Frontier Airpark Association v. Wilcoxon, No. 54680-5-I (WA 11/21/2005)

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Agid
• Decision Date: 21 November 2005
• Docket Number: No. 54680-5-I,54680-5-I
• Citation: Frontier Airpark Association v. Wilcoxon, No. 54680-5-I (WA 11/21/2005), No. 54680-5-I (Wash. Nov 21, 2005)
• Parties: FRONTIER AIRPARK ASSOCIATION, a Washington corporation, Respondent, v. DUANE WILCOXON, a single person, Appellant.

Page 1

Unpublished Opinion

FRONTIER AIRPARK ASSOCIATION, a Washington corporation, Respondent, v. DUANE WILCOXON, a single person, Appellant.

No. 54680-5-I

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.

Filed: November 21, 2005

Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County. Docket No: 01-2-02065-8. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 07/06/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Richard J Thorpe.

Counsel for Appellant(s), Duane Wilcoxon (Appearing Pro Se), 23022 — 155th Ave. S.E., Snohomish, WA 98296.

Counsel for Respondent(s), Bruce Ralph Bell, Attorney at Law, PO Box 1769, Everett, WA 98206-1769.

James Haron Jr Jones, Bell & Ingram PS, PO Box 1769, Everett, WA 98206-1769.

AGID, J.

Duane Wilcoxon was found in contempt for failing to comply with the terms and conditions of two earlier orders that required him to construct a single-family residence on his Frontier Airpark lot. He argues that because the covenants permit a hangar-home and he built one on the lot, the trial court erred by finding him in contempt for failing to build a single-family residence. Because the underlying orders fail to define a single-family residence with sufficient specificity to allow Wilcoxon to know how to comply or whether he has complied with those orders, we vacate the contempt order against him and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Neither party substantially prevailed on appeal, so we do not award attorneys fees to either party.

FACTS

Frontier Airpark is a residential fly-in airpark community in Snohomish County. In 1982 and 1995, a declaration of covenants, reservations and restrictions (`covenants') was adopted to protect the community's residential nature and its value, desirability and attractiveness. The covenants require that each parcel be used exclusively for residential purposes, establish minimum square footage, and allow owners to build garages, guest houses, barns or hangars. The covenants allow homes with built-in hangers. The Frontier Airpark Architectural Control Committee (ACC) guidelines state:

Nothing in this paragraph is intended to limit incorporating an aircraft hangar or other shop into the Primary Private Residence so long as the living area of the residence meets the minimum area requirements for the Primary Private Residence and it is designed to appear as a residence.

. . . Homes with built-in hangars are also permitted so long as the living area complies with the size requirements . . . .

Duane Wilcoxon purchased lot 221 in Frontier Airpark subject to these covenants.

In January 2001, the Frontier Airpark Association filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief against Wilcoxon to compel him to comply with vehicle parking restrictions and the association's covenant against living in a trailer. The parties settled before trial and entered into a Stipulation and Order on January 15, 2002. The order provided that Wilcoxon would complete construction of his residence in compliance with the covenants and subject to ACC approval no later than May 1, 2003.

Wilcoxon submitted a set of plans to the ACC and received their approval on June 24, 2002. But he did not build a residence according to these approved plans. Instead, over the course of 16 months, he modified his hanger to become a hangar-home but did not submit plans for ACC approval before he began construction. In January 2004, Wilcoxon submitted the plans for his hangar-home. On January 17, 2004, the ACC rejected Wilcoxon's plans and listed four items that were required before it would grant approval. The January 17 rejection letter stated:

1. . . . {I}t is acceptable to have a hangar home as long as it is designed to appear as a residence.

2. Each primary residence shall have a garage capable of parking two vehicles.

3. The exterior material of a primary residence may not be plywood. . . .

4. The exterior painting must be completed on the new siding within twelve months.

On February 6, 2004, Frontier Airpark filed a `Motion and Declaration For Order To Show Cause Re: Contempt' against Wilcoxon for failing to construct a single family residence. At the March 4, 2004 contempt hearing, Wilcoxon submitted sworn declarations from two ACC members and one Frontier Airpark Board Member stating that Wilcoxon was in compliance with items 2-4 of the January 17 letter from the ACC. The declarations stated that `{t}o the extent it is possible for a `hangar home' to look like a residence, Mr. Wilcoxon's residence design is consistent with other accepted hanger homes in our subdivision, and this should not be a basis for being singled out.' The trial court found Wilcoxon in contempt for failing to have an approved set of plans and warned him that if he did not submit a revised set of plans within 60 days that it would sanction him by awarding Frontier Airpark $2,000 in attorney fees. The court set a review hearing for May 21, 2004, at which time it would order additional sanctions for contempt if Wilcoxon failed to comply.

In a March 16 letter to Wilcoxon, the ACC outlined its criteria for homes, stating:

{T}he primary residence, be it a typical single-family dwelling or a hangar home, must portray itself first and foremost as a house. In order to convey the `look and feel' of a residence a hangar home must be constructed with some reasonable proportionate dimensions of the dwelling area such that the hangar portion is not the singular dominating feature of the structure. For example, if the hangar portion of the structure were removed, would the remaining structure have the appearance of a residence fulfilling the requirements of the declaratioins {sic} and ACC guidelines.. . .¹

On April 22, 2004, Wilcoxon submitted a new set of plans along with a letter prepared by Brian Geerhart from Impressions Design. Geerhart stated that in his professional opinion Wilcoxon's design included dormers and decorative windows and was as `much like a house as possible.' On May 3, 2004, the ACC again rejected Wilcoxon's plan, stating that `{w}hile these features certainly enhance the appearance of your hanger, they do not qualify the structure as a primary residence.'

At the May 21, 2004 hearing, the court again found Wilcoxon in contempt and ordered him to vacate his residence if he did not have an approved set of plans by July 5, 2004. It allowed him to re-enter or remain on the property once the plans were approved and construction began, and gave him one year to complete construction and obtain a certificate of occupancy. The court also awarded Frontier Airpark $2,000 in attorney fees.

On July 6, 2004, the court found Wilcoxon was in contempt for failing to build a single family residence. The court found that his `proposed plans for a hangar home putting shutters on the windows of the existing hangar did not make the hangar a residence' and again ordered him to comply with the prior orders and present plans to be approved by the ACC in compliance with the covenants. The court also ordered Wilcoxon to stop living in his hanger-house, completely vacate the premises within six months, and provide a sworn declaration that he had started construction on the single-family home. He could only enter the premises to construct the single-family residence, maintain the premises, or show the home to a prospective buyer. He had to leave by 10 p.m. every day. The court also ordered Wilcoxon to pay $2,500 in attorney fees and costs.

DISCUSSION

Wilcoxon argues that the trial court erred by finding him in contempt because he had complied with the prior orders by building a hangar-home. In the alternative, he argues that the orders were impermissibly ambiguous because they did not specify which ACC guidelines or interpretations of the covenants applied or how he was to comply with them. He also argues that he was unable to comply with the prior orders because the ACC unreasonably withheld their approval. We agree that the underlying orders fail to define a single-family residence and what Wilcoxon had to do with sufficient specificity to allow him to know how to comply and avoid contempt. We vacate the contempt order against him.

Contempt orders are subject to appeal.² Whether contempt is warranted in a particular case is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not disturb a trial court's contempt ruling absent an abuse of discretion.³ A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.⁴ A decision is based on untenable grounds if it is based on an incorrect standard or if the factual findings are unsupported in the record.⁵ Generally, a finding of...