing in residential areas" constitutes plain error, and runs afoul of the well-established principle that statutes will be interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties. Viewed in the light of the narrowing construction, the ordinance allows protestors to enter residential neighborhoods, either alone or marching in groups; to go door-to-door to proselytize their views or distribute literature; and to contact residents through the mails or by telephone, short of harassment. Pp. 482-484.
(d) As is evidenced by its text, the ordinance serves the significant government interest of protecting residential privacy. An important aspect of such privacy is the protection of unwilling listeners within their homes from the intrusion of objectionable or unwanted speech. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073. Moreover, the ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve that governmental interest, since, although its ban is complete, it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the "evil" it seeks to remedy: offensive and disturbing picketing focused on a "captive" home audience. It does not prohibit more generally directed means of public communication that may not be completely banned in residential areas. Pp. 484-488.
822 F.2d 642, reversed.
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. ---. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. ---.
Harold H. Fuhrman, Milwaukee, Wis., for appellants.
Steven Frederick McDowell, Milwaukee, Wis., for appellees.
Brookfield, Wisconsin, has adopted an ordinance that completely bans picketing "before or about" any residence. This case presents a facial First Amendment challenge to that ordinance.
Brookfield, Wisconsin, is a residential suburb of Milwaukee with a population of approximately 4,300. The appellees, Sandra C. Schultz and Robert C. Braun, are individuals strongly opposed to abortion and wish to express their views on the subject by picketing on a public street outside the Brookfield residence of a doctor who apparently performs abortions at two clinics in neighboring towns. Appellees and others engaged in precisely that activity, assembling outside the doctor's home on at least six occasions between April 20, 1985, and May 20, 1985, for periods ranging from one to one and a half hours. The size of the group varied from 11 to more than 40. The picketing was generally orderly and peaceful; the town never had occasion to invoke any of its various ordinances prohibiting obstruction of the streets, loud and unnecessary noises, or disorderly conduct. Nonetheless, the picketing generated substantial controversy and numerous complaints.
The Town Board therefore resolved to enact an ordinance to restrict the picketing. On May 7, 1985, the town passed an ordinance that prohibited all picketing in residential neighborhoods except for labor picketing. But after reviewing this Court's decision in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980), which invalidated a similar ordinance as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the town attorney instructed the police not to enforce the new ordinance and advised the Town Board that the ordinance's labor picketing exception likely rendered it unconstitutional. This ordinance was repealed on May 15, 1985, and replaced with the following flat ban on all residential picketing:
"It is unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brookfield." App. to Juris. Statement A-28.
The ordinance itself recites the primary purpose of this ban: "the protection and preservation of the home" through assurance "that members of the community enjoy in their homes and dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy." Id., at A-26. The Town Board believed that a ban was necessary because it determined that "the practice of picketing before or about residences and dwellings causes emotional disturbance and distress to the occupants . . . [and] has as its object the harassing of such occupants." Id., at A-26—A-27. The ordinance also evinces a concern for public safety, noting that picketing obstructs and interferes with "the free use of public sidewalks and public ways of travel." Id., at A-27.
On May 18, 1985, appellees were informed by the town attorney that enforcement of the new, revised ordinance would begin on May 21, 1985. Faced with this threat of arrest and prosecution, appellees ceased picketing in Brookfield and filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The complaint was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought declaratory as well as preliminary and permanent injunctive relief on the grounds that the ordinance violated the First Amendment. Appellees named appellants—the three members of the Town Board, the Chief of Police, the town attorney, and the town itself—as defendants.
