Frymire v. Ampex Corp., s. 94-1059
| Decision Date | 19 July 1995 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 94-1059,94-1090,s. 94-1059 |
| Citation | 61 F.3d 757 |
| Parties | 130 Lab.Cas. P 11,413, 10 IER Cases 1473 Carolyn FRYMIRE, John H. Olson, Jerry Robinett, C. Dean Steppler, Michael E. Lutz, Mark J. Maccerella, Gordon McManus, David R. Berg, Richard C. Goin, Michael C. Shannon, Phyllis Martinez, James Platt, Arthur D. Wood, Jr., Frank Boerner, Diana Madsen, E. Charles Robinson, Fred Ammermann, Sharon Canales, LaJuana Bremer, Donald N. Tow, Donald R. Suit, Shirley L. Knott, Dave Ruby, Mark C. Yarns, Howell E. Shepard, Shirley S. Elliott, Robert B. Wood, James W. McWilliams, Kent G. Karper, Richard Alderman, Tom Carley, Rose Roybal, Kenneth W. Brown, Juanita B. Nichols, Bonnie Staton, Carolyn J. Newland, Robert Wallace, Daniel J. Silva, Jeannette A. Portrey, Jack Evans, Leslie Gene Ward, James F. Soule, Jr., Mary Jane Kimmel, Mitsuko Smelker, Judy Hoyle, Lauri Gloria, Art Baca, Sue M. Harrison, Randy W. Lee, Robert M. Pucci, Jr., Michael Gorham, Paul A. Hann, Jo Ann Hann, Doyle McAlister, Glen Meissner, Joanne Gianni, Paul Box, JoAnne M. Runstadler, Bobby Vanlandingham, Christopher Jacobsen, Robert Kalkman, Jeffrey Foerster, Douglas Dow, Steven Mohr, Daniel Greenleaf, Cecilia Cordova, David Blair, Robert Salazar, Chris Caceres, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. AMPEX CORPORATION, a California Corporation, and Ampex Systems Corporation, a Delaware Corporation and successor in interest to Ampex Corporation, Appellant/Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Barney Iuppa of Iuppa, Simons & Martin, Colorado Springs, CO, for appellees/cross-appellants.
Joseph A. Schwachter (John C. Fish, Jr. of Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff, Tichy & Mathiason, San Francisco, CA and Cecil R. Hedger of Harding & Ogborn, Denver, CO, with him on the brief) of Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff, Tichy & Mathiason, San Francisco, CA, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Before KELLY, BRIGHT, * and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.
Frymire and eighty-four other employees ("Plaintiffs") of Ampex Corporation ("Ampex") brought this action against Ampex, alleging violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act ("WARN"), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 2101-2109. The WARN Act requires large employers who are either closing a plant or instituting mass layoffs to provide sixty-days advance notice to those employees who will be laid off or who will have their hours substantially reduced. After a bench trial, the district court 1 determined that Ampex had violated the notice requirements of WARN and instituted a judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs totalling $577,728.23 in damages, post-judgment interest and attorneys fees. 2 See Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 858 F.Supp. 1081 (D.Colo.1994).
Ampex raises six issues on appeal: (1) the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow Ampex to amend its complaint to raise a statute of limitations defense, and erred as a matter of law in applying Colorado's three-year contract limitations period to Plaintiffs' WARN claim, as opposed to the National Labor Relations Act's six-month limitations period for Sec. 10(b) claims; (2) the district court erred in its determination that the Video Systems facility and Recording Systems facility constituted two separate "single sites of employment" and thus erred in concluding that Ampex violated WARN; (3) the district court abused its discretion in not reducing Ampex's liability for its "good faith" efforts to comply with WARN's requirements; (4) the district court erred in not reducing Ampex's liability by the amount of "pay in lieu of notice" benefits distributed to each Plaintiff; (5) the district court erred as a matter of law in using "calendar days," and not "work days," in calculating the Plaintiffs' back pay damages; and (6) the district court erred in awarding Plaintiffs prejudgment interest.
In its cross-appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in not counting thirty-one temporary employees for purposes of determining the threshold liability amount required by WARN. We do not reach this issue.
Several of the WARN issues present matters of first impression in this circuit. After careful consideration, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to appropriately reduce the damages awarded against Ampex.
Ampex Corporation designs, engineers, manufactures and markets highly sophisticated electronic audio and video recording products. Headquartered in Redwood City, California Ampex has several manufacturing plants around the country, including one in Colorado Springs, Colorado, which is the subject of this cause of action. At the Colorado Springs facility, Ampex is further divided into two separate, wholly owned subsidiaries. Ampex Recording Systems Corporation ("RSC") produces recording devices that are comparable, albeit in more highly technical form, to one's home videocassette recorder. Ampex Video Systems Corporation ("VSC") produces computer-generated animation, graphics and special effects equipment, as well as switchers and editing equipment.
