Frost v. State
| Decision Date | 12 November 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 53715,53715 |
| Citation | 172 N.W.2d 575 |
| Parties | Adolph B. FROST, Appellant, v. The STATE of Iowa; the Iowa State Highway Commission; and Harry J. Bradley, Jr.; Derby D. Thompson; Robert C. Barry; John R. Hansen; Koert Voorhees, Commissioners; and J. R. Coupal, Jr., Director of Highways, Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
J. W. Conway, Muscatine, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., and Henry L. Holst, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.
This is an equity action brought by a taxpayer to challenge the constitutionality of chapter 255, Laws of the Sixty-second General Assembly, which appears as chapter 313A, Iowa Code Annotated. He also attacks the validity of certain proceedings under that chapter and seeks to enjoin the defendants from further action under its authority.
The act, commonly called the Interstate Bridge Act, authorizes the state highway commission to 'acquire, purchase and construct interstate bridges, approaches thereto and sites therefor, to reconstruct, complete, improve, repair, remodel, control, maintain, and operate interstate bridges, to establish tolls and charges for the use of interstate bridges, to borrow money and issue bonds payable solely from the revenues derived from the operation of interstate bridges, and to refund bonds payable from such revenues.'
This controversy concerns a proposed bridge across the Mississippi River at Muscatine, connecting Iowa Highway 92 with its Illinois counterpart. It would replace a present span owned and operated by the Muscatine Bridge Commission and would, when all indebtedness is retired, become part of the primary highway system of the state.
For convenience we refer to the Iowa State Highway Commission (or the commission) as though it were the only defendant.
Plaintiff asserts 31 propositions for reversal, which are divided into three groups: (1) constitutional objections; (2) public policy considerations; and (3) alleged statutory and procedural violations. Some of these are not seriously urged, and others are submitted with neither argument nor citation of authority. We have considered all issues raised, although some are not treated separately in our discussion.
The case was tried upon the following stipulated facts: The present bridge at Muscatine was built in 1896. It is anti-quated and unsuitable for present-day traffic. In 1956, part of one span collapsed. The bridge is now limited to vehicles of a certain type and weight. Since 1957 the bridge, a narrow 16-foot-9-inch structure, has been operated by the Muscatine Bridge Commission. It is debt free.
In 1965 it was necessary to close the bridge for safety reasons during the high water period. Since February 1, 1968, it has been limited to 8-ton vehicles upon the recommendation of safety engineers. The next nearest bridge crossing the river is at Davenport, some 25 miles away. Approximately 35 percent of all retail business in Muscatine comes from Illinois residents, and the city's economy is directly related to the existence of a bridge suitable for vehicular traffic.
Sometime in 1967, after the enactment of what is now chapter 313A, Iowa Code Annotated, the highway commission authorized an engineering study and feasibility report to discover the best location, the probable revenue and the potential traffic of a proposed new bridge across the Mississippi River at Muscatine. Based on the results of that study, the highway commission later adopted a resolution approving a new bridge to replace the present one and proposing to issue $3,160,000.00 of revenue bonds to be paid out of tolls collected from the use of the bridge.
Plaintiff raises eight separate objections to the constitutionality of chapter 313A. In considering the question of constitutionality, we indulge every reasonable inference in support of the legislation; the one challenging constitutionality has the burden to overcome this presumption and to negative every reasonable basis which may sustain the statute; a law will be declared void only when it clearly violates the constitution; and a statute must be construed so as to make it valid if there is any reasonable ground for doing so. We recite only a few of the many decisions to this effect. Knorr v. Beardsley, 240 Iowa 828, 839, 840, 38 N.W.2d 236, 243, and citations; Iowa Hotel Assn. v. State Board of Regents, 253 Iowa 870, 114 N.W.2d 539, 543; Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 850, 851, 146 N.W.2d 626, 630; Lee Enterprises, Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Commission, Iowa, 162 N.W.2d 730, 738, 739.
I. Plaintiff contends the act violates Article I, section 9, Constitution of Iowa, and Amendment 14, Constitution of the United States, because it takes his property without due process of law. This claim is apparently based on the fact plaintiff pays gasoline and motor vehicle taxes which go into a fund, part of which might be used for the construction of this bridge. We have held there is no taking of property by the levy of a tax for a public purpose. Nor is due process involved. We cite only two of the decisions to that effect. McLeland v. Marshall County, 199 Iowa 1232, 1243, 201 N.W. 401, 405, 203 N.W. 1. There we said, 'Party is not deprived of property without due process by enforced collection of taxes merely because, in individual cases, (it) works hardships or imposes unequal burdens.'
More recently in Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 858, 146 N.W.2d 626, 639, we again held that the levy and collection of taxes for a public purpose does not constitute a taking of property and does not pose a due process problem under the constitution.
We might add, although it seems unnecessary, that the construction of highways, including bridges, qualifies as a public purpose under this rule. Section 4.1(5), Code of Iowa; Rhodes v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 416, 419, 94 N.W.2d 97, 99; Batcheller v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 251 Iowa 364, 368, 101 N.W.2d 30, 33. We hold against plaintiff on this point.
