Frost v. Bd. of Review of Oskaloosa

• Decision Date: 18 May 1901
• Parties: FROST v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF OSKALOOSA.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

114 Iowa 103

86 N.W. 213

FROST

v.BOARD OF REVIEW OF OSKALOOSA.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 18, 1901.

Appeal from district court, Mahaska county; A. R. Dewey, Judge.

The appellant filed in the district court a notice to the mayor of Oskaloosa, presiding officer of the board of review of that city, advising him that said Frost appealed to the district court “from the action of said board with reference to the complaint of said C. J. Frost with regard to the assessment of him, and the adding of his property to the assessment rolls by the said board at its session ending in June, 1899.” The record presented by appellant shows further the entry by the judge from which it appears that the cause came on for trial, both parties appearing by counsel, and it was stipulated as to the time when the board of review finally adjourned, and that each party then rested the case without introducing any evidence, whereupon appellee moved the dismissal of the appeal and the affirmance of the assessment made by the board of review against the said Frost, which motion was sustained, and appellant excepted, whereupon the court taxed the costs to him, and rendered judgment against him therefor, from which judgment he appeals. A certificate of the judge as to the evidence shows no other facts in addition to those appearing from the final judgment, except that appellant asked that appellee be held to have the burden and the opening and closing of the case, and the court held that appellant had the opening, to which he excepted. Affirmed.Liston McMillen, for appellant.

Byron W. Preston, for appellee.

McCLAIN, J.

As is usual in cases where an attempt is made to appeal to the district court from the decisions or findings of some administrative board, in accordance with statutory provisions regulating such appeal, we are met at the outset with a question as to what is the proper practice in such a case, and whether the party making complaint in the district court of the action of the board or tribunal has taken the proper steps to have his complaint considered. It is unfortunate that there are no general provisions in the statute for the regulation of these appeals, as, in the disconnected sections in which appeals of this kind are authorized, no direction is given as to the method of procedure. In Code, § 225, relating to the general jurisdiction of the district court, it is provided that it has jurisdiction “in all appeals and writs of error taken in civil or criminal actions and special proceedings authorized to be taken from all inferior courts, tribunals, boards, or officers, under any provisions of the law of this state”; and in section 3660 that “in appeals from justice courts or other inferior tribunals, in civil cases, the appellant shall cause the case to be docketed by noon of the second day of the term to which the same is returnable,” and then it is provided how appellee may have the judgment affirmed or the case set down for trial in the event that the appellant has failed to have the case docketed as required. It is evident that an affirmative duty is imposed on appellant, to get a case before the court, and that something more than a mere service of the notice is contemplated. Scott v. Lasell, 71 Iowa, 180, 32 N. W. 322. It is further said in this section that “the provisions of this Code as to appeals from justice courts shall be applicable, so far as may be, to other appeals contemplated in this section.” This last provision seems to have been inserted for the first time in the Code of 1897, and perhaps may indicate some rules of procedure not recognized by cases decided before that time relating to the proper method of procedure in these cases. If we look to the provisions of the Code relating to appeals from justice courts, we find, in general, that the appeal is perfected by giving a bond (Code, § 4552), and that notice is required, which may be given orally on the day when judgment is entered, or afterwards by written notice served on the appellee or his agent (Code, § 4560). In some of these proceedings before administrative boards from which appeals are allowed, it has been held, under provisions prior to the Code, that bond is not required. Ingersoll v. City of Des Moines, 46 Iowa, 553;Robertson v. Coal Co., 27 Iowa, 245. And we do not undertake to say now that the provision above referred to in Code, § 3360, makes a bond necessary. No such question is raised in this case. The important requirement recognized in cases of this kind heretofore decided by this court is the giving of notice. Bremer Co. Bank v. Bremer Co., 42 Iowa, 396;Hahn v. Railroad Co., 43 Iowa, 333;Richards v. Town of Rock Rapids, 72 Iowa, 77, 33 N. W. 372;Robinson v. Coal Co., 27 Iowa, 245. It would seem to us, however, that, to get the case into the district court by appeal from an inferior board or tribunal, it must be essential that, in addition to some form of notice, the proceedings of the board or tribunal from which an appeal is taken be made to appear in the district court, and also that it be made to appear that some decision was rendered by the board or tribunal of which the party appealing to the district court complains. In some of these cases it is expressly provided, as in Code, §§ 329, 2009, 2318, 2442, that the proper clerk or other recording officer of the board or tribunal shall file in the district court some transcript of the proceedings before such board or tribunal; and, where there is such provision, then the appellant has it within his power to compel the filing of such a transcript, and thus to make matter of record in the district court the proceedings in which the appeal is taken. But this duty of transmitting to the district court a transcript of the proceedings is not in all cases imposed upon the clerk of the board or tribunal, and we will not undertake now to say in what manner the appellant is to get before the district court the proceedings with reference to which complaint is made; but it seems to be clear that in some way this must be done, in order that the district court shall have a case before it. The duty imposed upon the district court by Code, § 225, is to try an appeal. Ross v. Campbell, 98 Iowa, 1, 66 N. W. 1064;Ashton v. Stoy, 96 Iowa, 197, 64 N. W. 804, 30 L. R. A. 584. That court can certainly not be substituted for an administrative board, and made to perform...