Frost v. Agnos

Decision Date13 August 1998
Docket Number96-17332,Nos. 94-15640,s. 94-15640
Citation152 F.3d 1124
Parties, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6314, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8764 Raymond Ludwig FROST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas AGNOS, Sheriff, et al., Defendant-Appellant. Raymond Ludwig FROST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Arthur HUFFMAN, External Referee, Maricopa County Sheriffs Office; Commander Seeverson, Detention Bureau; L Headquarters Commander, Cpt; William F. Williams; D. Alster, Lieutenant; SG Flecher; et al. Defendants, and Officer Jackson; Officer Coffman, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Nancy C. Luebbert, Terri R. Pickens, Legal Interns, Maureen E. Laflin, Supervising Attorney, University of Idaho College of Law Legal Aid Clinic, Moscow, Idaho, for the plaintiff-appellant. *

John W. Paulsen, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Arizona, for the defendant-appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona; Robert C. Broomfield, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-90-01062-RCB.

Before: GOODWIN, FLETCHER and D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge D.W. NELSON; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge GOODWIN.

D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

Arizona state prisoner Raymond Ludwig Frost, a former Maricopa County detention officer, appeals the district court's summary judgment dismissal of all but one of the claims listed in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Frost also appeals the district court's decision to deny as untimely his demand for a jury trial to resolve his remaining claim.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

BACKGROUND

While engaged in a gunfight with police officers, Frost sustained bullet wounds in both legs. He subsequently was apprehended and charged with the attempted murder of a police officer, kidnapping, and armed robbery. For the duration of his incarceration as a pretrial detainee, Frost was classified as a high-security, close custody inmate.

Because a bullet had pulverized his right tibia, Frost underwent surgery at the Maricopa County Medical Center ("Medical Center") on June 10, 1988; his right leg was placed in a long-leg cast and he was required to use crutches. Frost remained in the detention ward of the Medical Center until June 21, 1988, when he was transferred to the infirmary of the Madison Street Jail. On July 11, 1988, Frost was transferred out of the infirmary and into the maximum administrative segregation ward on the sixth floor of the Madison Street Jail.

In his complaint, Frost claims that the conditions of his confinement resulted in further injury to his leg. For example, he alleges that he had difficulty showering because he was unable to maneuver his crutches on the slippery bathroom floor and over the wall surrounding the shower. As a result, he often fell on his injured leg. Although jail officials placed Frost in the handicapped housing unit for a brief duration, he later was returned to a cell that lacked adequate handicapped shower facilities. Moreover, he asserts that he slipped several times as he attempted to carry his food-tray while balancing himself on crutches.

On February 1, 1989, Frost re-broke his leg in the jail's recreation area. To reach the recreation area, Frost was required to climb forty-eight stairs. Usually, detention officers assisted Frost by carrying his crutches as he hopped up the stairs, using his free hands to grasp the handrail. Officers Coffman and Jackson, however, refused to assist Frost with his crutches. Although Frost was able to climb the stairs without assistance, he reinjured his leg after climbing the stairs and entering the recreation area. Frost asserts that his injury resulted from putting too much weight on his leg, and that his injury could have been avoided had the officers been willing to carry his crutches for him.

Frost filed his first complaint on July 12, 1990, alleging numerous violations of his civil rights due to the acts and omissions of Maricopa County Sheriff's Office employees (collectively, "Defendants"). The complaint named twenty-one defendants, including Officers Jackson and Coffman. Service on Officer Jackson, however, was returned because Frost did not list her first name on the summons.

On December 5, 1991, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On September 29, 1993, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims, with the exception of Frost's claim stemming from certain unidentified Defendants' (later determined to be Officers Coffman and Jackson 1) refusal to carry his crutches up the stairs and into the recreation area.

Frost filed a demand for trial by jury on October 22, 1993. On January 19, 1994, Magistrate Judge Morton Sitver granted Frost's motion to amend but denied his demand for a jury trial as untimely. He also sua sponte dismissed all of Frost's claims except the claim relating to Defendants' failure to assist Frost with his crutches. Frost filed a petition for permission to appeal, which we construed as a notice of appeal.

Officers Coffman and Jackson filed a joint answer to the amended complaint on January 26, 1994. The remaining cause of action against Officers Coffman and Jackson was resolved pursuant to a bench trial before the Honorable Charles L. Hardy on October 8, 1996. The district court found that although no legitimate penological reason justified Officers Coffman and Jackson's refusal to assist Frost with his crutches, they lacked subjective awareness of the risk their refusal posed. Thus, the district court concluded that they were not deliberately indifferent to Frost's medical needs. Frost timely appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Fazio v. City and County of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1330-31 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1517, 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998). Facts and inferences must be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and the moving party must establish that no disputed issue of material fact exists, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Covey v. Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir.1997). Entitlement to a jury trial is a question of law subject to de novo review. United States v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir.1997).

DISCUSSION

Claims by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Because pretrial detainees' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are comparable to prisoners' rights under the Eighth Amendment, however, we apply the same standards. See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir.1991).

To determine whether the conditions of Frost's confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment, we must assess whether Frost was deprived of the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). If so, a prison official may be held liable if he acted with "deliberate indifference" to a substantial risk of serious harm. Mere negligence is not sufficient to establish liability. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Rather, the official's conduct must have been "wanton," which turns not upon its effect on the prisoner, but rather, upon the constraints facing the official. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03, 111 S.Ct. 2321.

I. The Conditions of Frost's Confinement
A. Failure to Accommodate Frost's Disability

Frost argues that by refusing to provide an accessible environment, jail officials failed to take reasonable measures to guarantee his safety, thereby violating his constitutional rights. For example, Frost claims that because he was forced to live in cells that did not have accessible shower facilities, he slipped and injured himself. Moreover, although he submitted several grievance forms to advise jail officials of the risk he faced, and although a prison doctor stated that he should be placed in the handicapped unit, prison officials declined to accommodate him. Frost concludes that Defendants knowingly subjected him to the risk of falling, thereby exhibiting a deliberate indifference to his well-being.

Defendants insist that slippery shower floors cannot establish a constitutional claim. Their characterization unfairly trivializes Frost's claim. Because Frost was on crutches, he fell and injured himself several times. Prison guards were aware of this. Slippery floors without protective measures could create a sufficient danger to warrant relief. See LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that inmates are entitled to be protected from unsafe prison conditions). Frost's repeated injuries and the unsafe conditions that follow from his use of crutches distinguish this case from LeMaire, upon which Defendants rely, and Jackson v. State of Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that slippery floors, by themselves do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).

Whether prison officials must provide handicapped-accessible accommodations for a pretrial detainee who wears a leg cast and relies on crutches presents an issue of first impression in our court. In resolving the issue, we recognize that the definition of cruel and unusual punishment is subject to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). As a society, we have grown increasingly sensitive to the need to accommodate individuals with disabilities. Notably, the Supreme Court recently held that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act covers inmates in state prisons. See Pennsylvania...

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