Fuentes v. Griffin

Decision Date15 July 2016
Docket NumberDocket No. 14-3878,August Term, 2015
PartiesJose Alex Fuentes, Petitioner–Appellant, v. T. Griffin, Superintendent, Respondent–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Colleen P. Cassidy, New York, New York (Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., Appeals Bureau, New York, New York, on the brief), for PetitionerAppellant.

Amy Appelbaum, Assistant District Attorney, Brooklyn, New York (Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney of Kings County, Leonard Joblove, Assistant District Attorney, Brooklyn, New York, on the brief), for RespondentAppellee.

Before: KEARSE, STRAUB, and WESLEY, Circuit Judges.

Judge Wesley

dissents in a separate opinion.

KEARSE

, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Jose Alex Fuentes, a New York State (“State”) prisoner convicted of rape in the first degree and sodomy in the first degree, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Sandra L. Townes, Judge , denying his amended petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the prosecution suppressed a psychiatric record of an evaluation of the complainant, in violation of Fuentes's due process rights, see Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and that Fuentes's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to prepare cross-examination or call expert witnesses to counter expert testimony introduced by the prosecution. The district court denied the petition on the ground that the State courts' rejections of Fuentes's constitutional claims were neither contrary to nor unreasonable applications of clearly established federal law, the standard set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). On appeal, Fuentes contends principally that the rejection by the New York Court of Appeals of his Brady claim was an unreasonable application of the materiality standard established by Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), and that the decision of the Kings County Supreme Court—the highest State court to address his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on the merits—was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). For the reasons that follow, we conclude, without need to assess the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that Fuentes's petition should have been granted with respect to the Brady claim. The contents of the suppressed psychiatric record provided information with which to impeach the complaining witness and to support the defendant's version of the events. The New York Court of Appeals, as the State concedes, misread the psychiatric record. And although the State argues that the error was harmless, the Court's conclusion that suppression of the document had no prejudicial effect resulted from its lack of understanding of what the psychiatric record stated, along with its failure to balance the evidence in light of the record as a whole and its inability to appreciate the import of the document in the unique context of this case, where (a) the issue was not whether an alleged rapist was the defendant but instead whether what occurred was a rape rather than a sexual encounter in which the complainant participated willingly, (b) the complainant provided the only evidence that what occurred was a crime, and (c) the withheld document was the only evidence by which the defense could have impeached the complainant's credibility as to her mental state. We reverse the decision of the district court and instruct that a new judgment be entered, ordering that Fuentes be released unless the State affords him a new trial within 90 days.

I. BACKGROUND

The present case arises out of the alleged sexual assault by Fuentes on a woman—referred to herein as “G.C.”—on the roof of her apartment building in the early morning hours of January 27, 2002. It is undisputed that Fuentes and G.C. had oral and vaginal intercourse on that roof; but the only persons present were G.C. and Fuentes, and the issue for trial was whether the sex was consensual. As set out in greater detail below, G.C., who was 22 years old in January 2002, testified that in the wee hours of January 27 she had gone to an arcade with friends; that a few hours later she left with the same friends to go home; and that when she exited the subway alone near her home, a stranger—later identified as Fuentes—followed her home, threatened her with a knife, and raped and sodomized her. In contrast, Fuentes, 23 years old in January 2002, testified that he and G.C. had met in a bar at the arcade, hit it off, left together, went to G.C.'s building for the mutual purpose of having sex, and had done so; however, when G.C. suggested that they see each other again and Fuentes demurred, she became angry and self-deprecating and said he would be sorry. The principal issue on this appeal is whether Fuentes was denied a fair trial by the prosecution's nondisclosure of the psychiatric record made with respect to G.C. later on January 27.

A. The State's Evidence at Trial

The State's trial evidence included G.C.'s medical records and the testimony of several witnesses. In addition to G.C., the State's witnesses included one of the friends who had been with G.C. at the arcade on January 27, two police officers, and expert witnesses.