Historically, the employees at the Colorado Springs campus worked in one building located at 600 Wooten Road and were part of one division within the Ampex corporate structure--the Audio/Video Systems Division. In 1988, Ampex divided the Audio/Video Systems Division into two separate divisions, and in 1989, Ampex separately incorporated them into VSC and RSC. In February 1990, Ampex moved VSC into a separate building located approximately 150 feet from the RSC building.
In many respects, the two corporations, although geographically almost contiguous, still functioned separately. First, RSC and VSC had, by and large, separate management teams. Second, the two corporations had no employees in common. And although certain employees were employed by one corporation while providing services to both corporations, their numbers were small. Finally, each corporation produced separate and distinct products which, while designed to work together and often marketed together, were nevertheless frequently sold separately and incorporated into the audio/video systems of Ampex's competitors. Despite these divisions, however, there still existed a sufficient amount of interfacing between the two corporations on both a formal and informal basis to suggest at least some unity and common design.
The events most relevant to this appeal took place in the latter part of 1990, approximately six months after Ampex housed RSC and VSC in separate buildings. On September 17, 1990, Ampex's then-President, Ron Ritchie, informed all Ampex employees that despite considerable operating improvements the company would have to eliminate a number of positions in the coming months. On November 13, 1990, Ritchie updated his employees, informing them that the company would have to eliminate approximately 350 positions by the first quarter of the year with some layoffs occurring immediately. Finally, on January 24, 1991, Ampex issued termination notices to the Plaintiffs and informed them that they would be entitled to Ampex's "pay in lieu of notice" benefits, pursuant to company policy.
Ampex's "pay in lieu of notice" policy, instituted months before WARN was enacted, provided that employees who were fired without advance notice would still receive regular wages and benefits for a period of time commensurate with each employee's length of service. Additionally, Ampex provided each of its dismissed employees two-days worth of job placement counseling, including resume assistance and job search strategizing.
Despite these benefits, dismissed employees from both the VSC and RSC facilities brought this action against Ampex, claiming they were entitled to sixty-days advance notice and, not having received such notice, sixty-days worth of back pay. Pursuant to Ampex's motion for summary judgment, the district court ruled that the two facilities constituted separate "single sites of employment" and granted Ampex summary judgment as to those Plaintiffs who were employed by RSC as not meeting WARN's threshold requirement. However, because the percentage of VSC employees laid off exceeded WARN's threshold dismissal rate, see Sec. 2101(a)(3), the court denied Ampex's motion as to these employees/Plaintiffs. Frymire v. Ampex Corp., No. 91-S-1858 (D.Colo. Sept. 14, 1992) (order). The court subsequently denied Ampex's motion for reconsideration and in an order filed February 26, 1993, granted class certification to the Plaintiffs.
This matter proceeded to trial and on January 7, 1994, the district court issued its opinion holding Ampex liable under the WARN Act and assessing damages. See Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 858 F.Supp. 1081 (D.Colo.1994). This appeal followed.
As an initial matter, we must determine whether Plaintiffs' cause of action is time-barred. Ampex first raised the time-bar issue in its Rule 15(a) 3 motion for leave to amend its defense. There, Ampex contended that Plaintiffs' WARN Act claim was barred under the applicable statute of limitations borrowed from Sec. 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b). Both parties agree that approximately nine months elapsed between the time that this cause of action accrued, January 24, 1991, and Plaintiffs filed suit, October 24, 1991. The NLRA establishes a six-month statute of limitations period and if applicable to WARN would render this suit dismissable.
After reviewing Ampex's motion, the district court refused to apply the NLRA limitations and instead determined that the three-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims in Colorado provided a more appropriate analogy to Plaintiffs' WARN claim. Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 821 F.Supp. 651, 654-55 (D.Colo.1993) (citing Colo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 13-80-101(1)(a)). Accordingly, the court denied Ampex's Rule...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Commercial Financial Services, Inc.
...action corresponded to a breach of contract action for the purpose of borrowing a state statute of limitations. See Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 764 (10th Cir.1995). The Tenth Circuit panel reasoned that (1) "borrowing a universally recognized cause of action, such as a contract act......
-
In re Jamesway Corp.
...(8th Cir.1998) cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 276, 142 L.Ed.2d 228 (1998); Saxion, 86 F.3d at 558-561; Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 771-772 (10th Cir.1995) ("Frymire"); Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1282-1286. Like those courts, we adopt the Dillard court's reasoning in utilizing a "wor......
-
Dery v. Karafa (In re Dearborn Bancorp, Inc.)
...whether such an award would serve to compensate the prevailing party and is equitable under the circumstances. See Frymire v. Ampex Corp. , 61 F.3d 757, 774 (10th Cir. 1995) ; Floyd v. Dunson, D/B/A MMD (In re Ramirez Rodriguez ), 209 B.R. 424, 434 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1997). A prejudgment int......
-
Kephart v. Data Systems Intern., Inc., CIV. A.01-2533-KHV.
...during any 30-day period for 50 or more employees excluding any part-time employees. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2); see Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 764 (10th Cir. 1995). Plaintiffs claim that the terminations constituted a plant closing because (1) DSI shut down the CHR unit nationwide by......