Frost v. Mead
Decision Date | 19 July 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 9244,9244 |
Citation | 86 Idaho 155,383 P.2d 834 |
Parties | George F. FROST and Helen Frost, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. A. R. MEAD and Juanita Dixon Mead, now known as Juanita Dixon, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Milton E. Zener, Pocatello, for appellants.
Johnson & Olson, Pocatello, for respondents.
At the times involved plaintiffs (respondents) were husband and wife and defendants were husband and wife. Sometime prior to 1960 the four parties organized a corporation known as the Star Cab Company, and thereafter operated a cab business in Pocatello under that name. The plaintiffs were owners of 50% of the outstanding capital stock and the defendants were owners of the other 50%.
In May, 1960, plaintiffs sold their stock in the corporation to defendants for the sum of $3,000 and defendants executed and delivered to plaintiffs their promissory note, in that amount. On the note, the signature of Juanita Dixon Mead (appellant) appears first, and A. R. Mead, second. The note was payable $1,000 cash 'on execution of this instrument' and $75 per month commencing July 1, 1960, with interest at 5%, and contained option to the holder to declare the entire amount due and payable upon default. The $1,000 down payment was made and an additional $225 of principal was paid on the note. Thereafter, upon default, plaintiffs declared the balance due and brought this action to recover thereon. In their complaint they alleged that the defendant, Juanita Dixon Mead, executed and delivered the note 'for her own use and benefit or for the use and benefit of her separate property,' and that the defendant, A. R. Mead, executed and delivered the note as 'accommodation maker or endorser or guarantor.' Default was entered against A. R. Mead.
Defendant Juanita Dixon Mead answered denying that the note was executed by her for her own use or benefit, or the use or benefit of her separate property, and alleged that the note was executed by her and A. R. Mead as co-makers; that, at the time, she and A. R. Mead were husband and wife; and that the note was given for a community obligation.
After trial to the court judgment was entered for plaintiffs, from which defendant Juanita Dixon Mead brought this appeal.
The assignments of error raise two issues, stated by appellant in her brief as follows:
The record reveals substantially the following facts. In May, 1960, plaintiffs approached A. R. Mead; advised him that they could not continue on with the cab business; that it was failing and they wanted to sell their stock therein. Mead told them he had no money. Mead tried to borrow money, but was refused a loan by the bank for want of assets or credit. The plaintiffs then met with both A. R. Mead and Juanita Dixon Mead, on which occasion plaintiffs represented that they had invested $6,000 to $6,500 in the business, but would sell for $3,000. Juanita stated that she had confidence in her husband and believed that he could make the cab business pay, but she wanted time to consider plaintiff's offer. At a third meeting, the four parties being present, Juanita advised that the offer to sell for $3,000 was accepted. The attorney for the cab company and plaintiffs' attorney were then directed by the parties to conclude the transaction.
Juanita went to a bank, other than the one in which she regularly carried her account. There she gave a financial statement showing a net worth of $129,081.58. The bank made a loan to her of $3,000, which she deposited in her name, in the bank which made the loan. On this account she drew a check for $1,000, which was delivered to plaintiffs for the down payment required by the note in suit. The record does not show how or by whom the other $225 of principal was paid.
Plaintiff, Mrs. Frost, testified concerning the negotiations between the parties at the first meeting at which Juanita was present, as follows:
'A. Well, of course, we kept saying the same thing that it certainly was going under financially and we could not afford to put any more money into it, and we wanted to get out of the business, sell our share of the stock, and if we couldn't do that we would have to close the doors because we couldn't continue on the way we were, and in the discussion, why, Juanita said she had all the faith in the world in Art, that he could make a go of the cab company, so I turned to her and said, 'Well, if you have that much faith in your husband why don't you buy the shares of stock from us then?' So she asked for time to consider this personally then and decide whether she would buy our shares of stock, or not.
'Q. At that time was there anything said about the price of the stock?
'A. Well, we had,--I don't know whether we decided that evening or not on the price. We wanted to get out full amount of $6500.00 out of the price, but I think she said she would like to decide and wait until we met the next evening, or within the next two or three days,--I don't recall just how long a time we had on that.
'Q. Did she think it over?
'A. Yes.
'Q. What happened next?
'A. Well, we met then and she said she had,--* * * and Juanita said she had decided she would buy the shares of stock, but she wouldn't pay us that much. She said she would pay us the three thousand dollars, as we come to agreement on. * * *
'Q. Now, with regard to the sale of the stock, was the stock to be sold only to Juanita Dixon?
'A. That was our understanding, yes. Juanita is the only one who had any money to buy it.
'Q. I see. And that was your understanding?
'A. That is right.
'Q. That it was to be sold only to,----
'A. Art already had his half in it, and we figured she wanted the other part. * * *
'Q. * * * Mrs. Frost, whose choice, if anyone's, was it as to in whose name these stock certificates would be place--, if you know?
A. No. I don't know of any choice. We just talked with Juanita because she was the one who had the money and could buy the stock, we just figured it would be her share of the stock. In other words, it would be complete ownership then if they took over. Art already had half of the shares, and we assumed she would take her half from the other part. That is just the way we felt about it, any way. * * * She said she had all the faith in the world in her husband making a go of the business. She felt he could do it; he was able to make that business pay.'
Plaintiff George Frost testified:
and further: that at the first meeting with Juanita plaintiffs offered their stock for $3,000; and that at the second meeting with Juanita:
* * *
Juanita testified:
and also further testified that she knew Mr. Mead had no assets; that he had attempted to negotiate a loan with the bank prior to her application for a loan; that he had not been successful; that she borrowed the $3,000 on her own credit; that it was deposited in her name and she was the only one authorized to draw thereon; and that the entire amount was spent for the benefit of the cab business, including the $1,000 paid on the note.
A. R. Mead testified that the plaintiffs asked him to buy them out; that he told them he had no money; that the agreement was that the Star Cab Company would purchase plaintiffs' stock, and----
and also testified that at the time it was his hope to continue with the cab business; that he had no assets nor credit; and that both the Frosts understood that he could not buy their...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Shrives v. Talbot
...time on the second appeal. Cantlin v. Carter, 88 Idaho 179, 397 P.2d 761; Robinson v. Spicer, 86 Idaho 138, 383 P.2d 844; Frost v. Mead, 86 Idaho 155, 383 P.2d 834; Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 513, 373 P.2d 929; Swaringen v. Swanstrom, 67 Idaho 245, 175 P.2d Finally the judgment on retrial is alle......
-
McLean v. City of Spirit Lake
...be heard to complain of variance between the pleading and proof, absent a showing it was thereby misled to its prejudice. Frost v. Mead, 86 Idaho 155, 383 P.2d 834; Wurm v. Pulice, 82 Idaho 359, 353 P.2d 1071. It is our conclusion that defendant's contention respecting the failure to submit......
-
Christensen v. Stuchlik
...will be held to the theory on which the cause was tried in the trial court. Cantlin v. Carter, 88 Idaho 179, 397 P.2d 761; Frost v. Mead, 86 Idaho 155, 383 P.2d 834. See also: Koran v. White, 69 N.M. 46, 363 P.2d 1038 (N.Mex.1961); 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error § 608, p. 72. This is in conf......
-
Williams v. Paxton
...to prevent herself from being bound by them. Finally, in Livingston v. Parish, 81 Idaho 473, 346 P.2d 1047 (1959), and Frost v. Mead, 86 Idaho 155, 383 P.2d 834 (1963), the two cases in which this Court has most recently expressed its opinion upon this question, the Court has adhered to the......