1. G.C.'s Testimony

G.C. testified that just after midnight on January 27 she, her friend Tammy Little (or “Tammy”), and Tammy's sister, cousin, and mother were in Manhattan at an arcade in Times Square. Some three hours later, G.C. and her friends left to go home to Brooklyn by subway. At the appropriate stop, G.C. left the others and switched to a G train to the Flushing Avenue station, near the Marcy Projects where she lived with her mother and three sisters. While walking home from that subway station, G.C. noticed a man—identified at trial as Fuentes—walking behind her.

When G.C. entered her building, Fuentes followed her inside. Having “a bad feeling,” G.C. declined to get into the building's elevator with Fuentes, intending to use it after he had used it. (Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) 368-69.) However, when the elevator returned to the ground floor, Fuentes was still inside. He appeared to be exiting, but as G.C. was entering, he pushed her in and followed her; Fuentes put a knife to her neck, and told her, ‘don't do nothing stupid or I'll cut you.’ (Id . at 369–70.) They took the elevator to the sixth floor, the top floor and the floor on which G.C.'s apartment was located; they then walked up a flight of stairs to the roof. Once on the roof, Fuentes forced G.C. to engage in oral and vaginal sex. G.C. did not see a condom and did not recall that one was used. (See id . at 375, 426.)

They then took the stairs and elevator down, with Fuentes holding his knife to G.C.'s neck. After they exited the building, Fuentes put the knife away, put his arm around G.C.'s shoulders as if she “was his girlfriend,” and “asked [G.C.] to walk with him to the train station.” (Id . at 377.) On the way, Fuentes apologized and said he was going through something.” (Id . at 377–78.) Fuentes told G.C. his mother was from Honduras, and G.C. testified that she “must have” told him she too was Honduran. (Id . at 403.) Fuentes told G.C. his name was “Alex.” (Id . at 378, 428.)

When they arrived at the subway station and went down the stairs, Fuentes took G.C.'s cell phone, powered it down, wiped its surface, and returned it to her. He warned G.C. not to call the police. (See id . at 379.) When Fuentes asked G.C. ‘which side goes to Queens?’ she informed him they were on the wrong side; they went back up to the street, and Fuentes crossed to the side on which the G train goes to Queens. (See id .)

G.C. watched Fuentes descend toward the Queens-bound platform; she then walked back to her apartment and went to sleep. (See id . at 380–81.) She did not tell her mother she had been raped. Asked why, G.C. responded, [b]ecause she wouldn't have believed me.” (Id . at 381.)

When G.C. awoke around noon, she got dressed and went to Tammy's home, where she told Tammy and Tammy's sister and mother that she had been raped. After about an hour, G.C. left and went to Woodhull Hospital and reported that she had been raped. A rape kit was prepared, and hospital personnel informed the police. (See id . at 383.) G.C. described her attacker to the police.

2. Testimony of Tammy Little

Tammy Little, G.C.'s good friend since high school, testified that she, her mother, and her sister were at the arcade in Times Square with G.C. in the early morning hours of January 27; Tammy testified that the four of them eventually left Manhattan together via subway. (See Tr. 501-02). Tammy did not see Fuentes that night, nor did she see G.C. talk to any men while they were at the arcade. (See id . at 504–05.)

Tammy testified that G.C. came to her house in the afternoon on January 27 and told Tammy and Tammy's mother that she had been raped “when she was home, she was going into the building.” (Id . at 503.) Tammy testified that G.C. did not provide any other details; she “didn't tell [them] she got raped at knifepoint” (id . at 507):

Q. And when she told you she got raped, what did she say to you? What did she say?
A. That was it, that she was raped.

(Id .) In response, Tammy and her mother were in shock, did not tell G.C. to call the police, and said nothing. (See id . (“I didn't say anything.”).) G.C. departed; Tammy did not know where she went (see id . at 504):

Q. So she came in, told you she was raped and just left?
A. Yes.

(Id . at 508.)

3. Police Witness Testimony

Police officer Kevin Fedynak and his partner interviewed G.C. at Woodhull Hospital on January 27. Fedynak testified that G.C. described her attacker as a well-dressed “male Hispanic, light skin, about six foot two, 200 pounds, going by the name of Alex.” (Tr. 456; see id . at 465.)

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