II. Plaintiff claims there was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the highway commission by the legislature, in violation of Article III, section 1, Constitution of Iowa. However, plaintiff does not point out the particular portion of the chapter to which he refers, and we do not know which part of the act is claimed to transcend this constitutional provision. Perhaps we should therefore disregard the claim entirely, since a party asserting unconstitutionality must point out the violation with particularity. Buda v. Fulton, Iowa, 157 N.W.2d 336, 341; Lee Enterprises, Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Commission, Iowa, 162 N.W.2d 730, 740.
Nevertheless we have considered plaintiff's complaint and find it to be without merit. The powers of the highway commission are admittedly broad and plenary, but the delegation of such authority has been held both necessary and proper. We find nothing in chapter 313A, Iowa Code Annotated, which exceeds the exercise of prerogatives which have already been approved on numerous occasions. See discussion in Porter v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 241 Iowa 1208, 1217, 44 N.W.2d 682, 687; Harvey v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 256 Iowa 1229, 1231, 130 N.W.2d 725, 727, and A and S, Inc. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 253 Iowa 1377, 1384, 116 N.W.2d 496, 503.
III. Plaintiff next asserts the law violates Article III, section 24, of our constitution as authorizing an illegal expenditure of state funds without a legislative appropriation. The section provides, 'No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.'
Plaintiff argues sections 313A.11 and 313A.12 of the law, which permit the use of primary road funds for certain purposes, violate this provision. No authority is cited in support of this claim.
Actually the primary road fund is established by specific legislative enactment; it is a standing appropriation which has been held to meet the constitutional requirements of Article III, section 24. Opinion of the Attorney General to the State Comptroller, January 9, 1968; Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 862, 146 N.W.2d 626, 637, 638, and citations. See also discussion of the character of such funds in State of Iowa ex rel. Fletcher v. Executive Council, 207 Iowa 923, 935, 223 N.W. 737, 742. There is no merit in plaintiff's contention.
IV. Plaintiff next claims the act is unconstitutional because it violates provisions of Article III, section 29, of the constitution which provides as follows: 'Every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith; which subject shall be expressed in the title. * * *'
The title to the act has already been set out. The chapter generally deals with the acquisition, purchase, construction, and financing of interstate bridges. The title with some particularity sets out what the act embraces. We find no constitutional violation here, especially in view of our holdings that this section is to be liberally construed rather than to be interpreted, in a narrow, technical or critical manner. Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 356 Iowa 1184, 1198, 131 N.W.2d 5, 15; Long v. Board of Sup'rs of Benton County, 258 Iowa 1278, 1283, 142 N.W.2d 378, 381; Lee Enterprises, Inc. et al. v. Iowa State Tax Commission at al. Iowa, 162 N.W.2d 730, 737, and citations.
There is no constitutional violation here.
V. Plaintiff objects to the Interstate Bridge Act as a violation of Article III, section 30, of our constitution, which provides:
'The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in the following cases:
'For the assessment and collection of taxes for State, County, or road purposes;
'For laying out, opening, and working roads or highways;
'For vacating road, town plats, streets, alleys, or public squares;
'In all the cases above enumerated * * * all laws shall be general, and of uniform operation throughout the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Blyth
...261 Iowa 1309, 158 N.W.2d 170; Lee Enterprises, Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Com'n, 162 N.W.2d 730, 741 (Iowa 1968); and Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Iowa 1969). Guidelines which serve as an aid in determining severability of statutes are summarized in this fashion in 82 C.J.S. Statutes §......
-
Faber v. Menard, Inc.
...that, under Iowa law, the court has the authority to sever any objectionable provisions of the arbitration clause, citing Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1969). However, Menard argues that the arbitration clause is neither illegal nor does it embody an illegal purpose, so that it does ......
-
Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds ex rel. State
......v. City of Fort Dodge , 174 N.W.2d 413, 418 (Iowa 1970) (finding that "planning, achieving, and financing urban renewal" was one subject); Frost v. State , 172 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Iowa 1969) (finding that the "acquisition, purchase, construction, and financing of interstate bridges" was one subject); Long , 142 N.W.2d at 380 975 N.W.2d 725 (finding that a courthouse hour provision did not violate the single-subject rule when it was added ......
-
Iron Workers Local No. 67 v. Hart, 54741
...challenge must specify constitutional provisions invoked and state with precision the details of a claimed defect. Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1969); Buda v. Fulton, 261 Iowa 981, 157 N.W.2d 336 Respondents' challenges to the constitutionality of these statutes might be rejected on......
-
Act 74, SB 2551 – Collective Bargaining Cost Items; Unit 7; Appropriation
...VII, sections 5, 9, and 11 of the State Constitution, the floor debates of the 1978 Constitutional Convention, and Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1969), the attorney general asserted that, "it is a fundamental principle that one legislature cannot restrict the power of future legislat......