Fuchilla v. Layman

• Decision Date: 27 May 1986
• Citation: 510 A.2d 281,210 N.J.Super. 574
• Parties: , 52 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1584, 33 Ed. Law Rep. 275 Anne FUCHILLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William A. LAYMAN, M.D., University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey and the Board of Trustees of the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 574

210 N.J.Super. 574

510 A.2d 281, 52 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1584,

33 Ed. Law Rep. 275

Anne FUCHILLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William A. LAYMAN, M.D., University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey and the Board of Trustees of the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey Defendants-Respondents.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued April 29, 1986.

Decided May 27, 1986.

James M. Burns, Woodbridge, for plaintiff-appellant (Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, attorneys; James M. Burns, of counsel and on brief).

Douglass L. Derry, Deputy Atty. Gen., for defendants-respondents (W. Cary Edwards, Atty. Gen., attorney, James J. Ciancia, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel; Douglass L. Derry, Deputy Atty. Gen., on brief).

W. Cary Edwards, Atty. Gen., filed a brief amicus curiae for Div. on Civil Rights (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel; Susan L. Reisner, Deputy Atty. Gen., on brief).

Before Judges DREIER, BILDER and GRUCCIO.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

DREIER, J.A.D.

Plaintiff has appealed from a Law Division summary judgment dismissing her claims against her public employer, The University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ). She demanded damages for sexual harassment, asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq., and the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, as well as equitable relief. Plaintiff apparently failed, however, to comply with the 90-day notice provision of the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. ¹ Plaintiff asserted in the trial court that the Tort Claims Act filing provisions were inapplicable to claims made under both the Law Against Discrimination and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. The trial judge held to the contrary and dismissed her complaint. We disagree and reverse.

I

The Law Against Discrimination is directed at ending discrimination in employment and public accommodations, N.J.S.A. 10:5-3 and 10:5-4. The Act sets forth a detailed mechanism of procedures and remedies and envisions either utilization of conciliation and administrative law procedures or a Superior Court action, each generally exclusive of the other while pending. N.J.S.A. 10:5-13, 10:5-27. ²

N.J.S.A. 59:1-2, the legislative preamble to the Tort Claims Act, declares "to be the public policy of this State that public entities shall only be liable for their negligence within the limitations of this act...." (Emphasis added). The Act is broader in scope than this initial legislative declaration, in that it includes redress for an "injury," defined in N.J.S.A. 59:1-3 as "death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property or any other injury that a person may suffer that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person." To determine whether the Legislature intended that a violation of the Law Against Discrimination would constitute an "injury" subject to the Tort Claims Act, we must analyze both the Law Against Discrimination and the Tort Claims Act.

We find that a discrimination claim is dissimilar to those envisioned by the Legislature to be included within the coverage of the Tort Claims Act. ³ In Lloyd v. Stone Harbor, 179 N.J.Super. 496, 511-12, 432 A.2d 572 (Ch.Div.1981), Judge Haines properly found that a tort claim based upon a violation of the New Jersey Constitution was subject to the notice provision of the Tort Claims Act. Such a finding, however, does not lead to the conclusion that a Law Against Discrimination claim is to be similarly constrained. The Law Against Discrimination's self-contained notice provisions, conciliation periods, mutual exclusivity of the judicial or administrative remedy while such remedy is being pursued, and the usual mixed injunctive and compensatory relief sought in an anti-discrimination suit govern those claims to the exclusion of any other time or notice provisions, including those of the Tort Claims Act.

We note also, that the Tort Claims Act provides no immunity for willful or malicious acts caused either by the employee or the entity itself. The Tort Claims Act in N.J.S.A. 59:3-14a and b permits personal liability and full recovery against a public employee for the results of actual malice or willful misconduct. N.J.S.A. 59:2-10 forbids only vicarious liability for such conduct on the part of a public entity. Discriminatory conduct actionable under the Law Against Discrimination is more akin to the malicious or willful acts exempted from the Tort Claims Act than the negligently or similarly inflicted injuries covered thereby.

We realize that our decision is in conflict with this court's recent opinion in Healey v. Dover Tp., 208 N.J.Super. 679, 506 A.2d 824 (App.Div.1986). Although it might be possible to distinguish Healey, we would have to strain to do so. ⁴ We, therefore, must indicate our disagreement with the result there reached.

