Fritchen v. Jacobs
Decision Date | 07 March 1931 |
Docket Number | 29,509 |
Citation | 132 Kan. 491,297 P. 409 |
Parties | F. F. FRITCHEN, Appellee, v. E. C. MUELLER and MARY JACOBS, Appellants |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Decided January, 1931.
Appeal from Mitchell district court; WILLIAM R. MITCHELL, judge.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.
1. BILLS AND NOTES--Duress--Jury Questions. In an action to recover on a promissory note, where the defense of duress was pleaded and evidence to support that plea was adduced by defendants, it is held that an instructed verdict in favor of plaintiff was erroneous, and the cause should have been submitted for a jury's determination.
2. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT--Proof of Agency. The fact of agency does not require proof of formal appointment to establish it; it may be implied from other facts, the conduct and statements of parties, and from relevant circumstances--following Wilson v. Haun, 97 Kan. 445, 155 P. 798.
3. BILLS AND NOTES--Holder in Due Course--Burden of Proof. When prima facie evidence of infirmity in a promissory note has been adduced by its defendant makers the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that he acquired it in due course without notice of such infirmity, and the question whether plaintiff's evidence meets that requirement is ordinarily one for a jury's determination and cannot be disposed of by an instructed verdict.
4. PLEADING--Amendment to Conform to Proof. Rule followed that when a cause is tried in full before a jury on the assumption that the issues have been sufficiently defined by the pleadings so as to permit the introduction of the evidence which the parties or either of them have adduced at length it is error to sustain a belated objection to the sufficiency of the pleadings; they should then be construed as having been informally amended and as interpreted throughout the course of the trial.
5. BILLS AND NOTES--Pleading Duress--Sufficiency of Answer. Where a defense to an action on a promissory note is duress or similar plea, the answer requires no general denial but does require a plea of new matter which will strip the colorable cause of action of its validity.
6. SAME--Trial. Other objections to defendants' pleadings considered and not sustained.
7. SAME GENERALLY. Arguments of appellee to justify the judgment based upon an instructed verdict, noted in the opinion, considered and not sustained.
R. L. Hamilton, C. L. Kagey, Leon W. Lundblade and L. M. Kagey, all of Beloit, for the appellants.
A. E. Crane, B. F. Messick, both of Topeka, and N. C. Else, of Osborne, for the appellee.
This was an action on a promissory note. The defense was a plea of duress. After the cause was tried in full before a jury the court gave an instructed verdict for plaintiff. That ruling is the basis of this appeal.
The facts and circumstances developed by the pleadings and by the evidence favorable to defendants were to this effect:
This was followed by the meeting of the board of directors, at which it was voted that the prior officers, including this plaintiff F. F. Fritchen, vice president, and A. Diebold, cashier, should be reelected. The minutes of this meeting also recite:
"It was further moved, seconded and carried that F. F. Fritchen and M. Lutgen go into the matter pertaining to the fidelity bond of E. C. Mueller and if possible to obtain payment thereon for losses sustained which we believe came about through transactions made by the former cashier E. C. Mueller and such transactions do not come up fully to our approval, and the cashier to render all assistance possible in this matter."
Shortly thereafter Diebold, the cashier, accompanied by N. C. Else, a lawyer who had previously acted as attorney for the bank in particular matters and who has subsequently acted as attorney for the bank and for Fritchen, its vice president, plaintiff herein, met defendant Mueller in Kansas City in the latter part of January, 1927. Diebold stated that Mr. Else was there to see Mueller as representative of the board of directors of the Home State Bank of Tipton. At first the court would not permit testimony to be given as to what Mr. Else himself said to Mueller, but later testimony concerning that conversation was admitted:
Shortly thereafter, on February 8, 1926, Mr. Else went to the home of the defendant, Mrs. Mary Jacobs, mother-in-law of Mueller. She is a woman of some means and resides with her husband in Tipton, some miles distant from Osborne. Mr. Else introduced himself as attorney for the Tipton bank, and presented two notes for $ 3,000 each, which he wanted her and her husband to sign. She asked him why she should do so:
"Well, he said that he wanted me to sign those two notes, or if we don't sign them, that he wouldn't say what would happen, and then I was scared to death, and I called for my husband, and he came into the room then and then he stated to him, that he was here to get me and Mr. Jacobs to sign those notes or if we didn't sign them Gene (Mueller) would be sent to the pen, or something like that, he said."
Mr. Jacobs, husband of defendant Mary Jacobs, testified:
Next day Mrs. Jacobs called at the Tipton bank and asked Cashier Diebold what Would happen if she didn't sign the notes. Diebold called Mr. Else at Osborne over the long-distance telephone and then stated to her that if she persisted in her refusal he [Mr. Else] would start for Topeka next morning.
Mr. Else got in touch with Mueller in Kansas City, and in response thereto Mueller came to Osborne on February 10, 1926. Mr. Else met Mueller at the train and took him to his law office, where he met the plaintiff Fritchen and M. Lutgen. These two men were the committee of the bank appointed to apply pressure on Mueller, as recited in the minutes of the stockholders' and directors' meetings in January. After some talk Fritchen, Lutgen and Else and another bank officer retired to another room for consultation. Else then reappeared and told Mueller "that the directors were in a very hostile mood and he didn't know how he could hold them off." Mueller testified:
Fritchen and his confreres then reappeared and in their presence Mueller signed the note involved in this action for $ 3,000 and another note for a similar sum; also one for $ 1,000, and he also agreed to convey to the bank certain lands and assign his stock in the Tipton bank. Mr. Else took charge of the notes and he and Mueller...
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