The District Court granted appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored enough to restrict protected speech in a public forum. 619 F.Supp. 792, 797 (1985). The District Court's order specified that unless the appellants requested a trial on the merits within 60 days or appealed, the preliminary injunction would become permanent. Appellants requested a trial and also appealed the District Court's entry of a preliminary injunction.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 807 F.2d 1339 (1986). The Court of Appeals subsequently vacated this decision, however, and ordered a rehearing en banc. 818 F.2d 1284 (1987). After rehearing, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court by an equally divided vote. 822 F.2d 642 (1987). Contending that the Court of Appeals had rendered a final judgment holding the ordinance "to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution," 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), appellants attempted to invoke our mandatory appellate jurisdiction. App. to Juris. Statement A-25 (citing § 1254(2)). We postponed further consideration of our appellate jurisdiction until the hearing on the merits. 484 U.S. 1003, 108 S.Ct. 692, 98 L.Ed.2d 644 (1988).
Appellees argue that there is no jurisdiction under § 1254(2) due to the lack of finality. They point out that the District Court entered only a preliminary injunction and that appellants requested a trial on the merits, which has yet to be conducted. These considerations certainly suggest a lack of finality. Yet despite the formally tentative nature of its order, the District Court appeared ready to enter a final judgment since it indicated that unless a trial was requested a permanent injunction would issue. In addition, while appellants initially requested a trial, they no longer adhere to this position and now say that they would have no additional arguments to offer at such a trial. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. In the context of this case, however, there is no need to decide whether jurisdiction is proper under § 1254(2). Because the question presented is of substantial importance, and because further proceedings below would not likely aid our consideration of it, we choose to avoid the finality issue simply...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, Civ. No. H-89-400 (PCD).
...1029, 47 L.Ed.2d 196 (1976); Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 66, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984); cf. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2499, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988) (no right to force speech into the home of unwilling listener). The same principle certainly applies to con......
-
Harman v. City of Santa Cruz
...San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1990), as amended on denial of reh'g (Dec. 26, 1991) (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988) ). In such traditional public fora, the government's authority to restrict speech is at its minimum. Id. A state......
-
Saltz v. City of Frederick
...Cir. 2005).13 Public streets, sidewalks, and parks are the "archetype of a traditional public forum." Frisby v. Schultz , 487 U.S. 474, 480, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988). And, in the traditional public forum, "speakers’ rights are at their apex." Steinburg v. Chesterfield Cnty. Pl......
-
Mahgerefteh v. City of Torrance
...the Court must first interpret the provisions to determine what is and is not prohibited by them. See Frisby v. Schultz , 487 U.S. 474, 482, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988). The provisions are contained in three different parts of the statute. The first part is a section defining the......
-
Do Not Knock? Lovell to Watchtower and Back Again
...Mktg. Servs., Inc. , 358 F.3d at 1238. 66 Id. at 1240. 67 Id. at 1241–42. 68 Id. at 1238. 69 Id. at 1237 (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (internal citation omitted)). 70 Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. , 358 F.3d at 1237–38 (quoting Frisby , 487 U.S. at 484–85). 71 See, e......
-
Targeted hate speech and the first amendment: how the supreme court should have decided Snyder.
...consensual conduct, in interpreting substantive due process right to privacy to prohibit state's sodomy law). (157.) Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (158.) Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). (159.) For example, in Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995), the S......
-
Community, Society, and Individualism in Constitutional Law
...in Miller v. California tacitly acknowledged that some localities have lost 323. 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974). 324. See, e.g. , Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) (upholding prohibition on residential picketing); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (plurality opinion) (upholding ban o......
-
Unleashing the limited public forum: a modest revision to a dysfunctional doctrine.
...Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (holding that the plaza outside city hall was a traditional public forum); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) (holding that town streets were a traditional public forum); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (holding that a sidewalk was......
-
Chapter 118, HB 1571 – An act relating to residential picketing; creating s. 810.15, F.S.; defining the term "dwelling"; prohibiting a person from picketing or protesting before or about the dwelling of a person with specified intent; providing criminal penalties; requiring a specified warning before arrest for a violation;...
...of the United States recognized this interest in upholding a challenged ordinance restricting residential picketing in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), NOW, THEREFORE,Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:Section 1. Section 810.15, Florida Statutes, is created to r......