Frost v. Flick

• Decision Date: 30 June 1875
• Parties: Frost et al. v. Flick.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

46 N.W. 508

1 Dak. 131

Frost et al.

v.Flick.¹

Supreme Court of the Territory of Dakota.

June Term, 1875.

Appeal from district court, Yankton county.

This was a suit to enjoin the sale of land for taxes, the plaintiffs alleging that the assessment rolls were not filed with the county clerk as required by Laws Dak. 1868-69, c. 25, § 24, and that their grantor, who owned the land when the taxes were levied, had personal property subject to execution. A demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiffs appealed. Laws Dak. 1868-69, c. 25, § 24, provide that the assessment rolls shall be filed with the county clerk by the first Monday of April; and section 27, that the board of equalization shall meet on that day.C. J. B. Harris, for appellants. Moody & Cramer, for appellee.

BENNETT, J.

The determination of this appeal involves the question as to what extent and in what cases the powers of a court of equity may be invoked to restrain the collection of taxes. As it is here presented for the first time in this territory, we have examined it with much care. Before proceeding to notice the main point in issue, we observe that, even admitting the soundness of the propositions laid down and contended for by appellants, they furnish no grounds for the relief asked in this case, as plaintiffs have, by their own showing, no standing in a court of equity. They first insist that the relief prayed should be granted, for the reason that no assessment rolls were returned to the county clerk as provided for by section 24, c. 25, Laws 1868-69. If true, does it in any manner appear that they were injured or damaged by such official neglect? Admitting it to be true that the filing of the assessment rolls with the county clerk was necessary to enable the tax-payer to appear before the equalization board, appellants do not claim that they or their grantors were deprived of a substantial right which they then desired to exercise, or which subsequent events have shown should have been exercised. There is no pretense that this property was not subject to taxation, or that the valuation or assessment was too high, or that the tax was levied for an illegal purpose. What complaint could then have been made to the board of equalization, or what relief asked? The object of taxation is the raising of a revenue for governmental purposes. If the same end is accomplished, even though the proceedings may be irregular, that would have been reached had all the forms of the law been strictly complied with, equity, regarding the substance rather than the form, the end rather than the means, cannot be invokedto undo or restrain from the doing of that which it was the object and purpose of the law to accomplish, and relieve a party, on a mere technicality, from the discharge of a legal obligation due the public, which he cannot even allege in his complaint to be unjust or burdensome.

But again, how can appellants avail themselves of the second ground on which relief is asked, viz., that the personal property of their grantors should first be exhausted before the real estate can be sold. Section 59 of chapter 25, Laws 1868-69, provides: “No real estate belonging to any person shall be sold for taxes while personal property belonging to such person can be found by the treasurer or collector, and no taxable property shall be exempt from levy and sale for taxes.” The appellant Frost became the owner of the real estate advertised for sale, and which sale they seek to enjoin, in August, 1872. It seems clear to us that the right to have personal property exhausted before real estate can be sold is a personal right, of the violation of which the tax-payer alone can complain, and of which no third party can be allowed to take advantage. But again, the language of the statute is plain and unmistakable: “No real estate belonging to any person shall be sold for taxes while personal property belonging to such person can be found.” etc. This real estate belongs to appellants. Do they complain that they have personal property that should first be exhausted? No; but that their grantors have, and they undertake, by this extraordinary proceeding, to remove the lien. Appellants do not disclose the character of the conveyance to Frost. It may have been made by an order of court, on adjudging Frost to be the equitable owner of the land. In that event, how can he claim that he should not pay the taxes? It may be a quitclaim; if so, he took thereby only the interest of his grantors, subject to the lien for taxes, and is bound to pay them. If it was a deed with full covenants of warranty, then certainly he has a complete remedy at law, and is in no position to ask any relief in a court of equity. But these considerations aside, should the relief asked be granted in any case on the grounds stated?

The levy and collection of taxes are legal proceedings, under the statute, for the purpose of apportioning and enforcing a recognized obligation due the public, and can no more be interfered with or regulated by courts of equity than can proceedings at law upon private claims. Warden v. Supervisors, 14 Wis. 618. Revenue laws, from the very magnitude of the subject, and the diversified interests involved, are somewhat complex, and for the purpose of carrying out their various provisions call in the services of different officials. These officers, from the nature of things, are not always experienced, or men of good business qualifications. The result is that we frequently find departures from the strict letter of the statute, and irregularities in their proceedings. Should courts of equity undertake to interfere in all such cases, they would find their calendars crowded, collectors would constantly be embarrassed by injunctions, the collection of the revenue would be retarded, and in many instances defeated, while the public would be burdened with the costs and expenses of litigation, and the resources of the government necessary for its maintenance in all its departments rendered inadequate. It has been well said that courts of equity do not sit to reverse or correct errors and mistakes of law, and cannot attempt...