Frorer v. People

• Decision Date: 26 March 1892
• Citation: 31 N.E. 395,141 Ill. 171
• Parties: FRORER et al. v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

141 Ill. 171

31 N.E. 395

FRORER et al.

v.PEOPLE.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 26, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Christian county; JESSE J. PHILLIPPS, Judge.

Action of debt by the people of the state of Illinois against Frank Frorer, D. H. Harts, Emma Harts, and John Broehl. Plaintiff obtained judgment. Defendants appeal. Reversed.

George S. House and Drennan & Hogan, for appellants.

Ricks & Creighton and Wm. Mooney, for the People.

SCHOLFIELD, J.

This is an action of debt under the act approved May 28, 1891, in force July 1st of that year, entitled ‘An act to provide for the payment of wages in lawful money, and to prohibit the truck system, and to prevent deduction from wages except for lawful money actually advanced.’ The 1st, 2d, and 7th sections only are pertinent in the present case, and they read as follows: ‘Section 1. Be it enacted by the people of the state of Illinois, represented in general assembly, that it shall be unlawful for any person, company, corporation, or association, now engaged, or hereafter to be engaged, in any mining or manufacturing business in this state, to engage in, or be interested directly or indirectly in, the keeping of a trucks store, or the controlling of any store, shop, or scheme for the furnishing of supplies, tools, clothing, provisions, or groceries to his, its, or their employes, while so engaged in mining or manufacturing. Sec. 2. Every person, company, corporation, or association found guilty of violating section one (1) of this act, either by himself, its or their agents, servants, or employes or partners, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor for each and every day such business is done in violation of said section, and on conviction shall be liable to a fine for each offense of not less than fifty (50) nor more than two hundred (200) dollars, to be recovered in the name of the people, for the use of the school funds; and any person having knowledge of the fact that said section has been violated may make complaint, and cause summons or warrant to be issued.’ ‘Sec. 7. ‘Truck’ means the payment of wages otherwise than in lawful money, or otherwise than to the full amount earned by the employe.'

There are two counts in the declaration. It is alleged in the first count that ‘since the 1st day of July, 1891, and prior to the commencement of the suit, the defendants, as copartners, under the firm name of the Pana Coal Company, were engaged in the mining of coal at said Christian county, and in such business had in their employ divers persons; and that at said time and place the said defendants were interested in the keeping of a certain truck store, there situated, for the furnishing of supplies, tools, clothing, provisions, and groceries to their said employes, contrary to the form of the statute.’ In the second count it is alleged that ‘the said defendants, as copartners, were engaged in the mining of coal, and having in their employ divers persons, all at the time and place aforesaid, and were then and there interested in controlling a scheme for the furnishing of supplies, clothing, provisions, and groceries to their said employes, contrary to the form of the statute.’ The defendants pleaded not guilty, and the cause was, by agreement of the parties, tried by the court without the intervention of a jury.

Upon the trial, and after evidence was submitted, the defendants asked the court to mark as ‘held’ the following among other propositions submitted in writing: ‘(4) As a matter of law, the court holds that the act of the legislature entitled ‘An act to provide for the payment of wages in lawful money, and to prohibit the truck system, and to prevent the deduction from wages, except for lawful money actually advanced,’ approved May 28, 1891, and each and every section thereof, is illegal and void.' But the court declined to hold as thus requested, and found the defendants guilty, and assessed a fine of $50 against them on each count, and gave judgment accordingly. The defendants excepted to the several rulings of the court, and the record of that judgment is brought before us by the appeal of the defendants.

