Frye v. Frye

• Court: Kansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: JOHNSTON, C. J.
• Citation: Frye v. Frye, 134 Kan. 3, 4 P.2d 415 (Kan. 1931)
• Decision Date: 07 November 1931
• Docket Number: 29742.
• Parties: FRYE v. FRYE.

4 P.2d 415

134 Kan. 3

FRYE v. FRYE.

No. 29742.

Supreme Court of Kansas

November 7, 1931

Syllabus by the Court.

To warrant granting divorce, there must be corroborating evidence of testimony given by complaining spouse as to delinquencies of defending spouse (Rev. St. 1923, 60--1509).

Evidence of plaintiff's good reputation is insufficient corroborating evidence of plaintiff's testimony to authorize granting of divorce (Rev. St. 1923, 60--1509).

Under Rev. St. 60--1509, which provides, "That nothing in this act shall be construed as authorizing the granting of a decree of divorce upon the uncorroborated testimony of either husband or wife, or both of them," there must be corroborating evidence of the testimony given by the complaining spouse as to the delinquencies of the defending spouse alleged as grounds for the divorce.

Evidence of the good reputation of the plaintiff as to his character and reputation, is not sufficient to constitute the corroboration required by the statute.

Appeal from District Court, Marshall County; Fred R. Smith, Judge.

Action for divorce by George Frye against Frances Frye. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Reversed with directions.

N. J Wollard, of Kansas City, and Edgar C. Bennett, of Marysville for appellant.

R. L Helvering and Raymond E. Smith, both of Marysville, for appellee.

JOHNSTON C. J.

This is an appeal by Frances Frye, from a judgment granting her husband, George Frye, a divorce based on the ground that she had been guilty of gross neglect of duty. No other ground of divorce was alleged by him. He introduced evidence in support of his allegation, and at the close of the testimony the defendant claimed there was an insufficiency of proof to establish the ground charged and filed a demurrer to plaintiff's evidence which was overruled. Defendant introduced no evidence but stood upon her demurrer, whereupon the court entered judgment for plaintiff.

The defendant's main contention is that while plaintiff himself gave testimony of some defaults on the part of the wife, they did not constitute gross neglect of duty, but the ground relied on for reversal was that plaintiff's testimony, which was the only testimony touching the ground for divorce, had not been corroborated as it must be, to warrant the granting of a divorce in such a situation. Defendant invoked the rule of the statute requiring the corroboration of the testimony which provides: "In all actions for divorce or alimony, or for both divorce and alimony, hereafter to be tried, the parties thereto, or either of them, shall be competent to testify upon all material matters involved in the controversy to the same extent as other witnesses might do: Provided, however, That nothing in this act shall be construed as authorizing the granting...