Frommhagen v. Board of Supervisors

Citation197 Cal.App.3d 1292,243 Cal.Rptr. 390
Decision Date28 December 1987
Docket NumberNo. H001889,H001889
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
PartiesLaurence FROMMHAGEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF SANTA CRUZ COUNTY, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Laurence H. Frommhagen, in pro per.

Robert K. Booth, Jr., Atkinson-Farasyn, Mountain View, for defendants and respondents.

STONE, Associate Justice *.

Appellant Laurence H. Frommhagen appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer filed by respondents Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors and the County of Santa Cruz. We conclude that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer with respect to the bulk of appellant's action, but erred in sustaining the demurrer as to two of the allegations in the complaint. Consequently, we reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings on those two allegations only.

I. FACTS

In June of 1984, appellant filed an in pro per suit against respondents to invalidate service charges levied by respondents in a number of "County Service Areas" for the 1984-1985 fiscal year. The County Service Area Law gives counties an alternative method of providing services to unincorporated areas by allowing the counties to create special county service areas for the provision of services such as road maintenance, sewers, and other county services. (Gov.Code, §§ 25210.1, 25210.3, 25210.4, 25210.4a; see generally, City of Santa Barbara v. County of Santa Barbara (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 277, 280-283, 156 Cal.Rptr. 320; Gov.Code, §§ 25210.1-25211.33.) 1 For the types of services at issue in this case (§ 25210.4a), a county may determine the charge to be levied on each parcel in the service area by apportioning the total cost of the service to each parcel therein in proportion to the estimated benefits from such service to be received by each parcel. (§ 25210.77a.) Section 25210.77a, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), also provide that each year a county must calculate the charges to be assessed to a parcel for the service, and, after a public hearing, the board of supervisors must confirm the charges. 2 Appellant's 1984 complaint alleged that the 1984-1985 charges were invalid on a number of grounds: First, the complaint attacked 33 service areas established to provide road maintenance on the ground that the areas improperly provided maintenance for private roads. Second, appellant complained that respondents violated section 25210.77a and Santa Cruz County Ordinance No. 3406 in establishing the county service area rates for 1984-1985. Specifically, the complaint alleged that respondents had failed to enact the ordinance required by section 25210.77a, calculated the charges on the basis of an improper formula, failed to file a list of each parcel in the service areas showing the amount of the charge for each parcel for the fiscal year (§ 25210.77a, subd. (a)), and did not hold a public hearing as required by section 25210.77a, subdivisions (b) and (c). (See fn. 2, ante.) Third, appellant alleged that, for various reasons, some (particularly County Service Areas Nos. 9, 9A, and 9D) if not all county service areas are special taxing districts which require voter approval under article 13A, section 4 of the California Constitution. Fourth, the imposition of a service charge in County Service Area No. 9C for operation of county refuse disposal sites violated section 25210.77f, which (according to appellant) allows for special assessments for refuse disposal only after direct billings for that service are unpaid for one year. Finally, the complaint alleged that the respondents failed to use the appropriate method to determine the benefits conferred on a particular parcel in order to calculate the fee for service owed by that parcel.

Following a two-day trial, the superior court issued its statement of decision rejecting each of appellant's contentions. Specifically, the court found that respondents could properly expend money through service areas to maintain "private" roads, provided those roads were open to public travel; in addition, the court found no evidence that any of the roads maintained in the service areas were closed to public travel. Second, the court found that respondents had complied with section 25210.77a in calculating the charges for 1984-1985. In particular, the court found that respondents used a proper formula for apportioning benefit (and hence charges) to the parcels within the service areas; properly filed a list of parcel service charges with the clerk; and held properly noticed hearings as required by section 25210.77a. Third, the court found none of the county service area charges were "special taxes" within the meaning of article 13A, section 4 of the California Constitution, and consequently did not have to be approved by the electorate. Fourth, the court rejected appellant's contention that service area assessments could be levied for refuse disposal only after direct billings remained unpaid for one year. Finally, the court found that the methods respondent employed to determine the estimated benefits conferred on each parcel were proper, and that each determination was supported by substantial evidence.