The question whether there is error in the judgment depends upon whether sections 1 and 2, supra, are constitutional enactments, and therefore the law of the land; for, if they are not, there is no statute or principle of the common law upon which the judgments can be sustained. The first section assumes to make it unlawful for a person or a corporation, while in the business of mining or manufacturing, to engage or be interested, directly or indirectly, in keeping or controlling any truck store, shop, or scheme for the furnishing of supplies, tools, clothing, provisions, or groceries to employes. Laws 1891, p. 212. This is not confined to sales upon credit, nor to sales of articles paid or to be paid for in work, nor are any exceptions made because of any peculiar circumstances or occasions, however urgently the necessities of individuals may require that there should be such exception; but it extends, under any and all circumstances, to every keeping or controlling of any store, shop, or scheme for furnishing supplies, tools, clothing, provisions, or groceries, by the operator of the mine or manufactory, to employes while engaged in mining or manufacturing. While the prohibition includes, by name, only the person, company, corporation, or association engaged in ‘mining or manufacturing,’ it includes equally within its effect their employes; for the employe is necessarily denied the right to contract with one who is forbidden by the law to possess, for the purpose of contracting with him, the articles about which he wishes to contract. It would therefore have added nothing to the legal meaning of this section if it had expressly prohibited the employes from contracting with their employer for the purchase of the property in which it is thus made unlawful for their employer to have any ownership. We must take judicial notice that employes in mines and manufactories include but a part of those who are employed by others, and who depend upon their daily labor for subsistence; for we know, from daily observation, that many thousands are employed in making excavations and embankments for roads, buildings, and other improvements, erecting and repairing buildings and various other structures, in the business of transportation, in that of the sale of goods, wares, and merchandise, in that of quarrying stone, and that of agriculture, and in that of domestic service, and in all of these branches of industry employers and employes are unaffected by this statute; and such employers may therefore, after as before its taking effect, engage or be interested in truck stores or shops or schemes for the furnishing of supplies, tools, clothing, provisions, and groceries to their employes.

And this leads to the inquiry whether the keeping of a truck store, or controlling of a store, shop, or scheme for the furnishing of supplies, tools, clothing, provisions, or groceries to his employes, by the person carrying on the business of making excavations and embankments for roads and other improvements, erecting and repairing buildings and other structures, the business of transportation, that of the sale of goods, wares, and merchandise, or that of agriculture, is, in substance and in principle, a different thing from that of the keeping of a truck store, or controlling of a store, shop, or scheme for the furnishing of supplies, tools, clothing, provisions, or groceries to his employes, by the person carrying on the business of mining or manufacturing. The purpose is, manifestly, the same in each case, namely, the sale by the employer to the employe of the articles designated; and it requires precisely the same elements to constitute a contract-including mental capacity in the parties contracting, and freedom from fraud and overreaching-in the one case as it does in the others. The operator of a mine and the manufacturer have no other control over the employe than that which may result from employing him, or continuing him in employment, or refusing to do so; and every other employer of labor has precisely the same control over those who obtain or wish to obtain employment with him. There can be no reason why the miner or the operative in the manufactory will be more or differently influenced by his hopes and fears in these respects than will laborers in any other industries. Mining and manufacturing are indispensable branches of industry, and as honorable as any others. There is nothing in operating mines or manufactories to render the individual less capable to contract, or to give him greater wisdom and adroitness therein, than he would possess were he engaged in operating and controlling some other branch of industry. It may be conceded that there is more of dependence of the employe upon the employer in case of skilled labor, in a special department, because the demand for such labor is limited in each locality by the number and size of its industries, than there is in the case of the general laborer, who may find employment anywhere and everywhere; but mining and manufacturing do not include all the skilled labor in the country. In constructing roads, in building houses, in the business of commerce, including buying, selling, and transportation, and in other branches of industry, a vast number of skilled laborers are constantly employed, and their relations to their employers would seem to be under precisely the same conditions as are those affecting the relations between operators of mines and manufacturers and their employes. And, in any view, the extent and degree of dependence in particular classes of industry cannot affect the general principle, since, human nature being the same in all classes of industry, the effect of equal degrees of dependence must be the same in each class. It cannot truthfully be said that all operators in mines or...