Froede v. Holland Ladder & Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 October 1994
• Docket Number: Docket No. 143336
• Parties: William R. FROEDE and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HOLLAND LADDER & MANUFACTURING COMPANY and National Ladder & Scaffold Company, Michigan corporations, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 849

523 N.W.2d 849

207 Mich.App. 127

William R. FROEDE and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HOLLAND LADDER & MANUFACTURING COMPANY and National Ladder &amp Scaffold Company, Michigan corporations, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 143336.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 16, 1994, at Detroit.

Decided Oct. 3, 1994, at 9:10 a.m.

Released for Publication Dec. 2, 1994.

John Bovill, III, Saginaw (Bendure & Thomas by Mark R. Bendure, Detroit, of counsel), for William R. Froede.

Johnson, Johnson & Frost, P.C. by Roy W. Johnson, Birmingham, Bendure & Thomas (Mark R. Bendure, Detroit, of counsel), for Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.

Garan, Lucow, Miller, Seward, Cooper & Becker, P.C. by James S. Goulding and Daniel S. Saylor, Detroit, for defendants.

Before JANSEN, P.J., and HOLBROOK, and PENZIEN, ^* JJ.

JANSEN, Presiding Judge.

In this products liability action, defendants appeal as of right from the order of the Oakland Circuit Court effectuating the jury's verdict of $1.5 million in favor of plaintiffs. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

Plaintiff William Froede was injured in a fall from a ladder at a construction site where he was working for Great Lakes Construction Company. Plaintiff Liberty Mutual Insurance Company is Great Lakes' worker's compensation insurer. Defendant Holland Ladder & Manufacturing Company manufactured the ladder. Defendant National Ladder & Scaffold Company sold the ladder.

Defendants first argue that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion for a new trial based on evidence discovered after trial that juror Hilda Singleton-Luter misrepresented her status by failing to note on the written juror questionnaire that she was a convicted felon. We agree with defendants, but on the narrow facts of this case.

A motion for a new trial may be based on juror bias or misconduct. MCR 2.611(A)(1)(b). The decision whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial on this basis is within the discretion of the trial court and will be reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Hunt v. C.H.A.D. Enterprises, Inc. 183 Mich.App. 59, 63-64, 454 N.W.2d 188 (1990).

A juror is presumed to be qualified and competent. Id.; Poet v. Traverse City Osteopathic Hosp., 433 Mich. 228, 235-236, 445 N.W.2d 115 (1989). To rebut this presumption, the moving party must establish that it would have challenged the juror for cause or otherwise dismissed the juror had the truth been revealed before trial, or establish actual proof of prejudice on the part of the challenged juror. Hunt, supra, 183 Mich.App. at p. 64, 454 N.W.2d 188.

Defendants contend that the juror in question was unqualified to serve as a juror because of her status as a convicted felon. Pursuant to the jury selection statute, a juror is qualified to serve if, among other things, not "under sentence for a felony at the time of jury selection." M.C.L. § 600.1307a(1)(e); M.S.A. § 27A.1307(1)(1)(e). Pursuant to court rule, a party may challenge for cause a juror who "has been convicted of a felony." MCR 2.511(D)(2). Neither the jury selection statute nor the court rules expressly mandate that a convicted felon be disqualified per se from sitting on a jury in a civil case.

The apparent nonconformity between § 1307a(1)(e) and MCR 2.511(D)(2) must be resolved by determining whether juror qualifications fall within the ambit of the Michigan Legislature's mandate to enact substantive law or the Michigan Supreme Court's mandate to establish general rules of practice and procedure. Where there is a conflict between a statute and a court rule, the court rule prevails if it governs practice and procedure. Const. 1963, art. 6, § 5; MCR 1.104; In re Hillier Estate, 189 Mich.App. 716, 719-720, 473 N.W.2d 811 (1991). It has been stated that juror qualifications are matters of legislative control. People v. Merhige, 219 Mich. 95, 97, 188 N.W. 454 (1922); People v. Barltz, 212 Mich. 580, 588, 180 N.W. 423 (1920); People v. Legrone, 205 Mich.App. 77, 79-80, n. 1, 517 N.W.2d 270 (1994) (dicta). This finding is further supported by United States v. Dahms, 938 F.2d 131, 134 (CA 9, 1991), that interpreted § 1307a(1)(e) to restore substantially and automatically a convicted felon's right to serve as a juror following a period of suspension during incarceration.