Our decision is buttressed by Snipes v. Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760 (Ct.App.1983), interpreting the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. When a similar claim was made that plaintiff had failed to file a timely notice under the California Tort Claims Act, the California Court of Appeals agreed that such actions were exempted from the Tort Claims Act's notice requirements. 193 Cal.Rptr. at 762-765. See also Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 173 Cal.App.3d 701, 219 Cal.Rptr. 544, 549-50 (Ct.App.1985). We recognize that the administrative remedy in California was exclusive, whereas as noted earlier, a New Jersey plaintiff has the choice between administrative and judicial relief. However, since claims in New Jersey may be discontinued in one forum and then pursued in the other, the exclusivity of the California remedy should not dilute the persuasiveness of the California authorities.

II

The trial judge generally barred "plaintiff's claims." By this we must assume that he intended to bar not only the Law Against Discrimination claims discussed in part I of this opinion, but also the Federal Civil Rights claims authorized by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

Defendants raise a threshold question which, although not argued below, we elect to consider. It could provide a basis for sustaining the trial judge's action, since it would render unnecessary a substantive decision on the Tort Claims Act issue. Defendants contend that neither the University nor its Board of Trustees qualifies as a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 which by its terms only forbids denial of a citizen's civil rights by any "person." Thus defendants argue that the University and Trustees are not subject to liability under federal law.

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), held the State and its subdivisions free from liability under § 1983. Monroe was overruled, however, insofar as local agencies were concerned in Monell v. N.Y. City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), which adopted the rule that local governing bodies and local officials joined in their official capacities could be sued for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief. We need not resolve the jurisdictional question of whether Monell signalled a complete abrogation of state immunity from § 1983 actions, even in state courts. See Wolcher, "Sovereign Immunity and The Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violation," 61 Cal.L.Rev. 189 (1981). That issue is of no moment here, since it is apparent from the statutes controlling the organization of the UMDNJ, N.J.S.A. 18A:64G-1 et seq., that it is an autonomous governmental agency rather than an alter ego of the State. ⁵ UMDMJ's predecessor, the College of Medicine and Dentistry, was held to be autonomous and hence not a State agency in DeAngelis v. Addonizio, 103 N.J.Super. 238, 253, 247 A.2d 39 (Law Div.1968). After the College's merger with the Rutgers School of Medicine in 1970 the new entity became known as the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey. The key attributes noted in DeAngelis weighing in favor of independence from direct State control are still present in the merged institution.

We next turn to the issue of whether the Tort Claims Act notice requirements may be applied to bar a § 1983 claim. As noted in Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1509 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. den. sub nom. District of Columbia v. Brown, 471 U.S. 1073, 105 S.Ct. 2153, 85 L.Ed.2d 509 (1985), "the overwhelming majority of federal and state courts that have confronted the issue" have precluded state tort claims notice provisions from barring federal § 1983 rights.

On the other hand, there is no question that a reasonable and generally applicable statute of limitations may be applied to determine whether a § 1983 claim is stale. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254, 260 (1985). As noted in Brown, however, a notice of claim is an impermissible precondition to suit as opposed to a limitation of action. 742 F.2d at 1508. To borrow such a state restriction would be to add an unwarranted element to a federal right of action. Ibid. Thus in Brown the court held that the plaintiff's noncompliance with the notice-of-claim provision was no bar to his federal remedy. Id. at 1509-10. See also Williams v. Allen, 616 F.Supp. 653, 658 (E.D.N.Y.1985); Burroughs v. Holiday Inn, 606 F.Supp. 629, 630 (W.D.N.Y.1985); Spencer v. Seagoville, 700 S.W.2d 953, 955-56 (Tex.App.1985); Firestone v. Fritz, 119 Ill.App.3d 685, 75 Ill.Dec. 83, 87, 456 N.E.2d 904, 908 (Ill.App.1983).

A minority view is represented by decisions from Indiana and New York. See Indiana Dept. of Public Welfare v. Clark, 478 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind.App.1985) (terming the notice provision "a procedural precondition to sue" which "overrides the procedural framework of § 1983 when the litigant chooses a state court forum"), and Mills v. Monroe Cty., 59 N.Y.2d 307, 451 N.E.2d 456, 464 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711 (Ct.App.1983), ...