Fruchey v. Eagleson
| Decision Date | 04 March 1896 |
| Docket Number | 1,882 |
| Citation | 43 N.E. 146,15 Ind.App. 88 |
| Parties | FRUCHEY v. EAGLESON, BY NEXT FRIEND |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Petition for rehearing overruled April 17, 1896.
From the Montgomery Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed.
H. D Van Cleave, and I. M. Davis, for appellant.
J. B Wilson, for appellee.
The appellee brought this action against the appellant, to recover a penalty for an alleged violation of the statute known as the Civil Rights Act. R. S. 1894, sections 3291, 3293 (Acts 1885, p. 76). The first and second sections of said act are as follows:
The third section relates to the subject of jurors and their qualifications, and has no bearing upon the questions involved in this case.
A demurrer to the complaint was overruled, and this ruling constitutes the first specification of error.
The complaint alleges, among other things, that appellee is an infant of the age of eighteen years, and appears by his next friend; that he is a negro; that the appellant is the proprietor of a large and commodious inn or hotel in the city of Crawfordsville, in Montgomery county, Indiana; that said inn or hotel is known as the "Nutt House;" that the appellee, on or about the 29th day of October, 1894, applied for lodging and meals at said inn or hotel of the appellant; that at said time the appellee was clean, sober, orderly and well-behaved, and was ready, willing and able to comply with any and all lawful and reasonable rules of said inn or hotel of the appellant; that the appellant seeing and knowing that the appellee was a colored boy and of African descent, wholly failed and refused to entertain or allow him to take lodging or meals at said inn or hotel, giving as a reason, or excuse therefor, that appellee was a negro or colored boy; that appellee, on account of his color, was, by the appellant, refused and denied admission and entertainment at said inn or hotel, and at the time aforesaid, and on account of his color, was denied full and equal privileges and enjoyments of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of said inn or hotel with other persons; and for no other reason whatever than that he was a colored boy as aforesaid. He demands judgment for $ 100.00 damages.
The statute above set out is known to be an exact copy of an act of Congress, passed in 1875, and which was, in part at least, declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States as legislation not authorized by Congress. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 27 L.Ed. 835, 3 S.Ct. 18. This objection would not be applicable, of course, to such a statute passed by the legislature of a State. Nor is any attack made upon the constitutionality or validity of the act, and we are consequently relieved of the duty of passing upon any jurisdictional question as preliminary to a determination of the points presented by the record.
It is earnestly insisted that the court erred in overruling the demurrer, and that the complaint is insufficient. It is urged that it should have been stated what were the accommodations, advantages and privileges that were denied the appellee by the appellant.
It is alleged that the "Nutt House" was a large and commodious inn or hotel. The word "inn" has a well-defined meaning. Among the definitions given of the word by the International Dictionary are the following:
Hence, the charge that the place was an "inn" necessarily implies that it afforded accommodations for the traveling public, such as public hotels and taverns afford, and it was not necessary to specify the accommodations which such hotel possessed and denied to the appellee; the presumption being that they were the ordinary accommodations of boarding, or lodging, or both.
The same is true of the word hotel. It is defined by the same authority as "a house for entertaining travelers," "an inn or public house of the better class." It was, therefore, sufficient to aver that the appellee "was denied full and equal privileges and enjoyments of the accommodations, advantages," etc., of said inn or hotel, with other persons. But the averments do not stop here, for the complaint also alleges that the appellant failed and refused to allow the appellee to take lodging or meals at said inn or hotel. This is sufficiently specific to inform the appellant what accommodations, it is claimed, the appellee was deprived of.
The Federal Statute of the same import as our own, to which we have already referred, was interpreted, before it was held unconstitutional, as we interpret this. It was decided not necessary for the plaintiff in his complaint, in an action under that statute, to aver anything more than that the place was an inn, "as that is an ancient English word with a fixed and definite legal signification, and must be held to be so used in the statute." Lewis v. Hitchcock, 10 F. 4.
If, as appellant's counsel seem to insist, the appellant might not have been able, on account of lack of room, or other facilities, to entertain the appellee, this would be a matter of defense; but it is expressly averred that appellee was denied these rights and privileges because he was a negro or colored boy, and, hence, it could not have been true that he was turned away for the reason that the appellant was scarce of room or other accommodations. This defense would, therefore, have been available under the general denial.
Appellant's counsel further contend that inasmuch as the complaint shows the appellee to be under twenty-one years of age, it was incumbent upon him to allege and prove that the meals and lodging applied for were necessaries, etc. The appellant doubtless had the right to demand payment for his accommodations, in advance, and was not required to furnish them until satisfactory arrangements had been made to secure him therein. But it does not appear from any of the averments of the complaint, that appellee was refused the privileges of the hotel on account of his failure or refusal to prepay his fare. On the contrary, the sole reason for such refusal appears to have been his color. As we said in connection with the other objection to the complaint, if the appellant refused to receive the appellee into his hotel for any other reason than that of his color, this would be a matter of defense, and would probably be available under the general issue. Moreover, it is alleged that appellee was willing and able to comply with any and all lawful and reasonable rules of said inn or hotel, and this averment, we think, would exclude any supposition that appellee was debarred on account of failing or refusing to comply with such rules or regulations as the appellant had the right to make and did make.
It is true, as appellant's counsel contend, that penal statutes should receive a strict construction, but they should never be construed so as to defeat the objects for which they were enacted. This trite old rule, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania says has run into an aphorism, means no more than that acts shall not be brought within the scope of the punishment which the courts may suppose to fall within the spirit of the law, though not within its terms. Com. v. Cooke, 50 Pa. 201.
We have examined the complaint, with reference to all the objections urged against it, and our conclusion is that none of them is well taken.
The overruling of the motion for a new trial is assigned as error. One of the causes assigned in the motion for a new trial, is the overruling of the appellant's motion to suppress depositions. The motion to suppress was based upon the ground that the answers to the questions propounded elicited hearsay testimony only. The objection does not seem to have been made until the deposition was offered in evidence. Where, as in this case the objections appear on the face of the deposition, the motion to suppress must be made and a decision had before the beginning of the trial, or it will not be error to overrule such motion. Newman v. Manning, 89 Ind. 422. The same rule is applicable to other objections to the...
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