Fry v. Schroder

• Decision Date: 16 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 09A02–1206–CT–474.,09A02–1206–CT–474.
• Citation: 986 N.E.2d 821
• Parties: Loren H. FRY, Appellant–Defendant, v. Terry L. SCHRODER and Robert C. Schroder, Individually and as beneficiaries and personal representatives of the Estate of David H. Schroder, Appellees–Plaintiffs.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

986 N.E.2d 821

Loren H. FRY, Appellant–Defendant,

v.Terry L. SCHRODER and Robert C. Schroder, Individually and as beneficiaries and personal representatives of the Estate of David H. Schroder, Appellees–Plaintiffs.

No. 09A02–1206–CT–474.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Feb. 28, 2013.

Ordered Published April 16, 2013.

Jim Brugh, Logansport, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Andrew B. Miller, Starr Austen & Miller, LLP, Logansport, IN, Attorney for Appellees.

OPINION

KIRSCH, Judge.

Loren H. Fry (“Fry”) interlocutorily appeals the trial court's order denying his motion to stay the civil proceeding brought against him by Terry L. Schroder and Robert C. Schroder (collectively “the Schroders”), individually and as beneficiaries and personal representatives of the Estate of David H. Schroder. Fry raises the following restated issue for our review: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to stay the civil proceeding pending resolution of the criminal action against him.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Fry is a resident of Cass County, Indiana and owns real property in Cass County. On September 23, 2011, the State of Indiana filed its information for murder against Fry and alleged that Fry killed his neighbor, David H. Schroder (“David”), on September 20, 2011. On September 27, 2011, the Schroders filed a civil complaint against Fry, alleging that Fry intentionally inflicted emotional distress on David, intentionally caused harm to David by shooting him, and caused the wrongful death of David. Appellant's App. at 7–12. The Schroders also moved for an injunction to prevent Fry from transferring or encumbering his real property to preserve the property for availability to be used to pay damages to the Schroders and filed a lis pendens notice against Fry's land, which was later ordered stricken from the clerk's records.

On October 7, 2011, the Schroders served a request for admissions and interrogatories upon Fry at the Cass County Jail. Fry filed an objection to the request for admission and a motion to stay discovery in the civil proceeding until “the threat of the criminal prosecution of [Fry] passed.” Id. at 21. After the Schroders filed a response, the trial court issued an order, on March 21, 2012, temporarily staying the discovery related to Counts I, II, and III of the Schroders' complaint, which were the intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional battery, and wrongful death claims. On May 1, 2012, the trial court issued an order denying Fry's motion to stay the civil proceeding pending the resolution of his criminal case. In denying Fry's motion, the trial court concluded that the Schroders' interest in an expeditious resolution of the civil case outweighed the burden on Fry to choose between responding to the civil allegations or his right against self-incrimination. Id. at 91–92. In its order, the trial court also determined that there was no legal basis at that time to enter a preliminary injunction with respect to Fry's real property and dismissed Count IV of the Schroders' complaint. Id. at 4, 90. The trial court noted, in its order, that “should any of the factors which form the basis for this stay change the court will consider reversing this position.” Id. at 92. Fry now files this interlocutory appeal.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

We review a trial court's denial of a motion to stay under an abuse of discretionstandard. In re Stephen L. Chapman Irrevocable Trust Agreement, 953 N.E.2d 573, 577 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (citing Hilliard v. Jacobs, 927 N.E.2d 393, 403 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied ), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion is found only when the trial court's action is clearly erroneous, against the logic and effect of the facts before it and the inferences which may be drawn from it. In re A.K., 755 N.E.2d 1090, 1098 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). In reviewing discretionary motions, we will affirm the trial court's ruling if any evidence supports the trial court's decision or if there is any rational basis for the trial court's action. Baker Mach., Inc. v. Superior Canopy Corp., 883 N.E.2d 818, 821 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (emphasis added), trans. denied; Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. Merchs. Inv. Counseling, Inc., 451 N.E.2d 346, 349 (Ind.Ct.App.1983).

Fry argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to stay the civil proceeding against him pending the resolution in his criminal case. He contends that, although the United States Constitution does not ordinarily require a stay of civil proceedings pending the outcome of criminal proceedings, when proceedings arising from the same transactions or conduct are pending simultaneously, a trial court must consider several factors to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a stay is warranted. Fry asserts that, in the present case, a review of these factors show that the trial court did not properly consider and fully apply the factors because the stay was necessary to protect his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

While a trial court has the inherent power to stay its proceedings, the United States Constitution does not require a stay of civil proceedings pending the outcome of criminal proceedings. Jones v. City of Indianapolis, 216 F.R.D. 440, 450 (S.D.Ind.2003). However, a trial court may use its discretion to determine whether to stay civil proceedings when the “interests of justice” require such action. Id. at 450–51. “The ultimate question, therefore, is ‘whether the court should exercise its discretion in order to avoid placing the defendants in the position of having to choose between risking a loss in their civil cases by invoking their Fifth Amendment rights, or risking conviction in their criminal cases by waiving their Fifth Amendment rights and testifying in the civil proceedings.’ ” Id. at 451 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In deciding whether to stay civil proceedings where a similar criminal action is brought before the completion of the civil proceedings, a court may consider a variety of factors. Id. They include: (1) the interest of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously with the litigation or any particular aspect of it, and the potential prejudice to the plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden which any particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on the defendant; (3) the convenience of the court in the management of its cases, and the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the...