Fritz v. Uwchlan Ambulance Corps, CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-3181

• Decision Date: 04 March 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-3181
• Parties: JANEL FRITZ Plaintiff v. UWCHLAN AMBULANCE CORPS, INC. Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

JANEL FRITZ Plaintiff v. UWCHLAN AMBULANCE CORPS, INC. Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-3181

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARCH 4, 2020

NITZA I. QUIÑONEZ ALEJANDRO, J.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Janel Fritz filed this discrimination action, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq, against her former employer, Defendant Uwchlan Ambulance Corps, Inc. ("Defendant"), in which she asserts claims of pregnancy discrimination, gender discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. [ECF 1]. Before this Court are Defendant's motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 56, [ECF 19], Plaintiff's response in opposition thereto, [ECF 20], and Defendant's reply. [ECF 23]. The issues raised in Defendant's motion are fully briefed and ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion is granted and judgment is entered in favor of Defendant.

BACKGROUND

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant (here, Plaintiff). Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 196 (3d Cir. 2011). The relevant facts are summarized as follows:

Plaintiff, a female Emergency Medical Technician/Paramedic ("EMT/P"), was employed by Defendant Uwchlan Ambulance Corps, Inc. at all relevant times. In the complaint, Plaintiff describes instances of negative treatment at work, which she contends were based on her gender and her pregnancy. While Plaintiff references a series of interactions with coworkers and supervisors that she found offensive, the most relevant instances are detailed below.

Facts Related to Plaintiff's Pregnancy

In June 2017, Plaintiff was in the third trimester of her pregnancy and requested an accommodation from Defendant in the form of lifting assistance during the remainder of her pregnancy. In response to her request, Defendant assigned a second EMT/P to Plaintiff's shifts.¹ Plaintiff also contends that Defendant's employees repeatedly urged her to begin maternity leave prior to the birth of her child, and prior to the date required and directed by her doctor. When Supervisor John Applegate ("Supervisor Applegate") encouraged Plaintiff to go out on leave earlier than Plaintiff had planned, he told her that he would "save her spot" for twelve weeks. Supervisor Applegate made the following comments to Plaintiff while she was pregnant: 1) Plaintiff's shirt looked like "a tent," 2) Plaintiff looked like she was "ready to pop," 3) Plaintiff should not work too hard because she may "hatch," and 4) Plaintiff should let him know "if [she] hatch[es]."

In July 2017, Plaintiff was informed that she could no longer work at a particular substation for the remainder of her pregnancy because of the late stage of her pregnancy. Plaintiff identifies two other employees who were permitted to continue working at the same substation throughout their pregnancies.

After giving birth, Plaintiff attempted to return to work on September 21, 2017 and Defendant's secretary asked her for a doctor's note indicating that she was able to return to work. A male employee who was absent from work for less than three consecutive days was not required to produce a doctor's note to return to work.

Facts Related to Plaintiff's Gender

In July 2017, Matthew Applegate ("Matthew"), a fellow employee and the son of Supervisor Applegate, made a comment about Plaintiff "shoving a tampon in each hole," after which a supervisor told Matthew that the comment was inappropriate. In January 2018, Plaintiff and Matthew were watching television at work and Matthew commented on the size of the on-screen actresses' breasts and how attractive he found them. On another occasion, Plaintiff heard Matthew andother male employees discussing sexual behavior they had videotaped outside of work.

On or around July 31, 2017, Matthew approached Plaintiff and began a work-related discussion about a former dispatch to which Defendant had responded. The conversation became heated and Matthew called Plaintiff a "bitch." In response, Plaintiff told Matthew that she believed he was only able to make such comments without negative consequences because he is the son of a supervisor. Matthew then left, slammed the door, and called Plaintiff an "asshole." Matthew immediately reported what Plaintiff had said to him to Supervisor Emily McCarthy ("Supervisor McCarthy"), who immediately suspended Plaintiff without pay for three days for accusing Matthew of benefiting from nepotism. Plaintiff insisted on receiving, and did receive, written documentation of her suspension before leaving work that day. The Employee Disciplinary Action Notice that Plaintiff received that day indicated that she had engaged in substandard work, insubordination, and unprofessional conduct. More specifically, the notice indicated that Plaintiff "was giving incorrect information to another employee about disciplinary action that she had no knowledge of."

Plaintiff baldly contends that the proffered reason for her suspension was pretextual and baseless, yet continually admits in her filings that she was suspended because she made statements about Matthew not being subject to discipline because of his familial relationship with a supervisor. Matthew was not disciplined for his comments toward Plaintiff.

Plaintiff describes other instances where miscellaneous company policies were enforced against her but not against her coworkers. Most of these instances include other females being treated more favorably than Plaintiff and do not in any way suggest that Plaintiff's allegedly less favorable treatment had anything to do with her gender. A few instances where the behavior or treatment had any connection to Plaintiff's gender include: (1) a male employee was permitted to work a double shift and Plaintiff was not permitted to do so; (2) a volunteer commented to Plaintiff, "Nice strong legs, they are ready for bicycling and you should work out [at work] more often."

Plaintiff maintains that throughout her employment, she performed all duties satisfactorily and regularly exceeded the requirements of her position.

LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 56 governs the practice of summary judgment motions and provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if its existence or non-existence might affect the outcome of the case, and a dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Under Rule 56, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Galena, 638 F.3d at 196.

The movant bears the initial burden of identifying evidence that "demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also UPMC Health Sys. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the movant has met its initial burden, the nonmovant must rebut the motion by identifying "some evidence in the record that creates a genuine issue of material fact." Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006). In doing so, the nonmovant must rely on facts in the record and "cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument[,]" id., or on "bare assertions, conclusory allegations[,] or suspicions." Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982). If the nonmovant "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial[,]" then the court should grant summary judgment for the movant. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

DISCUSSION

As noted, Plaintiff asserts claims of pregnancy discrimination, gender discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment, all in violation of Title VII.² In its motion, Defendantargues that there are no genuine disputes of material fact and that Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law. For the reasons set forth below, this Court agrees.

Pregnancy Discrimination Claim

Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, prohibits discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions[,]" and requires that women affected by those bases be treated the same, for all employment-related purposes, as non-pregnant persons similar in their ability to work. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k), 2000e-2-3; see also Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, 527 F.3d 358, 363-64 (3d Cir. 2008). To establish a disparate treatment pregnancy discrimination claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the employer had knowledge of the pregnancy; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the job; (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) there is a nexus between the plaintiff's pregnancy and the adverse employment action that raises an inference of discrimination. Doe, 527 F.3d at 365. The fourth element is most frequently established by evidence that the plaintiff was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in the plaintiff's protected class—i.e., other non-pregnant employees who are temporarily disabled. Id. at 366.

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish the second, third, or fourth elements of a pregnancy discrimination claim. In response, Plaintiff argues that she suffered adverse employment actions by way of (1) the collective offensive comments made to her by Defendant's employees and (2) her suspension. Notably, Plaintiff does not offer any arguments that she was, indeed, qualified for her job, or that any nexus exists between her pregnancy and...