Relying on a line of federal cases that have interpreted MCR 2.511(D)(2) and § 1307a(1)(e) as not restoring a former felon's civil right to serve as a juror, defendants assert that once a trial court becomes aware of a juror's prior felony conviction, it must dismiss the juror, whether the juror is still under sentence or not. United States v. Metzger, 3 F.3d 756 (CA 4, 1993); United States v. Tinker, 985 F.2d 241 (CA 6, 1992); United States v. Gilliam, 979 F.2d 436 (CA 6, 1992); United States v. Driscoll, 970 F.2d 1472 (CA 6, 1992). We disagree with this line of federal cases holding that a former felon's civil right to serve as a juror is not restored once that felon is no longer under sentence.

The history of MCR 2.511(D)(2) has been stated in one treatise as follows:

[Subrule] (2) indicates that a juror is disqualified if the juror has ever been convicted of a felony. This subrule first appeared in GCR 511.4, and the committee note to it stated that it was inserted as a reflection that all jurors must possess good moral character. As all prior felons are no longer disqualified by MCLA 600.1301 et seq. [MSA 27A.1301 et seq.], and as Michigan has passed a Good Moral Character Act, MCLA 338.41 et seq. [MSA 18.1208(1) et seq.], the authors question the validity of the current prohibition. They suggest that the Supreme Court reexamine its position on this point. [3 Martin, Dean & Webster, Michigan Court Rules Practice, p 176, n 5].

We further find it notable that § 1307a of the jury selection statute was added in 1978, the same year that the Legislature enacted legislation that amended the definition of "good moral character" as used in various licensing acts and prohibited licensing boards and agencies from using a criminal conviction as the sole proof a person's lack of good moral character. 1978 P.A. 294, M.C.L. § 338.41 et seq.; M.S.A. § 18.1208(1) et seq. The stated purpose of the act is "to encourage and contribute to the rehabilitation of former offenders and to assist them in the assumption of the responsibilities of citizenship...." The act prohibits a licensing board or agency from using a judgment of guilt in a criminal or civil prosecution as the sole proof of an applicant's lack of good moral character for the purpose of denying or revoking the applicant's occupational or professional license. M.C.L. § 338.42; M.S.A. § 18.1208(2). The enactment of § 1307a and the licensing of former offenders act in the same year indicates a legislative intent to "remove barriers to the reintegration into society of former offenders." Rios v. Dep't of State Police, 188 Mich.App. 166, 171, 469 N.W.2d 71 (1991).

Because § 1307a(1)(e) only requires that a potential juror not be under sentence for a felony at the time of jury selection and because juror qualifications are matters of legislative control, we hold that a former felon's right to serve as a juror is restored once the sentence is completed.

The question remains whether a trial court has discretion to retain a convicted felon on a civil jury where a party challenges that juror for cause under MCR 2.511(D)(1) or (D)(2). While MCR 6.412(D)(2) requires that a trial court in a criminal case excuse a juror challenged for cause under any of the grounds listed in MCR 2.511(D), there is no similar requirement in a civil case. Indeed, we find that the existence of potential biases or prejudices of a juror with a prior felony conviction is substantially lessened in a civil case as opposed to a criminal case. Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that a trial court is required to excuse a juror only when the juror is challenged for cause on a ground enumerated in MCR 2.511(D)(4)--(D)(13). Poet, supra, 433 Mich. at p. 236, 445 N.W.2d 115. Consistent with our holding that a convicted felon's right to serve as a juror is restored upon completion of the sentence, we further hold that where a challenge for cause is timely made under MCR 2.511(D)(1) or (D)(2) and it is established that the juror does not satisfy one or more of the prerequisites under § 1307a, the trial court must excuse the challenged juror. However, where it is established that the prerequisites of § 1307a are satisfied and the juror does not exhibit biases or prejudices that would warrant excusal under MCR 2.511(D)(3)--(D)(13), the trial court has discretion to retain or excuse the juror.

In this case, juror Singleton-Luter was convicted of a felony in 1980 and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in the federal system. She was released from parole in June 1990. Because she was no longer "under sentence" at the time she was selected as a juror in March 1991, she was not disqualified per se from jury service. Therefore, defendants have failed to establish that they necessarily would have been successful had they challenged Singleton-Luter for cause at trial.

We must next determine whether defendants presented actual proof of prejudice on the part of the juror. M.C.L. § 600.1354(1); M.S.A. 27A.1354(1); Hunt, supra, 183 Mich.App. at p. 64, 454 N.W.2d 188. We find that, based on the narrow facts of this case, defendants have presented actual proof of prejudice and that defendants are entitled to a new trial on this basis.

There is no dispute that Singleton-Luter misrepresented her criminal history on the written questionnaire. Singleton-Luter misrepresented on the questionnaire that she had not been convicted of a felony, that she had not been incarcerated in a correctional institution, and that she had not been a defendant in a criminal trial. In fact, Singleton-Luter and her ex-husband, Harold Morton (a notorious...