Appellant's appeal in this first action was dismissed on September 5, 1985, and the judgment is now final.

Undaunted by this setback, on November 20, 1985, appellant filed a subsequent complaint attacking the county service area charges established for the 1985-1986 fiscal year pursuant to section 25210.77a. As appellant himself has admitted, the allegations in this second complaint are, with three exceptions, identical in substance to those alleged in the previous complaint attacking the 1984-1985 charges. In response to this second complaint, respondents filed a demurrer alleging that the suit was barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations, and that appellant had no standing to bring the suit since he had not alleged he owned property within any of the county service areas attacked in the suit. In addition, the demurrer alleged that an admittedly new allegation stated in paragraph X of the complaint failed to state a cause of action. Appellant filed opposition to the demurrer.

On February 19, 1986, the superior court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that the bulk of the complaint was barred by res judicata, and paragraph X failed to state a cause of action. Appellant was not afforded an opportunity to speak at the hearing.

Thereafter, a judgment of dismissal was entered in this second action and, once again, appellant appealed.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel

Appellant contends that his second complaint is not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. Although we agree with appellant with respect to certain limited issues, we nevertheless find that the bulk of his complaint is barred by collateral estoppel.

Appellant points to three differences between the 1984 and 1985 complaints which he claims defeat the defense of collateral estoppel. First, in his 1985 complaint he claims that an amendment to section 25210.4a (effective Jan. 1, 1985) now restricts road maintenance by the county to streets and highways owned by or dedicated to the county and maintained by the general public. Second, he points out that the 1984 complaint attacked the charges assessed for the 1984-1985 fiscal year, while the second complaint attacks the 1985-1986 charges. Third, he points out that the second complaint contains an allegation (in paragraph X) of misappropriation of surplus road resurfacing funds which was not made in the first complaint. We discuss each argument separately below.

1. The Legal Standards

If all of the facts necessary to show that an action is barred by res judicata are within the complaint or subject to judicial notice, a trial court may properly sustain a general demurrer. (Carroll v. Puritan Leasing Co. (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 481, 485, 143 Cal.Rptr. 772.) In ruling on a demurrer based on res judicata, a court may take judicial notice of the official acts or records of any court in this state. ( Id. at p. 481, 143 Cal.Rptr. 772; Safeco Insurance Co. v. Tholen (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 685, 696, 173 Cal.Rptr. 23; Evid.Code, § 452.)

The doctrine of res judicata has a double aspect. First, it precludes parties or their privies from relitigating the same cause of action that has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. Second, although a second suit between the same parties on a different cause of action is not precluded by a prior judgment, the first judgment operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action. ( Safeco Insurance Co. v. Tholen, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d at p. 696, 173 Cal.Rptr. 23; 7 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Judgment, §§ 243, 249, 253; see also, Commissioner v. Sunnen (1948) 333 U.S. 591, 597-598, 68 S.Ct. 715, 719, 92 L.Ed. 898.) This second aspect of res judicata is commonly referred to as collateral estoppel. (117 Cal.App.3d at p. 697, 173 Cal.Rptr. 23; 7 Witkin, Cal.Procedure, supra, § 253.)

2. Appellant's First Action Is Not A Complete Bar To His Second Action

Respondents contend that appellant's second action is barred completely by the first aspect of res judicata; that is, respondents claim appellant is attempting to litigate the same cause of action in this second suit as he did in the first. We disagree.

California has consistently applied the "primary rights" theory in defining a cause of action. Under this theory, the invasion of one "primary right" gives rise to a single cause of action, even though several remedies may be available to protect the primary right. (Slater v. Blackwood (1975) 15 Cal.3d 791, 795, 126 Cal.Rptr. 225, 543 P.2d 593; Busick v. Workmen's Comp....

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